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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Executive Summary provides an overview of the ~nethodology being used by the Yucca 
Mountain Project (YMP) to design waste packages and ancillary components. This summary 
information is intended for readers with general interest, but also provides technical readers a 
general framework surrounding a variety of technical de:tails provided in the main body of the 
report. 
The purpose of this report is to document and ensure appropriate design methods are used in the 
design of waste packages and ancillary components (the drip shields and emplacement pallets). 
The methodology includes identification of necessary design inputs, justification of design 
assumptions, and use of appropriate analysis methods ,and computational tools. This design 
work is subject to Quality Assurance Requirements and Llescription. The document is primarily 
intended for internal use and technical guidance for a variety of design activities. It is recognized 
that a wide audience including project management, the 'U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others are interested to various levels of detail in the 
design methods and therefore covers a wide range of topics at varying levels of detail. Due to 
the preliminary nature of the design, readers can expect to encounter varied levels of detail in the 
body of the report. It is expected that technical information used as input to design documents 
will be verified and taken from the latest versions of reference sources given herein. 
This revision of the methodology report has evolved with changes in the waste package, drip 
shield, and emplacement pallet designs over many years and may be further revised as the design 
is finalized. Different components and analyses are at different stages of development. Some 
parts of the report are detailed, while other less detailfed parts are likely to undergo further 
refinement. The design methodology is intended to provide designs that satisfy the safety and 
operational requirements of the YMP. Four waste package configurations have been selected to 
illustrate the application of the methodology during the licensing process. These four 
configurations are the 21-pressurized water reactor absorber plate waste package (21-PWRAP), 
the 44-boiling water reactor waste package (44-BWR), the 5 defense high-level radioactive 
waste (HLW) DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) codisposal short waste package (5-DHLWDOE 
SNF Short), and the naval canistered SNF long waste pac:kage (Naval SNF Long). Design work 
for the other six waste packages will be completed at a later date using the same design 
methodology. These include the 24-boiling water reactor waste package (24-BWR), the 21- 
pressurized water reactor control rod waste package (21-PWRCR), the 12-pressurized water 
reactor waste package (12-PWR), the 5 defense HLW DOE SNF codisposal long waste package 
(5-DHLWDOE SNF Long), the 2 defense HLW DOE SNF codisposal waste package 
(2-MC012-DHLW), and the naval canistered SNF short waste package (Naval SNF Short). 
This report is only part of the complete design description. Other reports related to the design 
include the design reports, the waste package system description documents, manufacturing 
specifications, and numerous documents for the many detailed calculations. The relationships 
between this report and other design documents are showri in Figure 1. 
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Overview of the Preliminary Waste Package Component Designs 
Figure 2 shows a typical emplacement drift in the reposjitory with waste packages beneath drip 
shields sitting on emplacement pallets, which rest on the steel invert structure. The invert 
structure will be filled with crushed tuff (ballast is not shown in Figure 2). This report applies to 
ten specific waste package configurations and the ancillary components (i.e., the drip shields and 
emplacement pallets). Different waste package configurations are designed for different waste 
forms and have different diameters, lengths, and internall structural arrangements. The internal 
structures not only separate waste assemblies but also provide thermal shunts for heat removal 
and neutron absorbers for criticality control. The waste plackages are supported by emplacement 
pallets and protected from dripping water and rockfall in t.he post-closure period by drip shields. 
The fundamental design of the waste packages is a dual cylinder comprised of an inner vessel 
and an outer corrosion barrier. The bottom end of the waste package has two lids, one for the 
inner vessel and one for the outer corrosion barrier. The top end of the waste package has three 
lids, one for the inner vessel and two for the outer corrosion barrier. Removable trunnion collars 
(not shown in Figure 2) and sleeves at the ends of the waste package provide an interface for 
lifting and handling operations. 
Design Methodology 
Design methodology can be viewed simply as (1) gathering all the design input information; 
(2) making reasonable assumptions; and (3) selecting analyses methods and computational tools, 
and (4) defining how design criteria are satisfied. Each of these parts of design methodology is 
quite extensive and discussed in subsequent detail in this report. The results of specific 
calculations and analyses performed using the design methodology are reported in the specific 
calculations. 
Design Inputs 
The inputs to waste package component design include design requirements, technical 
information, and project interfaces. Reference sources for design inputs are documented in the 
body of this report. 
Requirements-Top level requirements originate from the DOE and are presented in Project 
Requirements Document. Regulations such as 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 1566051 are included in 
project level requirements. Design requirements for the geologic repository flow down to design 
requirements in system description documents for waste package components. 
Criteria-The numeric values and other measures whereby satisfaction of the design 
requirements is demonstrated. The criteria are presented in the Project Design Criteria 
Document. 
Technical Information-Technical information includes physical dimensions, material 
properties, and radionuclide content. Differences in the physical forms, irradiation histories, and 
measured radionuclide content, among the commercial SNF, DOE SNF, and HLW are used to 
generate source terms for pressurized water reactor (PVirR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) 
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commercial SNF, DOE SNF, and defense HLW. S1:ructural and thermal calculations use 
standard mechanical and thermal properties. 
Interfaces-Waste package component designs interface with other parts of the YMP, include 
ties to fabrication and handling facilities, preclosu~re safety analysis, and performance 
assessment. Some parts of the facilities design are in an early stage at the present time and will 
not be complete at the time of the License Application submittal. Additional design analysis will 
be performed, if necessary, as the facilities design matures and risks are evaluated. 
Assumptions 
Design Assumptions-These may be divided into two categories. The first category consists of 
generic assumptions that can be part of a calculation process or computational tool. The second 
category of assumptions is specific assumptions related to a particular analysis or calculation. 
The generic assumptions are detailed in the body of this report as well as some specific 
assumptions where more detail is needed for technical clarification of particular design issues. 
Source Term Assumptions-Commercial SNF source terms are approximated by calculating 
source terms for generic PWR and BWR assemblies at incremental enrichments and burnups and 
a generic burnup history (without the modeling of outages, intermittent down times, etc.) for fuel 
depletion calculations. The Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) Mark B 15 x 15 PWR fuel assembly is 
selected as the generic PWR lattice for analysis. This lattice has a high initial heavy metal 
loading and large amounts of stainless steel and Inconel assembly hardware, maximizing fission 
product generation and activation of structural hardware. For BWR commercial SNF, a General 
Electric (GE) 8 x 8 BWR fuel assembly is used. This design has a high initial heavy metal 
loading and an adequate amount of fuel assembly hardware data. For PWR and BWR fuel, 
conservatively high fuel mass is added as increased length rather than to increase density. An 
average uniform specific power over the entire length of the assembly is assumed, and the total 
irradiation interval is determined as the ratio of the assembly burnup to the specific power. It is 
assumed that the source terms can be generated for an array of various enrichments, burnups, and 
decay times and that interpolation can then be used to obtain the source terms of any specific 
assemblies in the waste stream without requiring explicit modeling of the assemblies. DOE SNF 
source terms are based on radionuclide inventories for several representative fuel types in the 
DOE SNF waste stream. For the defense HLW, historical information regarding the inventory at 
the various sites is used in decay calculations to generate initial radionuclide inventories. 
Structural Analysis Assumptions-For a few materials, structural properties are not available 
but properties for materials with very similar compositions are available and are used in their 
place. Structural calculations are based on uniform strain. and ne lect strain rate effects. During B handling and lifting, accelerations are assumed to equal 1.0 m/s (total upward acceleration of 
10.81 m/s2 including gravity). Commonly used assumptions are made for friction coefficients. 
Geometric assumptions are required for missile impact and drop calculations and to evaluate a 
collapsed drift. Crack evaluations assume single crack propagation. Burst evaluations assume 
the inner lid fails first. 
Thermal Analysis Assumptions-Thermal  evaluation,^ used in waste package component 
analysis use several geometric scales and assumptions appropriate to the scale of the analysis 
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made. At the largest scale, pillar modeling used for a three-dimensional analysis assumes an 
average drift segment. Water movement is ignored in the conduction only model with a specific 
heat adjustment to account for latent heat of water as rock temperatures pass through the boiling 
point. At the waste package scale, a two-dimensional .analysis is performed at the mid-plane 
using the highest heat load peaking factor and ignoring axial conduction. An effective 
conductivity is used for the fuel assemblies. 
Shielding and Criticality Analysis Assumptions-The composition of fresh fuel is used to 
represent the attenuation properties of spent fuel in shieldling calculations. Because the radiation 
source terms assume burnup is uniformly distributed within a SNF assembly, an axial peaking 
factor is used for shielding analysis near the active fuel region. For three-dimensional shielding 
calculations, the contents and radiation sources of each .waste type are uniformly homogenized 
with the internal structural components. Criticality methods make conservative assumptions 
concerning burnup, moderator properties, and poison distributions. 
Analysis Methods and Computational Tools 
Numerous calculations are performed to assure the chosen design(s) perform as expected. These 
calculations are made using several computer software packages specifically suited to different 
purposes. 
Source Term Calculations-Source term calculations provide heat generation rates, photon and 
neutron spectra and intensities, and radionuclide inventories of commercial SNF assemblies, 
DOE SNF, and DOE HLW. The heat generation rates are used in thermal evaluations of the 
waste packages and the host rock of the repository. The photon and neutron sources are used to 
determine the radiation level surrounding a waste package. The radionuclide inventories are 
used to determine dose rates due to the release of radionuclides from the waste packages. 
Structural Calculations-Structural calculations demonstrate that the waste package, drip 
shield, and emplacement pallet meet the requirements for normal operations and Category 1 and 
Category 2 event sequences. Structural calculations fall into the following broad groups: 
Geometric Design 
Normal Operations 
Internal Pressurization 
Impacts on Waste Package or Drip Shield 
Dynamic Impacts on the Waste Package 
Seismic Evaluations 
Residual Stress Reduction. 
Waste packages, drip shields, and emplacement pallets can be represented as two-dimensional or 
three-dimensional finite-element geometries, depending on the symmetry of the design or the 
loading. 
Thermal Calculations-Thermal calculations are performed to assure that fuel cladding, waste 
package, and rock temperatures do not exceed maximi~m limits. Thermal analyses include 
calculations of all three modes of heat transfer: conduction, convection, and radiation. Thermal 
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calculations are performed in one, two, or three dimensions; and at geometric scales ranging 
from individual assembly cross sections to pillar representations of a drift segment. ANSYS is 
typically used to calculate conduction and radiation heat transfer. 
Shielding Calculations-For all waste package designs, radiation dose rates in the axial and 
radial directions are determined on segments of the waste package surfaces. The results of the 
shielding calculations allow an estimation of the average: operation time of welding equipment, 
radiolysis-induced corrosion, and the radiation environment outside the waste packages for 
personnel access. 
Criticality Analyses-The methodology to be used for criticality analysis for the repository at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is detailed for the preclosure period in Preclosure Criticality Analysis 
Process Report and for the postclosure period in Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report. These reports provide the design requirements; applicable regulations, codes, 
and standards; summary descriptions of the types of computational tools to be used; and the 
types of analyses to be performed. 
The details of the design methodology in the body of this report are organized around Design 
Inputs (Section 4), Design Assumptions (Section 5), and Analysis Methods (Section 6). Within 
each of these, subsections are included for source term, structural, thermal, shielding, and 
criticality design. The methodology should be considered1 together with information contained in 
other design reports and calculation report(s) for specific design issues. 
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1. OBJECTIVE ANI) SCOPE 
This report describes the design inputs, assumptions, analytical methods, and computational tools 
used to establish the appropriateness of the design of' waste package components. Design 
methodology has progressed over many years as the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) has evolved 
and will be further refined as the project matures. 
The purpose of this report is to document and ensure appropriate design methods are used in the 
design of waste packages and ancillary components (the drip shields and emplacement pallets). 
The methodology includes identification of necessary design inputs, justification of design 
assumptions, and use of appropriate analysis methods anti computational tools. The document is 
primarily intended for internal use as technical guidance for a variety of design activities. It is 
recognized that a wide audience including project management, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and others are interested to various 
levels of detail in the design methods. It is expected that technical information used as input to 
design documents will be verified and taken from the latest versions of reference sources given 
herein. 
The design methodology is intended to provide designs that satisfy the safety and operational 
requirements of the YMP. Four waste package configurations have been selected to illustrate the 
application of the methodology during the licensing process. These four configurations are the 
21-pressurized water reactor absorber plate waste package (21-PWR AP), the 44-boiling water 
reactor waste package (44-BWR), the 5 defense high-level radioactive waste (HLW) DOE spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF) codisposal short waste package (5-DHLWDOE SNF Short), and the naval 
canistered SNF long waste package (Naval SNF Long). The compliance of these waste packages 
to requirements delineating the safety strategy is documented in three reports: 
Commercial SNF Waste Package Design Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1682171) 
HLWDOE SNF Codisposal Waste Package Design Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1668951) 
Naval Waste Package Design Report (BSC 2004 DIRS 166894) 
Design work for the other six waste packages will be completed at a later date using the same 
design methodology. These include the 24-boiling water reactor waste package (24-BWR), the 
21-pressurized water reactor control rod waste package (21-PWRCR), the 12-pressurized water 
reactor waste package (12-PWR), the 5 defense HLW DOE SNF codisposal long waste package 
(5-DHLWDOE SNF Long), the 2 defense HLW DOE SNF codisposal waste package 
(2-MC012-DHLW), and the naval canistered SNF short waste package (Naval SNF Short). 
This revision of the methodology report has evolved w.ith changes in the waste package, drip 
shield, and emplacement pallet designs over many years and will be further revised as the design 
is finalized. Different components and analyses are at different stages of development. Some 
parts of the report are detailed, while other less detailed parts are likely to undergo further 
refinement. 
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This report is only part of the complete design description. Other reports related to the design 
include the design reports, waste package system description documents, manufacturing 
specifications, and numerous documents for the many dletailed calculations. The relationships 
between the Methodology Report and other design docurrlents are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 2 shows a typical emplacement drift in the repository with waste packages beneath drip 
shields sitting on emplacement pallets, which rest on the steel invert structure. The invert 
structure will be filled with crushed tuff (the ballast is not shown in Figure 2). This report 
applies to ten specific waste package configurations and the ancillary components (i.e., the drip 
shields and emplacement pallets). Different waste package configurations accommodate 
different waste forms and have different diameters, lengths, and internal structural arrangements. 
The internal structures not only separate waste assemblic?~ but may also provide thermal shunts 
for heat removal and neutron absorbers for criticality control. The waste packages are supported 
by emplacement pallets and protected from post-closure moisture and rockfall by drip shields. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between Methodology Report and other Design Documents 
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The design methods and techniques described in this report are to be used in design activities 
producing input to the License Application of all waste package components. These include all 
waste package configurations, the emplacement pallets, and drip shields. 
Waste package components are evaluated for the preclosure and postclosure periods. During 
preclosure the waste packages do not breach, do prevent criticality, and do maintain an 
environment for physical and chemical stability of the waste. During postclosure the waste 
packages restrict the transport of radionuclides to the outside of the waste package, greatly 
decrease the likelihood of criticality, and delay the degradation of the waste form. Various 
structural, thermal, and criticality analyses are performed to assure performance for normal 
operations and Category 1 and Category 2 sequence events. These analyses provide confidence 
that the waste packages will survive hazards such as drops, rockfall, seismic motion, and fires 
without breaching during preclosure. 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
This document is subject to Quality Assurance Requirerncnts and Description (DOE 2004 [DIRS 
1686691) requirements. This document was developed in accordance with AP-3.1 lQ, Technical 
Reports. 
3. COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND MODEL USAGE 
No computer software or models were used in the generation of this report; however, computer 
software that is used to implement the methodology presemted in this report is described in detail 
in Section 6. 
Design methods use several computer software packages, including: 
SCALE V.4.4.A (HP-UX B 10.20 operating system, Software Tracking Number 10129- 
4.4A-OO), for criticality and shielding (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1543941) 
SAS2 module, for depletion analysis 
ORIGEN-S module, for decay calculations 
MCNP V.4B2LV (HP-UX B 10.20 operating system, Software Tracking Number 30033 
V4B2LV), for neutron/photon/electron transport for shielding calculations (CRWMS 
M&O 1998 [DIRS 1540601) 
ANSYS V.5.6.2 (HP-UX 11.0 operating system, Software Tracking Number 10364- 
5.6.2-Ol), or many structural and thermal calculations (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1593571) 
LS-DYNA V.960.1106 (HP-UX 11.0 operating system, Software Tracking Number 
10300-960.1 106-OO.), for dynamic structural calculations (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1588981) 
MATHCAD, for solving systems of equations (Mathsoft 1998 [DIRS 1194371) 
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FLUENT V.6.0.12 (HP-UX 11.00 operating system, Software Tracking Number 10550- 
6.0.12-OO), for some convective flow and heat transfer calculations (Fluent, Inc. 2003 
[DIRS 1630011) 
DRIFTFLOW V1.O (PC Windows 2000 operating system, Software Tracking Number 
10722-1.0-OO), for ventilation calculations (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1630901). 
Software used for criticality analysis is described in the lPreclosure Criticality Analysis Process 
Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1695901) and in the following model reports: Errata for isotopic 
Model Report for Commercial SNF Burnup Credit (BSC: 2003 [DIRS 168037]), Configuration 
Generator Model for in-Package Criticality (BSC 2003 [DIRS 165629]), Geochemistry Model 
Validation Report: External Accumulation Model (BSC 200 1 [DIRS 156324]), Geochemistry 
Model Validation Report: Material Degradation and Release Model (BSC 2001 
[DIRS 156790]), and the Criticality Model Report (BSC 2,003 [DIRS 1657331). 
The computer codes listed above (except MATHCAD) are maintained under YMP Software 
Configuration Management to assure quality control of the software used in performing design 
calculations. These are the latest, but not only, versions of the software packages under Software 
Configuration Management. Some calculations use earlier versions and other operating systems, 
and individual calculations document the actual version used for specific applications. In the 
remainder of this document, the software is referred to by name only, without specific version 
numbers and operating systems, but the controlled code v~ersions are the only code versions to be 
used. 
4. WASTE PACKAGE COMPONENT DESIGN INPUTS 
The first levels of input to waste package component design are requirements established 
through a process starting with the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 [DIRS 
1000161. These requirements are further developed into design requirements and assigned to 
structures, systems, and components through system description documents. Compliance with 
the requirements is demonstrated by satisfaction of design criteria. In order to develop the 
necessary design output, additional information and parameters are required, including 
radionuclide parameters and structural and thermal properties of materials. Finally, inputs are 
developed through interfaces with equipment and processczs assigned to other organizations. The 
next three subsections will describe the source of require~nents, information and parameters, and 
interface inputs. 
4.1 REQUIREMENTS 
Structures, systems, and components of the repository are designed to specified requirements. 
Requirements for the repository originate from the DOE and are presented in Project 
Requirements Document (Canori and Leitner [DIRS 1662751). Laws and statutes, such as 
10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 1566051, are included in these project level requirements. The Project 
Requirements Document decomposes these requirements to the point that each can be assigned 
as appropriate. The assigned organization uses the requirement or further breaks it down by 
deriving daughter requirements. Project Functional and Operational Requirements (Siddoway 
2003 [DIRS 1639041) generates requirements based on functions of the repository. All of these 
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requirements are ultimately assigned to a system and ire published in a System Description 
Document. Some of these requirements will point to criteria in the Project Design Criteria 
Document (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621). Criteria, are the numerical values and other 
measures whereby satisfaction of the design requirements is demonstrated. Identifying criteria in 
a system description document assigns the criteria to structures, systems, and components of the 
system description document. Design criteria consist of the codes, standards, general discipline 
design criteria, and load combinations that are specified for use on the project. 
4.1.1 Assigned Requirements 
The Analysis and Component Design organization is concerned with requirements in several 
system description documents. The Analysis and Component Design organization is directly 
responsible for three system description documents that deal with waste packages and waste 
package closure: 
DOE and Commercial Waste Package System Description Document (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
1672731) 
Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package Systtzm Description Document (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 1672721) 
Waste Package Closure System Description Document (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1672781). 
The Analysis and Component Design organization is also responsible for the requirements and 
criteria for waste package drip shields and emplacement pallets, which are described in the 
Subsu$ace Facility Description Document (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1702651). 
4.1.2 Design Philosophy 
Requirements drive the design of the waste package, tirip shield, and waste package pallet. 
There are two primary conditions or periods of concern. 'These are the preclosure period and the 
postclosure period. For preclosure the waste package is relied on to contain the waste form 
within its boundary, prevent criticality, and preserve the physical and chemical stability of the 
waste form. For postclosure the waste package is ]relied on to restrict the transport of 
radionuclides to the outside of the waste package, greatly decrease the likelihood of criticality, 
and delay the degradation of the waste form. Structurally, waste packages consist of an 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111) inner 
vessel of 316 stainless steel and an outer corrosion barrier made of Alloy 22 N06022. In order to 
show that the waste package will perform these functions adequately, many analyses must be 
performed on them. The design philosophy requires the waste package to survive external 
hazards such as drops, rockfall, seismic motion, and fires. without breaching. It must also show 
that the waste form stays within specified thermal limits throughout its life. A calculation will be 
done in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
1581151) to account for the pressure retention by the inner vessel. Additional calculations will 
be done outside the code for the conditions identified for off-normal event sequences. 
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4.1.3 Codes and Standards 
Some codes and standards are imposed through the Project Design Criteria Document (Minwalla 
2003 [DIRS 161362]), while the design engineer select:; others. Codes and standards include 
industry codes such as the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
1581151) and standards such as those published by American National Standards Institute. 
Publications by the NRC are included, which consist of: 
, 
Regulatory Guides-Rules for specific areas of concern that if followed are acceptable 
ways to meet NRC requirements 
NRC Regulation Reports (NUREGs)--Guidance tfocuments from the NRC 
NUREGIContractor Reports (NUREG1CRs)-Information published by the NRC. 
The Analysis and Component Design organization uses these selected codes and standards as 
follows: 
Commitments to the regulators--credit is taken for meeting the item. Examples include 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 111, Division 1 (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
1581 151 and ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161). 
Accepted Source of Methods or Data-the method or data is used. For example, 
NUREGICR-6608 (Witte et al. 1998 [DIRS 1361151) addresses the impact of large 
packages during a drop event. 
Internal Guidance to Analysis and Component Design-the item was reviewed and used 
for design input. For example, NUREG-1804 (IVRC 2003' [DIRS 1632741) is used to 
ensure that items identified by the NRC are addressed. 
4.1.3.1 Commitment Codes and Standards 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, 
Division 1) is used for general structural analysis 2nd fabrication of the inner vessel 
ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161 addresses liftin,g devices for large packages 
ANSIJANS-6.1.1-1977 [DIRS 1070161 presents flux-to-dose rate conversion factors for 
neutron and gamma radiation. 
4.1.3.2 Accepted Source or Guidance 
Structural: 
ASTM A 887-89 (Reapproved 2000) [DIRS 1540621, Standard Specification for Borated 
Stainless Steel Plate, Sheet, and Strip for Nuclear ,4pplication 
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NUREGICR-18 15 (Holman and Langland 198 1 [DIRS 145 1921) addresses the fracture 
toughness requirements of cylindrical shells for pa.ckages 
NUREGICR-048 1 (Rack and Knorovsky 1978 [IIIRS 145 1851) addresses elastic plastic 
data for structural analyses 
NUREGICR-6608 (Witte et al. 1998 [DIRS 1361151) addresses the impact of large 
packages during a drop event 
NUREGICR-6322 (Lee and Bumpas 1995 [DIRS 1540681) provides a method for 
evaluating the buckling stresses in SNF baskets 
NUREGICR-4554 (Gerhard et al. 1992 [DIRS 1453 181) presents information regarding 
the structural stresses for large packages during a drop event 
NUREG-0612 (NRC 1980 [DIRS 1049391) describes the requirements for lifting and 
handling large packages such as waste packages 
Dynamic Impact EfSects on Spent Fuel Assemblies (Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 1443571) 
describes the effects on spent fuel of high g-loads From impact. 
Thermal: 
"Level 2 Directed Baseline Change" (Arthur 2003 [DIRS 1649831) specifies that the clad 
temperature limit is 350°C 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, 
Division 1, Subsection NB-1120) sets temperature limits for structural alloys. 
Source Term and Shielding: 
NUREGICR-5625 (Hermann et al. 1994 [DIRS 1540451) provides technical support for 
the NRC decay heat guide using the SAS2H anti ORIGEN-S analysis sequence of the 
SCALE system 
NUREG-1536 (NRC 1997 [DIRS 1019031) provilde guidance for evaluating shielding of 
SNF packages 
NUREG-1617 (NRC 2000 [DIRS 1540001) provide guidance for evaluating shielding of 
SNF packages 
- NUREG-1567 (NRC 2000 [DIRS 1497561) provide guidance for evaluating shielding of 
SNF packages. 
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4.1.4 Use of Codes and Standards 
4.1.4.1 Structural Codes and Standards 
The ASME Boiler and pressure Vessel Code (ASME 20011 [DIRS 1581 151) is used for structural 
analysis in general and fabrication of the inner vessel. This is consistent with the NRC 
requirements to use codes and standards based on acc~cpted industry technology (NRC 2003 
[DIRS 1632741). 
The thickness of the Yucca Mountain waste package inne.r vessel is determined by the postulated 
accident loads. Therefore it will satisfy the ASME Colde Design Loads, which are based on 
pressure and loaded dead weight. The inner vessel will1 be constructed in accordance with all 
provisions of the ASME Section 111, Division 1, Class 2 (lode requirements including application 
of the ASME N Code Symbol Stamp. The ASME design work will be performed by an ASME 
Designer of Record, not by Bechtel SAIC Company, LLCI. 
Alloy 22 NO6022 is specifically included as a corrosion barrier and is not a pressure vessel. It 
will however be constructed in accordance with specific applicable Section 111 technical 
requirements including the material, fabrication, and examination requirements and in 
accordance with selected administrative requirements of the ASME Code. The postulated 
dynamic loads will be evaluated against appropriate criteria. The outer corrosion barrier will be 
fabricated in accordance with the applicable specified pirovisions of NC-2000 (Materials), NC- 
4000 (Welding), and NC-5000 (Nondestructive Examination). 
The waste form is placed within the inner vessel, which is partitioned by divider plates to 
separate waste in canisters or partitioned by basket asse~nblies for individual elements. Divider 
plates and basket assemblies facilitate loading and aid in transferring heat from the fuel to the 
outside. The internal basket assemblies within the inner vessel also ensure proper geometry of 
the fuel and provide additional neutron poisons where required in order to preclude criticality 
events. The ASME Code does not address criticality issues, and therefore the ASME Code rules 
do not apply to the vessel internals. The internal bas:ket assemblies will be attached to the 
interior of the inner vessel. These attachment welds ,will be performed in accordance with 
ASME requirements (ASME 2001 [I581 151, Section 111, 'Division 1, Class 2). 
The waste package is lifted in the vertical position .for loading and rotated into the horizontal 
position for emplacement by use of trunnion collars. The trunnion collar is a removable lifting 
device attached to the corrosion resistant barrier. The ASME Code is not applicable to the 
trunnion collar. The function of the trunnion collar is to lift the waste package. Materials will be 
selected to ensure that there will be no galling of the corrosion barrier material. The design and 
fabrication requirements will be in accordance with ANSI: N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161. 
The ASME Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, Division I, Subsection NC) was 
selected for the code-compliant design and fabrication of the waste packages. The 
implementation of the ASME Code is described in BSC Position on the Use of the ASME Boiler 
and Pressure Vessel Code for the Yucca Mountain Waste Packages (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1650581). 
For the code design, the only part of the waste package considered to be a pressure vessel is the 
stainless steel type 316 inner vessel. For all other components of the waste package, the ASME 
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code is used as guidance, either through the use of conservative material properties or 
conservative stress limits. For credible preclosure event sequences and the assessment of those 
event sequences, the code and supporting code interpretations are used to formulate layered 
defensible material failure criteria. While the seal welds are anticipated to be sound welds, no 
credit for resistance against dynamic events is taken, as these are partial-penetration welds. 
Therefore, for dynamic structural events where the inner vessel in the vicinity of the seal welds 
may be reasonably anticipated to experience considerabl~: loads, these welds are not credited to 
maintain the hermeticity of the inner vessel. To maintain containment of the waste form, it must 
be shown that the outer corrosion barrier does not breach. 
The following are specific applications of structural standards used in design. 
ASTM A 887-89 (Reapproved 2000) ([DIRS 1540621, Table I),  Standard Specification for 
Borated Stainless Steel Plate, Sheet, and Strip for Nuclear Application, prescribes a range of 
boron-10 contents that are approved for the specification as well as two metallurgical processes, 
which may be used to manufacture the borated stainless steel. Plate, sheet, and strip are the 
approved borated stainless steel forms because the manufacturing process assures an even 
distribution of boron in the resulting steel. Local increases in boron content are undesirable 
because boron acts as a hardener of stainless steel and reduces the ductility of the alloy. 
Extrusions and castings would require different metal production processes, and control of the 
distribution of the boron in the stainless steel alloy would: have to be assured. Boron contents in 
ranges from 0.20-0.29 (Type 304B) up to 1.75-2.25 percent (Type 304B7) are approved by the 
specification (ASTM A 887-89 (Reapproved 2000) [DIRS 1540621). 
The two metallurgical processes used to produce borate~d stainless steel are a traditional metal 
melt technology (Grade B) and a more modern powder metallurgy process (Grade A). The 
powder metallurgy process results in a more even distribution of boron in the alloy, and the 
ductility is improved compared to the wrought (metal melt) process. Because the borated 
stainless steel is not a load-carrying structural componenlt in existing waste package SNF basket 
designs, the Grade B alloy is acceptable. 
ASME Code Case N-510-1 (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 1511) specifies the code material properties 
for evaluating 304 stainless steel with boron to allow struc:tural credit to be taken for this material 
under construction of Section 111, Subsections NF and NG components. This code case describes 
the mathematical combination of principal stresses in the stainless steel to determine the 
effective stress that could cause failure of the structure, and it also provides the limits and 
limitations on the use of these materials. 
ASME Code Case N-284-1 (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151) specifies a methodology for 
evaluating buckling stresses in a cylindrical body. This code case describes the mathematical 
combination of principal stresses in a cylindrical shell to determine the effective stress that could 
cause buckling collapse of the cylinder. Code Case N-'284 provides factors of safety that are 
used in the calculation, but it should be noted that these factors only apply when the ASME Code 
Case N-284 methodology is used. It is inappropriate to use these factors of safety if buckling is 
evaluated using classical crippling and buckling analysis techniques. This is because the Code 
Case N-284 calculation methodology contains an imbedd.ed measure of conservatism that is not 
necessarily present in classical methods. 
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ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161 provides a standard for crane and lifting devices for large 
packages. This standard provides guidance on seismic requirements for the crane and lift 
fixtures and is normally applied in conjunction with NUREG-0612 (NRC 1980 [DIRS 1049391); 
thus, ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161 should be used as supplemental information for trunnion 
design. 
NUREG-0612 (NRC 1980 [DIRS 1049391) describes the requirements for lifting and handling of 
large packages such as the waste package. The standard explicitly applies to heavy loads lifted 
near or over spent fuel pools at nuclear reactor facilities but is also applied to storage and 
transport cask lifting devices. Thus, the standard cim be applied to the waste package. 
NUREG-0612 specifies that all components that participate in the load path must be designed to 
a safety factor of six against yield and a factor of ten against ultimate. The standard implicitly 
includes a dynamic factor to account for "bounce" when lifting and lowering large objects. The 
standard pennits load splitting between redundant load paths, so that if a redundant lifting yoke 
is used, a factor of three against yield is used for each separate yoke and a factor of five against 
ultimate is applied. These factors ensure that structural failure of lifting components will not 
occur in normal conditions, but it is the responsibility of the facility personnel to ensure that the 
lifting attachments are securely engaged. to the large package. A positive means of verification 
of lifting fixture engagement is necessary, and in general,. it is necessary to provide a flat surface 
to set the package on. Guide.plates to center a waste package in a specific location in a pool or 
dry location are not recommended as such guide devices have caused disengagement of the 
lifting fixtures for storage cask systems. The particu1.z form of engagement of the lifting 
fixtures and the waste package is not specified by the standard; only the structural load path 
requirements are specified. 
NUREGICR-1815 (Holman and Langland 1981 [DIRS 145 1921) provides a methodology to 
determine the fracture toughness requirements of cylindrical shells for packages with a thickness 
less than 4 inches. The methodology allows the steel type used in the design of a package to be 
evaluated to ensure that sufficient ductility exists over ,the operating temperature range of the 
package. Cold temperatures reduce the ductility of steel alloys, and a substantial temperature 
margin is provided through the use of these documents to prevent brittle fracture. Metals that do 
not comply with the methodology should not be used for structural components of the waste 
package. 
NUREGICR-0481 (Rack and Knorovsky 1978 [DIRS 1451851) addresses elasticlplastic data for 
structural analyses and attempts to provide a methodology for evaluating the effects of 
temperature and strain-rate upon metals such as stainless steel. This approach is useful because 
strain-rate data are normally measured at room temperature, and the waste package is operated 
over a range of temperatures from below room temperature to much higher than room 
temperature. The methodology can be used to evaluate the results provided by finite-element 
structural analysis tools to ensure that the data used by the analysis system is appropriate. The 
waste package could experience considerable plastic deformation of the package ends in some 
drop accident scenarios, and a rockfall could similarly cause substantial deformation of the waste 
package at any location along its length. These accident scenarios would occur at quite different 
temperatures, and therefore the structural parameters over the elasticlplastic regime must be 
evaluated. One effect noted in NUREGICR-0481 is that the shape of the stress-strain curve is 
essentially the same at different temperatures, but it was also noted that dynamic strain aging 
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might occur at elevated temperatures (over 200°C), even in austenitic stainless steels. Also, a 
significant variation in material properties was observed ill different heats of stainless steel. 
NUREGICR-6608 (Witte et al. 1998 [DIRS 1361151) cliscusses the impact of large packages 
during a drop event, especially with respect to the modeling of the impact target. NUREGICR- 
6608 describes acceptable methods of describing a crushable/breakable impact pad such as a 
reinforced concrete pad, which is more realistic than an unyielding surface but still provides a 
conservative calculation. Using a crushable impact pad would reduce the g-loads applied to the 
waste package and SNF basket substantially. The design methodology presently uses an 
unyielding surface to model the impact target for drop analyses. Future design methodology 
may consider a crushable/breakable impact pad, which would provide an additional safety 
margin where desired. 
NUREGICR-6322 (Lee and Bumpas 1995 [DIRS 1540681) provides a methodology for 
evaluating the buckling stresses in SNF baskets by determining the stability capacity of the 
basket based on analysis of the individual structural coniponents of the basket. The individual 
components are treated as columns, beam-columns, and plates. The methodology required for 
determining buckling stresses and comparing these stresses to the acceptance criteria of the 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151) is presented in 
NUREGICR-6322. The resulting methodology is acceptable to the NRC for transport casks and 
is thus applicable to waste packages for handling drop accident scenarios. 
NUREGICR-4554 (Gerhard et al. 1992 [DIRS 1453 181) provides information regarding the 
structural stresses for large packages during a drop event and is applicable to the waste package. 
It is useful for comparison of stresses calculated for the waste package to those calculated for a 
commercial cask. 
Dynamic Impact Eflects on Spent Fuel Assemblies (Chun et al. 1987 [DIRS 144357]), is a de 
facto standard for the ability of SNF to withstand the effects of high g-loads in an impact, which 
was developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the NRC. 
4.1.4.2 Thermal Codes and Standards 
Methods of thermal analysis are discussed in various standard review plans. NUREG-1536 
(NRC 1997 [DIRS 1019031) and NUREG-1567 (NRC 2000 [DIRS 1497561) discuss storage, 
and NUREG-16 17 (NRC 2000 [DIRS 1540001) discusses transportation. 
Other relevant standards include the ASME Code (ASPrlE 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, 
Division 1, Subsection NB, NB-1120), which sets the temperature limit for containment 
structural alloys, states that the ASME Code is not applicable to materials subjected to 
temperatures outside a certain range (ASME (2001 [DDRS 1581151, Tables 2A, 2B, and 4 of 
Section 11, Part D, Subpart I), essentially setting the temperature limit for reactor vessels alloys 
to 800°F. The DOE has specified the maximum cladding temperature limit at 350°C for 
commercial Zirconium clad fuel (Arthur 2003 [DIRS 1649831, p. 3). 
A reference relevant to temporary SNF storage at the repository surface facility is Recommended 
Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircaloy-Clad Fuel Rods in 
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Inert Gas (Levy et al. 1987 [DIRS 1443491). This publication provides methods for evaluation 
of fuel rod pressure at elevated temperatures and provides temperature limits for a desired forty- 
year storage period. The ability of irradiated Zircaloy cladding to provide a barrier against the 
release of radioactive material is evaluated as a function of thermal damage to the cladding. 
Damage is expressed in terms of diffusion-controlled cavity growth of micro-flaws in the 
Zircaloy matrix. 
4.1.4.3 Shielding and Source Term Codes and Standards 
Standards for performing shielding and source term calculations include Code of Federal 
Regulations, American National Standards Institute stanclards, and NRC Regulatory Guides and 
NUREG reports. The nuclear engineering codes and standards applicable to the YMP are listed 
in the Project Design Criteria Document (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Section 4.9.1.1). 
Shielding and source term methodologies follow the recommendations of appropriate NUREGs 
to ensure compliance with applicable American National Standards Institute standards and NRC 
Regulatory Guides. 
4.1.4.4 Criticality Safety Codes and Standards 
The standards for criticality safety analysis principally are NUREGs and standards published by 
the American National Standards Institute and the American Nuclear Society. Applicable 
criticality codes and standards for the YMF are listed in the Project Design Criteria Document 
(Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Section 4.9.2.1). The storage and transportation standard 
review plans (Section 4.1.4.2) also present data regarding criticality safety analyses for packages. 
Further information is contained in the Disposal Criiicality Analysis Methodology Topical 
Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051) and the supporting model reports. 
4.2 INFORMATION AND PARAMETERS 
A considerable amount of technical information and piuameters is needed as input to waste 
package, emplacement pallet, and drip shield design. This input is used in source term, structural, 
thermal, and shielding analyses. 
4.2.1 Source Term 
The decay of radionuclides in SNF and HLW is the source of decay heat and radiation. Source 
term calculations are performed for scores of decay chains to determine radionuclide 
concentrations, radiation fields, and decay heat. The jinputs to source term calculations are 
needed for a wide range of waste forms. Differences in the physical forms among commercial 
SNF, DOE SNF, and DOE HLW lead to very different input requirements for generating the 
source terms for the representative waste forms. Similari1:ies between PWRs and BWRs result in 
common input requirements; geometric and operationa:l differences between the two reactor 
types also create input requirements that are uniquely appllicable to each. 
4.2.1.1 Inputs for Commercial Spent Nuclear F U ~ I  Source Term Determinations 
Sources for material compositions (other than uranium dioxide) used to determine commercial 
SNF source terms are listed in Table 1. For each material, the maximum permissible amount of 
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cobalt is incorporated, except for the stainless steels, where a cobalt impurity of 0.08 weight 
percent (wt%) is used (Ludwig and Renier 1989 [DIRS 1463981, p. 45). For SS-348H, a cobalt 
impurity of 0.2 wt% is used (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 11, Part A, SA-240, Table 1). 
The remaining elements are representative of the material compositions for each material, but 
they are biased towards the maximum amount of tin, nic:kel, and niobium because these lead to 
larger gamma sources. 
Table 1. Sources of Material Compositions Used in Source Term Determinations 
Material 
U N S ~  R60802 (Zircaloy-2) 
I Materials (ASTM B 81 1-90 [DIRS 131 7!53], Table 2) 
UNS S30400 (SS-304) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 2001 
Standard Specification for Wrought Zirconium Alloy Seamless Tubes for Nuclear 
Reactor Fuel Cladding. Philadelphia, P8ennsylvania: American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM B 81 1-90 [DIRS 1317!53], Table 2) 
UNS R60804 (Zircaloy-4) 
I I [DIRS 1581 151, Section IIA, SA-240, Table 1) I 
Standard Specification for Wrought Zirconium Alloy Seamless Tubes for Nuclear 
Reactor Fuel Cladding. Philadelphia, Pt?nnsylvania: American Society for Testing and 
I UNS S30403 (SS-304L) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 2001 I 1 I [DIRS 1581 151, Section IIA, SA-240, Table 1) 
UNS S30200 (SS-302) I Standard Specification for Heat-Resistir~g Chromium and Chromium-Nickel Stainless 
SS-348H 
I ~e ia l s .  Volume 3 of Metals Handbook (ASM 1 980 [Dl RS 10431 71, p. 95) ' 
NOTE: aUNS = Unified Numbering System. 
Steel Plate; Sheet, and Strip for Pressure Vessels (ASTM A 240lA 240M-97a [DIRS 
1027691 Table 1 ) 
Standard Specification for 
Steel Plate. Sheet, and Strip for Pressure Vessels (ASTM A 240lA 240M-97a [DIRS 
lnconel-718 
Inconel-X-750 
Stainless Steel CF3M 
Elemental impurities in the uranium dioxide of the fuel are given in Standard- and Extended- 
Burnup PWR and BWR Reactor Models for the ORIGEM Computer Code (Ludwig and Renier 
1989 [DIRS 1463981, Table 5.4). 
1027691 Table I )  
The isotopic composition of commercially available uranium is provided by the empirical 
relationships in Sequoyah Unit 2, Cycle 3 - Volume 2 of Scale-4 Analysis of Pressurized Water 
Reactor Critical Configurations (Bowman et al. 1995 [DIRS 1237961, p. 20). 
Neutron flux scaling factors are also required for regions outside the active fuel in order to 
determine neutron-activated gamma source terms. These scaling factors are 150 percent of those 
provided by Activation Measurements and Comparison with Calculations for Spent Fuel 
Assembly Hardware. Volume 1 of Spent Fuel Assembly Hardware: Characterization and 10 
CFR 61 Classification for Waste Disposal (Luksic 1989 [DIRS 1205061, Table S.1, p. vi). 
The presence of corrosion products (crud) on the fuel is also accounted for in the source term 
determination. This is obtained from: ' 
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Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities (NRC 2000 [DIRS 1497561, 
Table 9.2) 
Spent Fuel Corrosion Product and Fuel Clec(!ning As~essment (Jones 1992 [DIRS 
1464051, Tables 1 and 2). 
The half-lives of the radionuclides used in the crud source calculations are provided by Nuclides 
and Isotopes, Chart of the Nuclides (Parrington et al. 1996 [DIRS 1038961). 
PWR Lattice-For the PWR commercial SNF, the Babc:ock & Wilcox (B&W) Mark B 15 x 15 
PWR fuel assembly is selected as the generic PWR lattice for analysis. This lattice has a high 
initial heavy metal loading and large amounts of stainless steel and Inconel assembly hardware, 
maximizing fission product generation and activation o:F structural hardware. While a typical 
B&W Mark B assembly has an initial heavy metal 1oadi:ng of 464 kg of uranium (Punatar 2001 
[DIRS 1556351, Table 3.1), this is increased to 475 kg to provide coverage of all commercial 
SNF waste streams (Assumption 5.1.1.4). Source terms for a generic stainless-steel-clad fuel 
assembly and for a longer South Texas assembly are also generated in PWR Source Term 
Generation and Evaluation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1690611). For the longer South Texas assembly, a 
uranium metal mass of 550 kg is used. 
The additional uranium mass is accommodated by increa.sing the fuel length of a B&W Mark B 
assembly, rather than by increasing the fuel density. This is consistent with the demonstration of 
previous calculations that a lower fuel density generates higher gamma and neutron sources 
described in BWR Source Term Generation and Evczluation (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1643641, 
pp. 48 and 49). A longer active fuel length and a lower density decrease the fuel self-shielding. 
This results in a higher flux and consequently higher sourlce intensities. 
The physical characteristics and operating conditions of the B&W Mark B 15 x 15 PWR fuel 
assembly are obtained from: 
Summary Report of Commercial Reactor Criticality Data for Crystal River Unit 3 
(Punatar 2001 [DIRS 1556351, Table 2-2, Figure ;!-2, Table 2-9) 
Operational Data-B& W NSS (Framatome Cogenla Fuels 1999 [DIRS 1464191, p. 3) 
The Mark B and the South Texas assemblies are used in t:he evaluation of the crud activity on the 
assembly surface. The larger fuel rod surface area in the South Texas assembly is used as the 
bounding case because crud activity is directly proportional to the surface area in the assembly 
exposed to the coolant. 
BWR La t t i ceFor  BWR commercial SNF, a General Electric (GE) 8 x 8 BWR fuel assembly 
is used as the generic fuel design for BWR source tczrm determination (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
1643641, p. 6). This design has a high initial heavy metal loading and an adequate amount of 
fuel assembly hardware data. The initial heavy metal lo'ading is conservatively increased from 
184 kg (Larsen et al. 1976 [DIRS 1465761, p. A-2) to 200 kg to provide coverage of the actual 
waste stream (Assumption 5.1.1.4). In cases where the hardware for the assembly is not 
conservative, substitutions and approximations are made to increase conservatism. The 
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stainless-steel-clad fuel assembly is also considered because it presents higher gamma source 
intensity due to activation. 
As was the case for PWR fuel, the additional fuel mass is added as increased length, rather than 
as increased density. 
The crud activity is directly proportional to the surface area in the assembly components exposed 
to coola'nt. Therefore, an assembly that has a higher ,surface area is used to conservatively 
evaluate the crud activity. The Advanced Nuclear Fuel 5 )  x 9 JP-4 fuel assembly is selected for 
crud activity evaluation of a BWR assembly because it has a greater area exposed to coolant than 
that of the GE 8 x 8 BWR fuel assembly. 
The physical characteristics and operating conditions for the GE 8 x 8 fuel assembly are obtained 
from the following sources: 
Summary Report of Commercial Reactor Criti'cality Data for Quad Cities Unit 2 
(CRWMS M&O 1999 [DIRS 1346601) 
Core Design and Operating Data for Cycles 1 and 2 of Quad Cities 1 (Larsen et al. 1976 
[DIRS 1465761, pp. A-1, A-8, and C-12) 
Appendix 2A. Physical Descriptions of LWR Fuel Assemblies. Volume 3 of 
Characteristics of Spent Fuel, High-Level Waste, and Other Radioactive Wastes Which 
May Require Long-Term Isolation (DOE 1987 [DIRS 1323331, pp. 2A-16 and 2A-158). 
Additional information required to perform the BWR source term calculation (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 1643641) is taken from: 
CRC Depletion Calculations for Quad Cities Unit 2 (CRWMS M&O 1999 
[DIRS 1346501, pp. 50-55) for dimensions and materials for PATH B geometric 
descriptions of the SAS2H code 
SCALE, RSIC Computer Code Collection (NRC: 1997 [DIRS 1226751, Table S2.6.4, 
p. S2.6.12) for clad temperature during operation. 
4.2.1.2 Inputs for U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-level 
Radioactive Waste Source Term Determinations 
The DOE SNF and HLW source term calculations rely on the input of initial radionuclide 
inventories and, in the case of HLW, chemical compositions of the glass waste forms. The initial 
radionuclide inventories for DOE SNF are taken from Source Term Estimates for DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuels (DOE 2003 [163377]). 
The volume, mass, and canister quantities for the HLW have historically been taken from Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada (DOE 2002 
[DIRS 1559701, Volume 11, Appendixes A through 0, pp. A-39 to A-43, A-48, A-55, and A-56). 
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As inventories are better quantified, the canister quantities are taken from updated references 
(e-g., Allison 2004 [DIRS 1687341). 
Chemical compositions and initial radionuclide inventories are provided by: 
"Response to Repository Environmental Impact Statement Data Call for High-Level 
Waste" (Picha 1997 [DIRS 1044061, pp. 6,7, and 12) 
"Clarification of High-Level Waste and Special Performance Assessment Required Data 
for Repository Environmental Impact Statement" (Picha 1998 [DIRS 1044071, p. 3) 
Projected Radionuclide Inventories and Radiogenic Properties of the DWPF Product ( U )  
(Plodinec and Marra 1994 [DIRS 1019081, p. 10) 
Waste Form Qualification Report (WQR), West Valley Demonstration Project (WVNS 
1998 [DIRS 1035001, Section WQR-1.1, p. 7 and Section WQR-1.2, pp. AP-1 to AP-3) 
"Revision to Original INEEL Response to Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Office 
Data Call for High-Level Waste" (Goff 1998 [DIR.S 1043891, pp. 3 to 7) 
"Follow Up Response to Repository Environm~zntal Impact Statement Data Call for 
High-Level Waste" (Picha 1998 [DIRS 1044131, p. 9) 
"Response to Clarification Data for the Repository Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) Data Call Memorandum Dated October 3., 1997" (Taylor 1997 [DIRS 1044761, 
pp. 8 to 10) 
4.2.2 Structural 
The technical data and parameters for structural calculatic~ns include the mechanical properties of 
the design materials and the configuration of the surface facility and engineered barrier system. 
In addition, the geometry of the waste package, emp1ace:ment pallet, and drip shield are used in 
the process; however, these parameters are varied apprc~priately to obtain designs that comply . 
with the governing requirements. 
4.2.2.1 Mechanical Material Properties 
Sources for values of the mechanical material properties used in structural analyses are listed in 
Table 2. Discussions on the use of some of the material properties listed in this table are 
provided in Section 5.2. 
4.2.2.2 Configuration Interfaces 
Coordination drawings define the interfaces for waste package components with facilities and the 
engineered barrier system. Interface controls that delineate the design responsibilities of the 
Analysis and Component Design organization and other organizations are developed as 
necessary. 
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4.2.2.3 Dimensional and Material Variability 
All structural calculations assume the nominal thicknesses for the inner vessel and corrosion 
barrier are the minimum material thicknesses. Future drawings will indicate tolerances that show 
these dimensions as minimum values. This ensures structural design requirements will be 
achieved. 
Available minimum material strength properties are used to ensure conservative assessments due 
to material variability. When available, material properties that are temperature dependent are 
used for variable temperature environment calculations. In general, when a range of values is 
given for material properties, the values that ensure conservative results are used. 
Table 2. Sources of Material Properties for Structural Analyses 
Corrosion. Volume 13 of Metal:: Handbook (ASM International 1987 [DIRS 
1037531, D. 931 1. This document is used to determine chemical composition of 
Material Property 
1 31 6 stainless steel 
Ultimate Tensile Strenath 6 , )  1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
Source 
I " . -, I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D; Table U) I 
Corrosion. Volume 13 of Metal:: Handbook (ASM International 1987 [DIRS 
1037531, p. 931). This document is used to determine chemical composition of 
SA-240 S31600 (SS 316) (Inne!r vessel) 
31 6 stainless steel 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part A, SA-240, Table 2), which 
presents specifications for heat-resisting chromium and chromium-nickel 
stainless steel plate, sheet, and strip for pressure vessels 
Density (p) 
Yield Strength (S,) 
Standard Practice for Preparing, Cleaning, and Evaluating Corrosion Test 
Specimens (ASTM G 1-90 1999 [DIRS 10351 51, Table XI  .I) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressurt? Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table Y-I) 
Elastic Modulus (El 
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Technical Data Blue Sheet, Stainless Steels, Chromium-Nickel-Molybdenum, 
Types 316 (S31600), 316L (S31603), 31 7 (S31700), 31 7L (531 703) (Allegheny 
Ludlum 1999 [DIRS 1514091, p. 8) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressurt? Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
. , 
Mean Coefficient of Thermal 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TM-1) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TE-I) 
Properties and Selection: Stainless Steels, Tool Materials and Special- 
Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of WEetals Handbook (ASM 1980 [DIRS 10431 71, 
Figure 15, p. 755) 
TSw2 Rock 
Density (p) Reference Information Base Dai:a Item: Rock Geomechanical Properties (DTN: M09808RIB00041.000 [DIRS 1048501, Table 5) 
SA-312 S31603 (SS 31 6L) (DOE Canisters) 
Density (p) 
Yield Strength (S,) 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (S,) 
Percentage Elongation 
Standard Practice for Preparing! Cleaning, and Evaluating Corrosion Test 
Specimens (ASTM G 1-90 1999 [DIRS 1035151, Table XI  .I) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressufie Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
. (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table Y-1) 
200 1 ASME Boiler and Pressufie Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, St?ction II, Part D, Table U) 
-2001 ASME Boiler and Pressufis Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Staction II, Part A, SA-240. Table 2) 
Elastic Modulus (E) 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of Edetals Handbook (ASM 1980 [DIRS 10431 71, 
~ i ~ u r e  15, p. 755). Poisson's raltio for 316 stainless steel will be used for 3 1 6 ~  
stainless steel (Assumption 5.2.8.4). 
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Table 2. Sources of Material Properties for Structural Analyses (Continued) 
Material Property Source 
SA-705 SO17400 (17-4 PH) (Lifting Collars) 
Density (p) Properties and Selection: Stainless Steels, Tool Materials and Special- 
Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of Metals  Handbook (ASM 1980 [DIRS 10431 71, 
Table 12, p. 34) 
Yield Strength (S,) Properties and Selection of 
[DIRS 1581321, p. 506) 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (S,) Properties and Selection of Metals. Volume 1 of Metals Handbook (ASM 1961 
DIRS 158132 p. 506) 
Percentage Elongation 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressurt? Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 
- - 
2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part A, SA-705lSA-705M, Table 3) 
Elastic Modulus (E) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressun? Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D, Table TM-I) 
Poisson's Ratio (E) "17-4Ph Technical Data" (High lremp Metals 2002 DlRS [158006]) 
SA-240 S30400 (SS 304) (Fuel Assemlbly Components) 
Yield Strenath (Sv) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressulre Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
" \ ,r  I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D; Table Y-1) 
Ultimate Tensile Strenath IS,,) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressuire Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) " , -3  (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D; Table U) 
Elastic Modulus (E) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TM-1) 
Poisson's Ratio (E) Properties and Selection: Stairiless Steels, Tool Materials and Special- 
Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of Ibfetals Handbook (ASM 1980 [Dl RS 10431 71, 
I ~ i ~ u r e  15, p. 755) 
SA-516 KO2700 (A 516, Grade 70) (Fuel Tubes, Structural Plates) 
Density (p) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section II, Part A, SA-20, Section 14.1), which 
presents specifications for pressure vessel plates, carbon steel, for moderate- 
I and lower-temperature service 
Yield Strenath ISv) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
" 1 ,r  I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D: Table Y-I) 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (Su) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table U) 
Percentage Elongation 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
Elastic Modulus (E) 
Mean Coefficient of Thermal 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio fa) Properties and Selection: Irons and Steels. Volume 1 of Metals Handbook . , (ASM 1978 [DIRS 102018], p. 393), which provides Poisson's ratio for cast 
carbon steel that will be 
SB-209 A96061 T4 (Alloy,6061 
Densitv lo) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and - - . . - . . , \r, I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section II, Part  able NF-2) 
Yield Strenath ISv) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressul-e Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
I " . ,, I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part B; SB-209, Table 3), which I 
provides specifications for aluminum and aluminum-alloy sheet and plate 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (S,) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DlRS 1581 151, Section II, Part B, SB-209, Table 3), which I provides s~edifications for aluminum and aluminum-alloy sheet and plate 
Percentaae Elonaation 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
- - (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Ssection 11, Part B, SB-209, Table 3), which 
provides specifications for aluminum and aluminum-alloy sheet and plate 
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Table 2. Sources of Material Properties for Str~~ctural  Analyses (Continued) 
Yield Strength (S,)  
Material Property 
Elastic Modulus (E) 
Mean Coefficient of Thermal 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (S,) I 
Source 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TM-2) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D, Table TE-2) 
200 1 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table NF-I) 
Percentage Elongation  
Elastic Modulus (E) 
SB-265 R52400 (Ti Grade 7)  (Drip Shield) 
I Mean Coefficient of Thermal 
Density (p) 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Iiection 11, Part D, Table NF-2) 
Properties and Selection: Nonlferrous Alloys and Special-Purpose Materials. 
Volume 2 of ASM Handbook (ASM lnternational 1990 [DIRS 141 61 51, Table 
20, p. 620) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D; Table Y-1) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part B; SB-265, Table I) ,  which 
provides specifications for titanium and titanium alloy strip, sheet, and plate 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part B, SB-265, Table I ) ,  which 
provides specifications for titanium and titanium alloy strip, sheet, and plate 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D; Table TM-5) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TE-5) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D; Table NF-1) 
Properties and Selection: Nonferrous Alloys and Special-Purpose Materials. 
Volume 2 of ASM Handbook ( ISM lnternational 1990 [DIRS 141 61 51, Table 
21, p. 621) 
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SB-265 R56405 (Ti Grade 24) (Drip Shield Structural Members) 
Density (p) 
Yield Strength (S,) 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (S,,) 
Percentage Elongation 
Elastic Modulus (E) 
Mean Coefficient of Thermal 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
Properties and Selection: Nonferrous Alloys and Special-Purpose Materials. 
Volume 2 of ASM Handbook (PSM lnternational 1990 [DIRS 141 61 51, Table 
20, p. 620). 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part B, SB-265, Table 3), which 
provides specifications for titanium and titanium alloy strip, sheet, and plate 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part B, SB-265, Table I ) ,  which 
provides specifications for titan~um and titanium alloy strip, sheet, and plate 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part B, SB-265, Table 1) 
Properties and Selection: Nonferrous Alloys and Special-Purpose Materials. 
Volume 2 of ASM Handbook (ASM lnternational 1990 [DIRS 141 61 51, Table 
21, p. 621) 
Properties and Selection: Nonl'errous Alloys and Special-Purpose Materials. 
Volume 2 of ASM Handbook (ASM International 1990 [DIRS 141 61 51, Table 
20, p. 620) 
Properties and Selection: Nonferrous Alloys and Special-Purpose Materials. 
Volume 2 of ASM Handbook (ASM lnternational 1990 [DIRS 141 61 51, Table 
Table 2. Sources of Material Properties for Str~~ctural  Analyses (Continued) 
I Material Property 1 Source I . - I 
Alloy 22 NO6022 (88-575 N06022) (Outer Corrosion Barrier, Emplacement Pallet Plates) 
Densitv (0) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part B, SB-575, Section 7.1), which provides 
specifications for low-carbon nickel-molybdenum-chromium, low-carbon nickel- 
chromium-molvbdenum, low-carbon nickel-chromium-molvbdenum-copper, and 
. .  - I low-carbon nickel-chromium-molybdenum-tungsten alloy plate, sheet, and strip 
Yield Strenath IS,) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 
- . ,, , . 1 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table Y-I) 
Ultimate Tensile Strenath IS,,) 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581 151, SB-575, Table 3), which provides specifications for low- 
carbon nickel-molybdenum-chromium, low-carbon nickel-chromium- 
molybdenum, low-carbon nickel-chromium-molybdenum-copper, and low- 
carbon nickel-chromium-molybdenum-tungsten alloy plate, sheet, and strip 
Elastic Modulus (E) 
Mean.Coefficient Of Thermal 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
4.2.3 Thermal 
Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes lnternational 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 15) 
Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes International 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 14) 
Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes lnternational 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 13) 
Properties and Selection: Stainless Steels, Tool Materials and Special- 
Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of Metals Handbook (ASM 1980 [DIRS 10431 71, p. 
143). Poisson's ratio for Allov 625 is used for Allov 22 NO6022 (Assum~tion 
Thermal Conductivity (k) 
Specific Heat (c,) 
As is the case for structural analyses, the engineering designs of the waste package, emplacement 
pallet, drip shield, and surface facilities are also input to the thermal analyses. In addition, the 
5.2.8.2) 
Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes International 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 13) 
Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes International 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 13) 
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Neutronit A 978 (Neutron Absorber Plates) 
NOTE: At the time of this revision a new material (a nickel-g,adilium alloy) has just been selected for 
absorber plates. 
Density (p) 
Yield Strength (S,) 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (S,) 
Percentage Elongation ' 
Elastic Modulus (E) 
Mean Coefficient of Thermal 
Expansion 
Poisson's Ratio (E) 
Future revisions to this document will make the change. 
Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Eng,ineering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 17). Thc? density of Neutronit A 976 is used for 
Neutronit A 978 (Assumption 5.2.8.1 1) 
Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Engheering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 15). The yield strength of Neutronit A 976 is used for 
Neutronit A 978 (Assumption 5.2.8.1 1) 
Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Eng,heering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 15). The ultimate strength of Neutronit A 976 is used 
for Neutronit A 978 (Assumption 5.2.8.1 1) 
Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Engineering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 15). The percentage elongation of Neutronit A 976 is 
used for Neutronit A 978 (Assumption 5.2.8.1 1) 
Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Engineering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 17). The elastic modulus of Neutronit A 976 is used for 
Neutronit A 978 (Assumption 5.2.8.1 1) 
2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TE-1). The coefficient of thermal 
expansion of Neutronit A 976 is used for Neutronit A 978 (Assumption 5.2.8.1 1) 
Properties and Selection: Stainlt?ss Steels, Tool Materials and Special- 
Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of Metals Handbook (ASM 1980 [DIRS 10431 71, 
Figure 15, p. 755). Poisson's ratio for Neutronit A 976 is used for Neutronit A 
978 (Assum~tion 5.2.8.1 1 \ 
thermal properties for the design materials and the configuration of the natural system are needed 
for thermal analyses. 
4.2.3.1 Thermal Material Properties 
The material properties used in thermal analyses are fourtd in the references listed in Table 3 for 
the major materials used in the design. 
Table 3. Sources of Material Properties for Thermal Analyses 
Material Property Source 
I 
SA-240 S31600 (SS 31 6) (Inner Vessel) 
Density (p) Standard Practice for Prepa~ing, Cleaning, and Evaluating Corrosion Test 
Specimens (ASTM G 1-90 1999 [DIRS 10351 51, Table X I  . I)  
Emissivity (E) Marks' Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers (Avallone and 
- . ,  
Baumeister 1987 [DIRS 103Ei081, p. 4-68) 
Thermal Conductivity (k) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pres$;ure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TCD) 
Specific Heat (c,) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DlRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TCD)--computed from I the thermal dihusivity 
2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part B, SB-575, Section 7.1), which 
provides specifications for low-carbon nickel-molybdenum-chromium, low- 
carbon nickel-chromium-molybdenum, low-carbon nickel-chromium- 
molvbdenum-copper, and low-carbon nickel-chromium-molvbdenum- I tungsten alloy piate, sheet, and strip 
Emissivity ( E )  I CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics (Lide 1995 [DIRS 101 8761, p. 10- 
297) for nickel-chromium alloy 
Thermal Conductivity (k) Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes International 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 13) 
Specific Heat (c,) Hastelloy C-22 Alloy (Haynes; International 1997 [DIRS 1008961, p. 13) 
SB-265 R52400 (Ti Grade 7, also used for Ti Grade 24) (Drip Shield) 
Density (p) 2001 ASME Boiler and Presa:ure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D, Table NF-2) 
Emissivity (E) CRC Handbook of Chemisty and Physics, 76'" Edition, 1995- 1996 (Lide 
1995 [DIRS 1018761, p. 10-2'38) 
Thermal Conductivity (k) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D, Table TCD) 
Specific Heat (c,) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
I (ASME 2001 [DlRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D, Table TCD) computed from [ the thermal diffusivity 
SB-209 A96061 T4 (Alloy 6061 T4) and SB-209 A96061 T4fil (Alloy 6061 T451) (Thermal Shunts) 
Densitv (01 1 2001 ASME Boiler and Press:ure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
. .. , I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table NF-2) 
Emissivitv (E) I Marks' Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers (Avallone and 
. . ,  
Baumeister 1987 [DIRS 103Ei081, p. 4-68) 
Thermal Conductivity (k) 2001 ASME Boiler and Press:ure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 11, Part D, Table TCD) 
Specific Heat (c,) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Table TCD) computed from 
I the thermal diffusivity 
Neutronit A 978 (Neutron Absorber Plates) 
Density (p) Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Engineering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kiigler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 17) 
Emissivitv IE )  Marks' Standard Handbook fix Mechanical Engineers (Avallone and , , ,  I Baumeister 1 ~ ~ ~ ' [ D I R s  1035081, p. 4-68).   he value for stainless steel 316 
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Table 3. Sources of Material Properties for Thermal Analyses (Continued) 
Material Property Source 
Thermal Conductivity (k) Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Engineering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
. . .  
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 17) 
Specific Heat (c,) Sheet and Plate for Nuclear Engineering, BOHLER Neutronit A976 (Kugler 
1997 [DIRS 1343271, p. 17) 
SA-516 KO2700 (A 516, Grade 70) (Fuel Assembly Tubes, Basket Guides) 
Density (p) 2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda) 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part A, SA-20, Section 14.1), which 
provides specifications for general requirements for steel plates for pressure 
vessels 
EmissivitV (E) Marks' Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers (Avallone and 
- . .  
Thermal Conductivity (k) 
Soecific Heat fc,\ - - - . . . - . . - -. . 
, -v ,  I (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D: Table TCD) 
Uranium Dioxide (Fuel) 
Densitv fo\ I Nuclear Systems I: Thermal ,Yvdraulic Fundamentals (Todreas and Kazimi - - . . - . - ,\r, 
1990 [ D I G  1077351, p. 296) - 
Emissivity (8) MATPRCrVersion 1 1 (Revision 2), A Handbook of Materials Properties for 
Use in the Analysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behavior (Hagrman et [ al. 1981 [DIRS 1035221,- quat ti on A-3.2, p. 48) 
Thermal Conductivity (k) I Nuclear Systems I: Thermal ~Yydraulic Fundamentals (Todreas and Kazimi 
. . 
Specific Heat (c,) 
Densitv (0) 
. .. , I (ASM International 1990 [DIFIS 141 61 51, p. 666) 
Emissivity (E) I MATPRO-Version 1 1 (Revi.sion 2), A Handbook of Materials Properties for 
- . .  
Use in the Analysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behavior (Hagrman et 
al. 1981 [DIRS 1035221, Equ.ation B-3.lb, p. 230, calculated as a function of 
zirconium oxide layer thickness 
Thermal Conductivity (k) MATPR&Version 11 (Revision 2), A Handbook of Materials Properties for 
Use in the Analysis of Light Water Reactor Fuel Rod Behavior (Hagrman et I al. 1981 [DIRS 103522],~qu,ation 8-2.1, p. 217) 
Specific Heat (cD) I Nuclear Systems I: Thermal Hydraulic Fundamentals (Todreas and Kazimi 
. 7 ,  I 1990 [ D I ~  1077351, p. 296) - 
Helium (Fuel Rod and Waste Paclkage Fill Gas) 
Densitv (01 1 2001 ASHRAE Handbook, F~~ndamentals (ASHRAE 2001 [DIRS 1577891, p. 
. .. , 1 19.71) 
Thermal Conductivity (k) 1 2001 ASHRAE Handbook, F~~ndamentals (ASHRAE 2001 [DIRS 1577891, p. 
- . .  1 19.71) 
Suecific Heat (co) 1 2001 ASHRAE Handbook, Fi~ndamentals (ASHRAE 2001 [DIRS 1577891, p. 
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Table 3. Sources of Material Properties for Thermal Analyses (Continued) 
Material Pro~ertv I Source 
. . I 
Soil ~ultimeier and Thermal Properties Sensor on selected Potential 
Candidate Backfill Materials Used in .the Engineered Barrier System (DTN: 
Density (p) 
Emissivity (E) 
Thermal Conductivitv (k) 
Thermal Properties 
Soil Multimeter and Thermal Properties Sensor on Selected Potential 
Candidate Backfill Materials Used in the Engineered Barrier System (DTN: 
GS000483351030.003 [DIRI; 1529321) 
Introduction to Heat Transfer: (Incropera and DeWitt 1996 [DIRS 1077841, 
p. 768). Use quartz sand as surrogate. 
Thermal Pro~erties Measure'd 12/01/99 to 12/02/99 Using the Thermolink 
4.2.3.2 Configuration of the Natural System and Tlhermal Transport Properties Thereof 
Specific Heat (c,) 
The layout of the subsurface area is shown in Figure 3, taken from Underground Layout 
Configuration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1655721, Figure 5). The emplacement drifts will be located 
within the lower part of the lithophysal zone of the densely welded devitrified lithophysal-rich 
tuff (TSwl) unit and the entire densely welded devitrified lithophysal-poor tuff (TSw2) unit of 
the Topopah Spring Tuff (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1655721, Table 11-2). The rock layer thicknesses are 
measured at the location of N233,760 m and E170,750 m; the ground surface elevation is 
4,663 ft (1421.3 m). 
GS000483351030.003 [DIRS 152932 
Thermal Properties 
Soil Multimeter and Thermal Properties Sensor on Selected Potential 
Candidate Backfill Materials IUsed in the Engineered Barrier System (DTN: 
The stratigraphy of the major geologic units near the center of the repository, and characteristic 
thermal transport properties rock, are taken from: 
Revised Heat Capacity of Yucca Mo~mtain Stratigraphic Units (DTN: 
SN0307T0510902.003 [DIRS 1641961) for heat capacity of all rock layers 
Revised Thermal Conductivity of the Non-Repos:itory Layers of Yucca Mountain (DTN: 
SN0303T0503102.008 [DIRS 1624011) for density and thermal conductivity of 
non-repository layers 
Thermal Conductivity of the Potential Repository Horizon Rev 3 (DTN: 
SN0404T0503 102.01 1 [DIRS 1691291) for dlensity and thermal conductivity of 
Repository Layers. 
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Figure 3. Underground Layout Configuration 
4.2.4 Shielding 
Shielding calculations determine radiation dose rates on waste package surfaces and in the 
vicinity of these surfaces. Radiation dose rate is a function of the radiation type, radiation energy 
spectrum and intensity, radiation interaction information, material compositions and densities, 
system geometry, and flux-to-dose rate conversion factors. In addition, radiation dose rate is 
dependent on the assumed location of the detector. 
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4.2.4.1 Radiation Source Terms 
The radiation source terms of the waste forms are an important input to shielding calculations. 
The radiation source terms consist of neutron and photon intensities as functions of their 
energies. The radiation source terms for commercial S:NF have been generated for PWR and 
BWR fuel designs. These are documented in the followin~g: 
PWR Source Term Generation and Evaluation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169061) 
BWR Source Term Generation and Evaluation (B!3C 2003 [DIRS 1643641). 
For HLW glass, photon and neutron source terms are generated using the design basis glass 
developed at the Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing Facility and are provided in 
Source Terms for HLW Glass Canisters (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1519471, Attachment V, 
p. V-1, and Attachment VI, p. VI-1). The Savannah River Site source terms are used in shielding 
evaluations because they are expected to be the highest: of all HLW glass. If future changes 
result in a higher level radioactive waste glass canister, it will be evaluated. 
DOE SNF has been categorized into nine fuel groups: 
1. Uranium Metal Fuels (N-Reactor fuel) 
2. Uranium-Zirconiurn/Uranium-Molybdenum Fuels (Fermi Liquid Metal Reactor fuel) 
3. Uranium Oxide Fuels (high enriched uranium fuels-Shippingport PWR fuel) 
4. Uranium Oxide Fuels (low enriched uranium fuels-Three Mile Island-2 PWR fuel) 
5. Uranium-Aluminum Fuels (foreign research reactor fuel) 
6. Uranium/Thorium/Plutonium Carbide Fuels (Ft. St. Vrain Gas Cooled Reactor fuel) 
7. Mixed Oxide Fuels (Fast Flux Test Facility Reactor fuel) 
8. UraniumIThorium Oxide Fuels (Shippingport Light Water Breeder Reactor fuel) 
9. Uranium-Zirconium-Hydride Fuels (TRIGA fuel). 
A representative fuel type is chosen as a bounding case for each group. Burnup, fissile 
enrichments, and total fuel mass determine the selection of the representative fuel used for 
shielding and criticality analysis. The bounding source terms for each fuel group are provided in 
the following documents. 
Shippingport LWBR (TWU Oxide) Fuel Characteristics for Disposal Criticality Analysis 
(DOE 1999 [DIRS 1050071) 
FFTF (MOX) Fuel Characteristics for Disposal Criticality Analysis (INEEL 2002 
[DIRS 1588201) 
Fermi (U-Mo) Fuel Characteristics for Disposal Criticality Analysis (DOE 1999 
[DIRS 104 1 101) 
Shippingport PWR (HEU Oxide) Fuel Characteristics for Disposal Criticality Analysis 
(DOE 1999 [DIRS 1049401) 
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TRZGA (UZrH) Fuel Characteristics for Disposal Criticality Analysis (DOE 1999 
[DIRS 1038911) 
N Reactor (U-metal) Fuel Characteristics for Diisposal Criticality Analysis (DOE 2000 
[DIRS 1500951) 
Fort Saint Vrain HTGR (TWU Carbide) Fuel (:haracteristics for Disposal Criticality 
Analysis (Taylor 2001 [DIRS 1547261) 
Statement of Work for DOE-Ofice of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, 
Technical Assistance on Melt-Dilute Criticality and Shielding Analyses, Revision 2, May 
30,2001 (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1552451) 
Intact and Degraded Mode Criticality Calculations for the Codisposal of TMZ-2 Spent 
Nuclear Fuel in a Waste Package (BSC 2004 [DIIRS 168935 I). 
4.2.4.2 Radiation Interaction Information 
Radiation interaction information is available in the computer code packages used in shielding 
calculations (Sections 6.4.1.3 and 6.4.1.4). This information is derived from evaluated nuclear 
data libraries by processing it into formats suitable for the individual codes. An evaluated 
nuclear data library is produced by combining experilnentally measured cross sections with 
results predicted by theoretical nuclear calculations, in (an attempt to extract the most accurate 
cross-section information. 
4.2.4.3 Material Chemical Compositions and Densities 
Radiation interaction information contains microscopic cross sections of individual nuclides. A 
microscopic cross section may be interpreted as the effective cross-sectional area presented by 
the target atom or electron to the incident particle for a given interaction. Microscopic cross 
sections deal with probabilities of the interaction of radiation with individual targets (nuclei or 
electrons). Macroscopic cross sections (number density times microscopic cross section) are 
related to probabilities for interaction with the aggregate of targets that compose the medium 
through which the radiation is passing. Macroscopic cross sections have units of reciprocal 
length (cm-I), and act as linear attenuation coefficients in photon transport. Shielding analyses 
require macroscopic cross sections in order to deternline interactions of radiation with the 
materials of the system. The codes calculate the macroscopic cross sections based on material 
compositions and densities, and, in the case of Monte Carlo radiation transport codes, the 
macroscopic cross sections of the materials determine the collision site and select the target 
element. The chemical compositions and densities of the materials in a waste package shielding 
calculation are available in the American Society for Testing and Materials standards database. 
4.2.4.4 Flux-to-Dose Rate Conversion Factors 
Flux-to-dose rate conversion factors are contained in the computer code packages used in 
shielding calculations (Sections 6.4.1.3 and 6.4.1.4). 
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4.2.5 Criticality Analyses 
Criticality analyses are performed to assure waste forms will not be loaded in a manner leading 
to the formation of a critical mass and, consequently, a nuclear criticality event. The process for 
analyzing the potential for criticality during the prec1o:sure period is described in Preclosure 
Criticality Analysis Process Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1695901). A risk-informed methodology 
will be used for criticality analyses during the postclosure period. Details of the criticality 
analysis models, including inputs, are given in the follovving reports: Errata for Isotopic Model 
Report for Commercial SNF Bumup Credit (BSC 2003 [DIRS 168037]), Configuration 
Generator Model for In-Package Criticality (BSC 2003 [DIRS 165629]), Geochemistry Model 
Validation Report: External Accumulation Model (BSC 2001 [DIRS 156324]), Geochemistry 
Model Validation Report: Material Degradation ana! Release Model (BSC 2001 [DIRS 
156790]), and Criticality Model Report (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1657331). 
4.3 INTERFACE WITH OTHER PROJECT ORGA,NIZATIONS 
Waste package, emplacement pallet, 'and drip shield design input is dependent on several parallel 
tasks including facility design, preclosure safety analys.is, and fabrication methods. Interface 
Exchange Drawings define the interfaces with the Perfomlance Assessment Project. 
Facilities design is in an early stage at the present time and will not be complete at the time of 
License Application submittal. Additional design analysis will be performed, if necessary, as the 
facilities design matures and risks are evaluated. 
5. WASTE PACKAGE COMPONENT DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumptions involved in making calculations or perfixrning analytical work may be divided 
into two categories. The first category consists of generic assumptions that can be part of a 
calculation process or computational tool. Appropriate generic assumptions are addressed in this 
report that relate to the processing and disposal of the range of waste forms in the repository. 
The second category of assumptions are specific assumptions related to a particular analysis or 
calculation. An example of a specific assumption is an assumption necessary to perform a drop 
calculation for a particular waste package. Some, but not all, specific assumptions are addressed 
in this report. Each individual calculation report describes all assumptions pertaining to the 
specific calculation. 
None of the assumptions listed in this section were used in this report to produce quality related 
results in the sense of generating numeric values or dlefining a specific component design; 
however, they define the assumptions appropriate to the: methodology. If the methodology is 
used in consonance with this document to produce quality related results in future analyses, then 
the quality of these assumptions (and whether or not they require further verification) will be 
determined at that time. 
5.1 SOURCE TERM GENERATION ASSUMPTIONS 
Source term calculations provide heat generation rates, photon and neutron. spectra and 
intensities, and radionuclide inventories of commercial SNF assemblies, DOE SNF, and HLW. 
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The heat generation rates are used in thermal evaluations of the waste packages and the host rock 
of the repository. The photon and neutron sources arc: used to determine the radiation level 
surrounding a waste package. The radionuclide inventories are used to determine dose rates due 
to the release of radionuclides from the waste packages during the postclosure period. The 
source terms discussed in this section are not used for criticality. Source term calculations for 
criticality are discussed in Sections 4.1.4.4 and 5.5. 
5.1.1 Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Forms 
Assumptions related to the evaluation of source terms fi-om commercial SNF waste forms are 
discussed in the following sections. 
5.1.1.1 Generic Fuel Assemblies and Burnup Histories 
It is assumed that the commercial SNF waste stream can be approximated by calculating source 
terms for generic PWR and BWR assemblies at incremental enrichments and burnups and that a 
generic burnup history (without the modeling of outages;, intermittent down times, etc.) can be 
used for the depletion calculations. The rationale for this assumption is based on the analysis 
provided in NUREiGJCR-5625 (Hermann et al. 1994 [DRS 154045]), which shows that the heat 
generation rates of generic PWR and BWR SNF assemblies, in watts per kg U, do not vary 
significantly with details of irradiation history for a given burnup and cooling time between 5 
and 100 years. Design basis values of fuel parameters (enrichment, burnup, and aging) can be 
different for shielding analysis and thermal analysis. 
The decay heat rates include the contributions from the radiation generated by the fission 
products and from the radiation generated by the actinides in commercial SNF. The fission 
product contribution dominates the decay heat generation initially, but its importance decreases 
with time relative to the actinide contribution. Fission product generation is sensitive to the 
assembly burnup, which is determined by the total number of fissions. It is less sensitive to the 
neutron spectra or actinide compositions because the fission yields vary slowly with these 
variables. While the irradiation history, especially for the last reactor cycle, will greatly 
influence the short-lived fission products, the dependence of the decay heat rate on the specific 
power exists only for the first five years of cooling. The mandatory five-year cooling period 
before waste acceptance, as dictated in 10 CFR 961.1 1, will progressively decrease the 
dependence of the heat generation rate on the short-lived1 fission products and allow for the use 
of generic burnup histories for the depletion calculations. This assumption is used in Section 6.1. 
5.1.1.2 Uniform Specific Power 
An average uniform specific power over the entire length of the assembly is assumed, and the 
total irradiation interval is determined as the ratio of the ;assembly burnup to the specific power. 
The rationale for using a uniform power within the as:;embly volume is that the subsequent 
shielding and thermal evaluations can conservatively take into account the burnup axial profile 
through an axial peaking factor (Section 5.4.1). This assumption is used in Section 6.1. 
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5.1.1.3 Interpolation in Arrays of Results 
It is assumed that the source terms can be generated for an array of various enrichments, 
burnups, and decay times and that interpolation can then be used to obtain the source terms of 
any specific assemblies in the waste stream without requiring explicit modeling of the 
assemblies. The rationale for this assumption is that, as described in Section 5.1.1.1, for a .given 
burnup and cooling time during the repository preclosure period, the decay heat rate, in watts per 
kg U, is relatively constant for different fuel assembly types. For a sufficient number of 
enrichments, burnups, and decay times, the source term error resulting from interpolation is on 
the order of the resolution of the calculational methods. This assumption is used in Section 6.1. 
5.1.1.4 Assembly Mass Loading 
As discussed in section 4.2.1.1, the B&W Mark B assembly is used as the generic PWR fuel 
lattice for analysis due to its high initial heavy metal loatling and large amount of stainless steel 
and Inconel hardware. It is assumed that the initial heavy metal loading of a PWR assembly is 
475 kg of heavy metal, instead of the 464 kg of a typical B&W Mark B assembly (Punatar 2001 
[DIRS 1556351, Table 3.1). For a BWR assembly, the initial heavy metal loading is assumed to 
be 200 kg, instead of the 184 kg of a typical GE 8 x 8 I8WR fuel assembly (Larsen et al. 1976 
[DIRS 1465761, p. A-2). The rationale for these assumptions is that a higher initial uranium 
loading leads to a proportionally higher source term, which is generally more conservative for 
design considerations. Design basis values of fuel parameters (enrichment, burnup, and aging) 
can be different for shielding analysis and thermal ;analysis. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.1. 
5.1.2 Non-Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Forms 
Assumptions related to evaluation of source terms from non-commercial SNF waste forms are 
discussed in the following sections. 
5.1.2.1 U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Forms 
For DOE SNF, it is assumed that the total initial radionuclide inventory provided by Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (DOIE 2003 [DIRS 1633771) is adequate for 
the analyses of the repository at Yucca Mountain. The rationale for this assumption is that the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory has generated inventories for several 
representative fuel types in the DOE SNF waste stream, which are used to generate radionuclide 
inventories for the rest of the waste stream. This assumption is used in Section 6.1.2.2. 
5.1.2.2 Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste 
For HLW in borosilicate glass logs, the defense HLW historical information regarding the 
inventory at the various sites is used in decay calculations to generate initial radionuclide 
inventories (originally DOE 2002 [DIRS 1559701, Appendix A, and later Hamel 2003 [DIRS 
1649471, Allison 2004 [DIRS 1687341, and WVNS 2003 [DIRS 1686611)). These inventories 
are then used in ORIGEN-S decay calculations to obtain source terms over time. The ORIGEN- 
S code is described in Section 6.1.1.2. It is assumed that the information for the material planned 
for disposal at Yucca Mountain is adequately represented by the radionuclide inventories 
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provided by the sites. Again, the rationale for this assulnption is that the information provided 
represents an average of the material, not the bounding. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.1.2.3. 
5.2 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
A wide array of structural calculations assumptions is discussed in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Contact Stiffness Between Waste Package and Impact Surface 
For ANSYS calculations, the assumption is made that the contact stiffness between the waste 
package and the impact surface can be determined iteratively. The rationale for this assumption 
is explained in the following paragraph. LS-DYNA calcu~lations do not require this assumption. 
The magnitude of the contact stiffness (between surfaces used in the simulation) is a parameter 
that influences the resulting stresses. If the stiffness value is very large; stiffness matrix 
ill-conditioning and divergence will occur. Similarly, an extremely small stiffness value results 
in compatibility violations. Therefore, an optimum value for the contact stiffness is one that is 
between the two and is arrived at iteratively. Therefore, an iterative process to determine the 
value of contact stiffness used in the finite element simu1:ation is deemed acceptable for transient 
dynamic solutions. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.2. 
5.2.2 Emplacement Pallet Lift 
The acceleration used for the emplacement pallet lift is 1.10 m/s2 (total upward acceleration being 
10.81 m/s2 including gravity). The rationale for this assumption is that it conservatively 
represents the lifting of the emplacement pallet by the enlplacement gantry and provides a basis 
for the lifting strength of the emplacement pallet. This as:sumption is used in Section 6.2.2.2. 
5.2.3 Geometry of Collapsed Drift 
The deterioration of the rock blocks surrounding the potential repository emplacement drifts 
increases the external pressure on the drip shield. This additional loose rock load, which takes 
place in lithophysal units, will be taken into structural de.sign considerations in accordance with 
the information provided in Drift Degradation Analysis (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1685501, Section 6.4). 
This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.2. 
5.2.4 First Failure of Inner Vessel Lid for Pressurization Event Sequence 
For evaluation of the pressurization event sequence, the inner vessel lid is assumed to fail before 
the outer lid; however, no structural credit is assumed for the outer lid. The rationale for this 
assumption is that, despite the ductile nature of the inner vessel, the gap between the inner vessel 
lid and outer lid at the waste package bottom end is large enough that the inner vessel lid can 
experience a nonlinear deformation sufficient to develop a through-wall crack. This assumption 
is used in Section 6.2.2.3. 
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5.2.5 Strain Rate Effect on Material Properties 
Strain rate effects are also known as material strain-rate sensitivity or viscoplasticity. Of all 
materials that are currently used in engineered barrie~r system, the strain rate data is only 
available for 304 stainless steel and is used when po;ssible. Where strain rate data is nit  
available, the material properties obtained under the static loading conditions are used. The 
impact of using material properties obtained under static loading conditions is small. The 
rationale for this assumption is that the change of mechanical properties of subject materials at 
the peak strain rates that typically occur during the simulated events does not have significant 
effect on the results presented in calculations. This assumption is used in Sections 6.2.2.4 and 
6.2.2.5. 
5.2.6 Uniform Strains 
5.2.6.1 Uniform Strain of SA-516 KO2700 Carbon Steel 
The uniform strain (the strain corresponding to the uniaxial tensile strength) of SA-516 KO2700 
carbon steel is not available in literature. Therefore, it is conservatively assumed that the 
uniform strain is 50 percent of the elongation. The rationale for this assumption is the character 
of the stress-strain curve for 'SA-36 carbon steel (Boyer 2000 [DIRS 1526561, p. 305; Bowles 
1980 [DIRS 1534091, Figure 1-3, p. l l ) ,  which has a siinilar chemical composition as SA-516 
KO2700 carbon steel (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Secti'on 11, Part A, SA-5 16lSA-5 16M, Table 
1 and SA-36lSA-36M, Table 2). This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.6.2 Uniform Strain of 316L Stainless Steel 
The uniform strain of 316L stainless steel is not available in the open literature. Therefore, it is 
conservatively assumed that the uniform strain is 60 percent of the elongation. The rationale for 
this assumption is the character of the stress-strain curve for 316L stainless steel (Boyer 2000 
[DIRS 1526561, p. 305). This assumption is used in Secticon 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.6.3 Uniform Strain of SB-575 NO6022 (Alloy :22 N06022) and SA-240 S31600 (SS 
316) 
Three-stage deformation characteristics are not observed in the stress-strain curves for Alloy 22 
NO6022 (DTN: LL020603612251.015 [DIRS 1604301) or Type 316 (Boyer 2000 [DIRS 
1526561, p. 302) stainless steel. Therefore, it is conservatively assumed that the uniform strain is 
90 percent of the elongation. The rationale for this assumption is the character of the stress- 
strain curves for Alloy 22 NO6022 and Type 316 stainless steel. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.6.4 Uniform Strain of 304 Stainless Steel 
The uniform strain of 304 stainless steel is not available in literature. Therefore, it is 
conservatively assumed that the uniform strain is 75 percent of the elongation. The rationale for 
this assumption is the character of stress-strain curve for 304 stainless steel (Boyer 2000 [DIRS 
1526563, p. 294). This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
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5.2.6.5 Uniform Strain of Ti-7 and Ti-24 
The uniform strains of Ti-7 and Ti-24 are not available in literature. Therefore, it is assumed that 
the uniform strain is equal to the elongation. The rationale for this assumption is that a small 
change in tangent modulus does not significantly affect the results of this calculation. This 
assumption is used in Sections 6.2.2.4 and 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.7 Assumptions for Missile Impact Analysis 
Assumptions for structural calculations of missile impact are discussed in this section. The 
analysis is for missiles resulting from Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences and not for 
missiles due to terrorism. 
5.2.7.1 Application of Empirical Relationships for Impact Analysis 
Empirical equations were developed for the perforation of ductile mild steel plates (Jones 1994 
[DIRS 1377001). These relations are assumed to give conservative results for the waste package 
inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. The rationale for this assumption is that nickel alloys 
have higher strength and ductility than mild steels (low-carbon steels), and the ductility of 
stainless steel is higher than that of mild steel. Therefore, these empirical relations can be 
conservatively used to approximate behavior of the waste package inner vessel and outer 
corrosion barrier impacted by an accidentally released missile. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.2.2.4. 
5.2.7.2 Assumption of Waste Package as Flat Plate for Impact Analysis 
Empirical relations of flat plates are assumed to be applicable to determining the structural 
response of the waste package to an impact load. The fixed-end boundary conditions of the 
waste package in the localized region of impact are assumed to be similar to those of the flat 
plate shown in the reference (Jones 1994 [DIRS 137700]., Figure 1, p. 57). The rationale for this 
assumption is that the effect of shell curvature is small compared to the plate thickness and the 
waste package in the vicinity of the impact region will resemble. a geometric configuration 
similar to a flat plate with fixed ends (Figure 4). This ass~smption is used in Section 6.2.2.4. 
Figure 4. Flat Plate Representation of Impact Analysis 
5.2.8 General Assumptions for Waste Package Drop Analyses 
The following assumptions are used for the waste package tipover, swing down, comer drop, 
horizontal drop, and vertical drop analyses. As the preliminary and final hazards analyses are 
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completed, the drop analyses will be reviewed to ensure that design parameters are consistent 
with the hazards identified. Assumptions specific to each drop analysis are presented in separate 
subsections. 
The drops and drop heights, taken from Preliminary Nuclear Safety Design Bases for License 
Application (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1651821 Table A-2, Page A-13), are defined as: 
Waste Package Tipover-the waste package is at rest on the ground in a vertical 
position and an external force (such as a seismic event) causes the waste package to tip 
over and impact the ground. A tipover from an elevated surface is also considered and 
bounds the tip over from a flat surface due to the higher impact energy. 
Waste Package Swing Down-the waste package is being lifted in a horizontal 
orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting device inadvertently releases one end. 
One end of the waste package remains held by the lifting device while the other end 
swings down and impacts the ground. 
Waste Package Corner Drop-the waste package is being lifted in a vertical orientation 
at a height of 2.0 m when the lifting device inadvertently drops it. A corner of the waste 
package impacts the ground first. 
Waste Package Horizontal Drop-the waste package is being lifted in a horizontal 
orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting device inadvertently drops it. The waste 
package impacts the ground squarely on its side. 
Waste Package Vertical Drop-the waste p'ackage is being lifted in a vertical 
orientation at a height of 2.0 m when the lifting device inadvertently drops it. The waste 
package impacts the ground squarely on its base. 
Horizontal Drop with Emplacement Pallet--the emplacement pallet with waste 
package is being lifted in a horizontal orientatio~i when the lifting device inadvertently 
drops it from a height of 2.0 m (floor to pallet, or 2.4 m floor to waste package). The 
emplacement pallet with waste package impacts the ground along its horizontal axis. 
This is also done as a horizontal drop onto the emplacement pallet. The emplacement 
pallet is the object considered that may puncture the waste package. 
The drop analyses are performed with the trunnion collar attached to the fully loaded waste 
package because that is the normal condition for moving the waste package. The swing down 
and corner drops are variations of the vertical and horizontal drops and use the same drop heights 
listed for the vertical and horizontal drops. These assumptions are used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.8.1 Unyielding Target Surface 
The target surface for the falling or dropped waste packiage is assumed to be unyielding. The 
rationale for this assumption is that it maximizes the stress on the falling waste package. This 
assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
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5.2.8.2 Poisson's Ratio for Alloy 22 NO6022 
Poisson's ratio of Alloy 22 NO6022 is not available in the literature. The Poisson's ratio of Alloy 
625 (SB-443 N06625) is assumed for Alloy 22 NO6022 because the chemical compositions of 
Alloy 22 NO6022 (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section IT, Part B, SB-575, Table 1) and Alloy 
625 (ASM 1980 [DIRS 1043171, p. 143) are similar. Hence, the impact of this assumption is 
negligible. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
I - 5.2.8.3 Poisson's Ratio for SA-516 Carbon Steel 
Poisson's ratio is not available for SA-516 carbon steel. Therefore, Poisson's ratio of cast 
carbon steel is assumed for SA-516 carbon steel. The rationale for this assumption is that the 
elastic constants of cast carbon steels are only slightly affected by changes in composition and 
structure (ASM 1978 [DIRS 1020181, p. 393). Hence, the impact of this assumption is minimal. 
This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
I 5.2.8.4 Poisson's Ratio of 316L Stainless Steel 
The Poisson's ratio of 316L stainless steel is not available in the literature. The Poisson's ratio of 
316 stainless steel (SA-240 S31600) is assumed for 3161L stainless steel. The rationale for this 
assumption is the similar chemical compositions of these two stainless steels (ASME 2001 
[DIRS 1581151, Section 11, Part A, SA-240, Table 1). Hence, the impact of this assumption is 
minimal. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
I 5.2.8.5 Poisson's Ratio for 304L Stainless Steel 
Poisson's ratio for 304L stainless steel is not available in the literature. Therefore, it is assumed 
to be the same as Poisson's ratio for 304 stainless steel. The rationale for this assumption is that 
the chemical compositions of 304L stainless steel and 1304 stainless steel are similar (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 11, Part A, SA-240, Table 1:). Hence, the impact of this assumption 
is minimal. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
I 5.2.8.6 Temperature-Dependent Material Propertitts 
Some of the temperature-dependent material properties (density, Poisson's ratio, and elongation) 
are not available for SB-575 NO6022 (Alloy 22 N060223, SA-705 SO17400 (17-4 PH), SB-265 
R52400 (Titanium Grade 7), SB-265 R56400 (Titanium Grade 24), SA-516 KO2700 (SA-516 
carbon steel), SA-240 S31600 (316 stainless steel), S,4-240 S31603 (316L stainless steel), 
SA-240 S30403 (304L stainless steel), and SA-240 S30400 (304 stainless steel) (Poisson's ratio 
only). The room temperature (20°C) material properties are assumed for these materials. The 
impact of using room-temperature material properties is anticipated to be small. The rationale 
for this assumption is that undetermined mechanical properties of said materials will not 
significantly impact the results. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
I 5.2.8.7 Material Elongation Properties 
The elongation properties of Alloy 22 NO6022 and 3 16 stainless steel at elevated temperatures is 
not available from codes and standards. However, vendor data is available for the typical 
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elongation of Alloy 22 NO6022 and 316 stainless steel (Haynes International 1997 [DIRS 
1008961, p. 15; Allegheny Ludlum 1999 [DIRS 1514091, p. 8, respectively). For comparison 
purposes, the percent difference between typical elongation at room temperature and elevated 
temperatures can be normalized and applied to the data available from accepted codes, thus 
ensuring that the bounding case is covered. The rationale for this assumption is to be as 
reasonably accurate as possible. It would not be logic,al for the elongation values to remain 
constant over the range of temperatures under consideration. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.8.8 Poisson's Ratio for 17-4 PH SS in the H900 Condition 
The Poisson's Ratio for 17-4 PH in the H900 condition is not available from traditional sources. 
It is assumed that this value is 0.272. The rationale for this assumption is that this is what is 
available from vendor resources (High Temp Metals 2002 [DIRS 1580061). The impact of this 
assumption is anticipated to be negligible. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.8.9 Friction Coefficient between 316 Stainless Steel and 314L Stainless Steel 
The friction coefficient for contact between 316 stainless steel and 316L stainless steel is not 
available in literature. It is, therefore, assumed that the dynamic (sliding) friction coefficient for 
this contact is 0.4. The rationale for this assumption is that this friction coefficient represents the 
lower bound for the steel-on-steel contacts (Avallone ;md Baumeister 1987 [DIRS 1035081, 
Table 3.2.1, p. 3-26; Meriam and Kraige 1987 [DIRS 104.3061, p. 441). This assumption is used 
in Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.8.10 Temperature Dependent Properties for Titanium Grade 24 
The temperature-dependent tensile and yield strength olf Ti-24 are not available through the 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 2001 [IIIRS 158 1 151). However, vendor data 
for these material properties are available (TIMET 2000 [DIRS 1606881, Figure 1). Therefore, 
the tensile and yield strengths of Ti-24 from TIMET at elevated temperatures will be normalized 
and used with the room temperature values from ASME to calculate the tensile and yield 
strength of Ti-24 at elevated temperatures. The rationale for this assumption is that the ASME 
Boiler and Pressure Code states the minimum material properties. Therefore, calculating the 
minimum properties at elevated temperatures with this method provides a bounding value of 
tensile and yield strength of Ti-24 for this calculation. 
The temperature-dependent modulus of elasticity of Titanium Grade 24 is not available through 
the ASME Code or through the ASM Metals Handbook (ASM International 1990 [DIRS 
1416151). However, vendor data are available for this material property (TIMET 2000 [DIRS 
1606881, Table 2). Therefore, the modulus of elasticity of Ti-24 from TIMET at elevated 
temperatures will be normalized and used with room temperature values from the ASM Metals 
Handbook (ASM International 1990 [DIRS 1416151, Table 21, p. 621) to calculate the modulus 
of elasticity of Ti-24 at elevated temperatures. The rationale for this assumption is that the room 
temperature data is only adjusted by the trend in the ventlor data and not by the absolute values 
in the vendor data. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
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5.2.8.11 Structural Properties for Neutronit A 978 
Structural properties including density, yield stress, ultimate stress, percent elongation, Young's 
Modulus, thermal expansion coefficient, and Poisson's ratio are not available for 
Neutronit A 978. Therefore, the corresponding proper tie:^ for Neutronit A 976 are assumed for 
Neutronit A 978. The rationale for this assumption is that the two materials have similar 
chemical compositions. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2. 
5.2.9 Assumptions for the Representation of Waste P'ackage Loaded Internals 
The following assumptions may be used in applicable individual calculations. 
5.2.9.1 Commercial Waste Form Geometry 
The exact geometry of the waste form is simplified in such a way that its total mass is assumed 
to be distributed within a bar of square cross section with uniform mass density. The rationale 
for this assumption is to provide a simplified finite element representation without affecting 
computational results. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.9.2 Commercial Waste Form Material 
The waste form is assumed to be made of 304 stainless steel. The rationale for this assumption is 
that the end fittings of the form are made of 304 stainless steel (Punatar 2001 [DIRS 1556351, 
Section 2.1, p. 2-4 [for PWR]; Stout and Leider 1997 [DIIRS 1004191, p. 2.1.2.3 [for BWR]), and 
these are the parts that will come in contact with other components. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.9.3 Removal of Thermal Shunts 
The thermal shunts are removed for the purpose of structural calculations. The rationale for this 
assumption is that the purpose of the thermal shunts is not to provide structural support. Their 
removal provides a bounding set of results, while simplifying the finite element representation. 
This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.9.4 Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste Form and Internals 
The exact geometry of the loaded internals is simplified for the purpose of structural 
calculations. The waste package internal structures, borosilicate glass canisters, and all other 
internals are created as a solid cylinder with an appropriate mass value. The rationale for this 
assumption is that it simplifies the finite element representation and conservatively neglects 
energy absorption within the internal components. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.9.5 Pressurized Water Reactor Waste Form Design Parameters for 21-PWR 
The following design parameters are assumed for a PWR. SNF assembly to be loaded into a 21- 
PWR waste package: mass = 1705 lbs (773.4 kg), width := 8.5 in. (216.9 mm), and length = 174 
in. (4407 mm). The rationale for this assumption is th~at these parameters correspond to the 
B&W 15 x 15 fuel assembly, which is the heaviest PWR fuel assembly available (BSC 2003 
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[DIRS 1672731, Table 4). The mass of the B&W 15 x :15 fuel assembly has been increased by 
25 lbs (11.4 kg) to account for variations in fuel asserrtbly mass. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.2.2. 
South Texas PWR fuel assemblies will not be disposed in the 21-PWR waste package and are 
therefore excluded from this assumption. Design parameters for South Texas assemblies will be 
established during future design work for the 12-PWR waste package. 
5.2.10 Assumed Geometry of Lid Lifting Features for Waste Package Tip-Over 
The geometry of the lid lifting features is simplified for tip-over calculations. The total mass of 
each lifting feature is assumed to be distributed within a disc with uniform mass density and 
constructed of the same material as the lid to which it is attached. The rationale for this 
assumption is that only the mass of the lifting feature has an effect on structural calculations. 
This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.11 Assumed Angular Velocity for Waste Package Swing Down Analysis 
For the purposes of analyzing the initial angular velocity of the waste package before impact, the 
waste package will be assumed to be a solid cylinder. This is necessary to calculate the rotary 
moment of inertia. The impact of this assumption on the: results is negligible. The rationale for 
this assumption is the overall cylindrical shape of the waste package and the relatively solid 
packing of the contents. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.12 5 DHLWDOE-Short Waste Package Swing Down Height 
The angle of impact for the 5 DHLWIDOE-Short waste package swing down is assumed to be 
45 degrees. A swing down event is usually calculated as starting from the maximum allowable 
horizontal lift height of 7.9 ft (2.4 m); however, in this case the waste package would not reach 
the ground if swung down from that height. The rationale for this assumption is that 45 degrees 
will provide a good representation of a swing down event for this waste package. This 
assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.13 Assumed Geometrical Arrangement of Waste Package for Corner Drop Analysis 
For corner drop analysis, the waste package is assumed to strike the ground at an angle that puts 
the center of mass, which is assumed to coincide with the geometric center of the waste package, 
directly above the point of impact. The rationale for this assumption is that it induces the highest 
impact load on the waste package outer corrosion barrier. This assumption is used in 
Section 6.2.2.5.. 
5.2.14 Additional Assumptions for Waste Package Vertical Drop Analysis 
Assumptions for structural calculations of vertical drop analysis are discussed in this section. 
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5.2.14.1 Friction Coefficients for Vertical Drop Contacts Involving Alloy 22 NO6022 
The friction coefficients for contacts involving Alloy 22 NO6022 are not available in literature. 
It is, therefore, assumed that the dynamic (sliding) frictioin coefficient for all contacts is 0.4. The 
rationale for this assumption is that this friction coefficient represents the lower bound for most 
dry contacts involving steel and nickel (Meriam and Kraige 1987 [DIRS 1043061, p. 441; 
Avallone and Baumeister 1987 [DIRS 1035081, Table 3.:2.1, p. 3-26), nickel being the dominant 
component in Alloy 22 NO6022 (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 11, Part B, SB-575, 
Table 1). This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.14.2 Variation of Functional Friction Coefficienl; 
The variation of functional friction coefficient between the static and dynamic values as a 
function of relative velocity between the contact surfaces is not available in literature for the 
materials used in this calculation. Therefore, the effect. of relative velocity of the surfaces in 
contact is neglected in these calculations by assuming that the functional friction coefficient and 
static friction coefficient are both equal to the dynamic friction coefficient. The impact of this 
assumption is anticipated to be negligible. The rationale for this conservative assumption is that 
it provides the bounding set of results by minimizing the friction coefficient within the given 
finite element analysis framework. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.5. 
5.2.15 Additional Assumptions for Waste Package Puincture Drop Analysis 
Drops onto objects that might puncture a waste package are not expected to occur. If future 
evaluations are needed, additional assumptions for structural calculations of waste package 
puncture drop analysis are described in the following sections. 
5.2.15.1 Contact Stiffness Between the Waste Package and the Emplacement Pallet 
The magnitudes of the contact stiffness between (1) the waste package and the emplacement 
pallet and (2) the emplacement pallet and unyielding surface is assumed to be 1 x lo9 Nlm. The 
rationale for this assumption is that this magnitude of colntact stiffness between surfaces results 
in simulation convergence and provides results that satisfy compatibility requirements. If the 
contact stiffness value is too large, stiffness matrix ill-conditioning and divergence occur. On the 
other hand, a contact stiffness that is too small will result in compatibility violations. Therefore, 
an optimum value for the contact stiffness is one that is in between the extremes and is derived 
by iteration. The iterative process is based on engineering judgment. It should be noted that the 
contact stiffness is neither a measurable nor an intrinsic property of the materials in contact. 
This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
5.2.15.2 Bending Stiffness of the Inner Vessel and Outer Corrosion Barrier 
The bending stiffness (plate constant) of the inner vessel iind outer corrosion barrier is calculated 
by assuming that the expression for the bending stiffness of a flat plate is also valid for the waste 
package. The rationale for this assumption-is that the diameter of the waste package is much 
larger than the respective thickness. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.6. 
July 2004 
5.2.16 Assumptions for Rockfall Upon Waste Package and Drip Shield 
Additional assumptions for structural calculations of rockfall analysis for waste package and drip 
shield are described in the following sections. 
5.2.16.1 Material Properties for TSw2 Rock 
Temperature-dependent material properties are not available for TSw2 (Topopah Spring Welded- 
Lithophysal Poor) rock. Hence, room temperature material properties are assumed for this 
material. The impact of using constant material properties is anticipated to be small. The 
rationale for this assumption is that the material properties of the rock do not have dominant 
impact on the calculation results. The likely exception is the yield strength of the rock, which 
decreases with the increasing temperature. Thus, the representation of the rock as an elastic- 
ideally-plastic solid with room temperature yield strength is conservative. 
5.2.16.2 Compressive Strength of TSw2 Rock 
The unconfined compressive strength of the TSw2 is available (DTN: M00003RIB00079.000 
[DIRS 1482951, Table I). The scatter of data is large, ranging from 31.6 MPa to 288.9 MPa, as 
expected for rocks and brittle materials in general. For the purpose of the rockfall calculations, 
the unconfined compressive strength of the TSw2 is assumed to be 70 MPa. The rationale for 
this assumption is that it leads to conservatively bounding set of results in terms of stresses and 
strains in the outer corrosion barrier of the waste package. 
5.2.16.3 Young's Modulus and Poisson's Ratio of TSw2 Rock 
The modulus of elasticity and Poisson's ratio of the TSw;! are characterized by significant scatter 
of data (DTN: M00003RIB00079.000 [DIRS 1482951, 'Tables 3 and 4, respectively). For the 
purpose of rockfall calculations, modulus of elasticity is assumed to be 33 GPa, and Poisson's 
ratio 0.21. The rationale for this assumption is that these values agree well with typical values of 
said properties for most rocks of interest (DTN: MOOOOCiRIB00079.000 [DIRS 1482951, Tables 
3 and 4). 
5.2.16.4 Density of TSw2 Rock 
The density of the TSw2 is assumed to be 2370 kglm3. The rationale for this assumption is that 
this value agrees well with all Topopah Spring Welded rocks and is not exceeded by any of other 
rock in the area (DTN: M09808RIB00041.000 [DIRS 1048501, Table 5). This assumption has 
no effect on the calculation results because the important input parameter is rock mass, 
regardless of the density. 
5.2.16.5 Friction Coefficients for Contacts Involving Seismic Rockfall Analysis 
The friction coefficient for contacts occurring between the rock and Ti-7 or invert and Alloy 22 
NO6022 is not available in literature. It is, therefore, assumed that the dynamic (sliding) friction 
coefficient for this contact is 0.5. The rationale for this assumption is that this friction coefficient 
represents a reasonable estimate based on available information for metal-on-stone contacts 
(Beer and Johnston 1977 [DIRS 1451381, Table 8.1, p. 306). 
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5.2.16.6 Rock Geometry for Rockfall Analysis 
The rock shape is assumed to be rectangular prism. The rationale for this assumption is: the rock 
block data shows that some of the rock blocks are essentially rectangular prism. A finite element 
representation of the rock with an inclined rectangular prism provides a conservative approach 
from the point of view that the rock center of gravity is located directly above the point of 
impact. Hence, transferring the maximum linear momentum to the drip shield. The sharp edge 
of the prism also results in maximum strain on the drip shield plate. Vertex coordinates of the 
prism are obtained from "Results from 3DEC Nonlithophysal Rockfall Analyses with 10-7 
Ground Motion Level" (DTN: M00301MWD3DE27.00:I [DIRS 1615361) and used to calculate 
the enveloping dimensions. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.4. 
5.2.16.7 Material Properties for Titanium 
Temperature-dependent Poisson's ratio is not available for Ti-7 (titanium Grade 7) and Ti-24 
(titanium Grade 24). Therefore, the room temperature: Poisson's ratio is assumed for these 
materials. The impact of using Poisson's ratio at room temperature is anticipated to be small. 
The rationale for this assumption is twofold: first, for the ;subject materials, this property does not 
change significantly at the temperature of interest in this calculation; secondly, the material 
property in question does not have dominant impact on the calculation results. This assumption 
is used in Section 6.2.2.4. 
The rate-dependent material properties obtained under the static loading conditions are used for 
dynamic loading of Ti-7 and Ti-24. The impact of using material properties obtained under 
static loading conditions is anticipated to be small. The rationale for this assumption is that the 
mechanical properties of subject materials do not significantly change at the peak strain rates that 
occur during the rockfall. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.4. 
5.2.16.8 Deformation of Drip Shield Vertical Section 
The vertical section of the drip shield is assumed to deform like a cantilever beam with the free 
edge at the bottom and the fixed edge connected to the curved section at the top. The rationale 
for this assumption is that the drip shield bottom end has similar boundary conditions to the free 
end of a cantilever beam, while the connection between the curved section and the vertical 
section of the drip shield has enough stiffness to prevent excessive deformation. Although the 
curved section will deform towards the center of its curvature, the effect of this deformation on 
the results is small compared to the deflection on the vertical section caused by the lateral active 
pressure. This assumption is used in Section 6.2.2.4. 
The drip shield sidewalls are assumed to be unconstrained in the lateral direction during the 
postclosure period. The rationale for this assumption is that the gantry rail is made of steel sets 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 1663631, Attachment A-l), which are not anticipated to remain intact during 
the postclosure period. This assumption is used in Sectio116.2.2.4. 
Assumption 5.2.16.8 is not valid, nor needed, if natural backfill is used or if substantial natural 
backfilling occurs. 
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5.3 THERMAL ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
Thermal analyses are performed at different geometric scales including repository scale, drift 
scale, waste package scale, and fuel assembly scale (Section 6.3.2). Assumptions appropriate to 
each scale of thermal analysis are presented in the following sections. 
5.3.1 Assumptions for Repository-Scale Thermal Analyses 
Assumptions used in repository-scale thermal analyses are discussed below. 
5.3.1.1 Pillar Representation of Repository 
In the pillar representation of the repository, the problem domain is represented as a rectangular 
parallelepiped (Section 6.3.2). Vertically, it ranges downward from the top of the mountain to 
well into the saturated zone. Laterally, the representation is bounded by planes parallel to the 
drifts and centered at the midpoint between the drifts. The thermal boundary conditions at these 
locations are adiabatic surfaces. For the three-dimensional pillar representation, the axial 
boundaries are placed perpendicular to the drift axis, either between waste packages or axially 
bisecting one or both of the waste packages at the end of the drift segment. Again, the thermal 
boundary conditions at these planes are adiabatic  surface:^. The rationale for this assumption is 
that it approximates a drift segment at or near the geometric center of the repository. The 
assumption of no lateral heat transfer is appropriate because it maximizes the temperatures 
within the pillar; however, it is a good assumption only from emplacement to about 1,000 years 
after, at which time appreciable cooling begins from the edges of the repository (CRWMS M&O 
1994 [DIRS 14261 11, p. 7). This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.1.2 Omission of Gross Water Movement 
The effect of water mobilization into the repository from the surrounding rock matrix, as well as 
that from percolation flux that reaches the repository horizon from the surface, is neglected in 
thermal evaluations of the waste package. The rationale for this assumption is that it is 
conservative (higher peak temperatures) because it neglects thermal energy transport away from 
the h f t s  by the gross movement of this water. For the first few decades after repository closure, 
the thermal pulse penetrates only a few meters into the host rock and little water will be 
mobilized. For high temperature operating mode, peak temperatures occur in this same short 
time period. For low temperature operating mode, the host rock remains below the boiling point 
of water and no water is mobilized. Hence, neglecting the movement of water has little effect on 
thermal calculations for either high or low temperature operation. 
While gross water movement within the host rock fracture network is not represented, the 
thermal transport properties include the effect of entrapped water. For instance, rock strata 
specific heats (DTN: SN0307T0510902.003 [DIRS 1641961) are represented as constant values 
for temperatures below boiling and are higher than any of the constituents; hence, they include 
the effect of local water. Near the boiling temperature in the host rock, the specific heat is 
adjusted upward to account for the latent heat of vaporization of water in the host rock (Figure 
5(a)). The thermal conductivity is also reduced at rock temperatures above boiling to represent 
the loss of aqueous water (Figure 5(b)). 
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This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
(a) (b) 
Specific Heat (cp) Thermal Conductivity (k) 
Figure 5. Adjustments of Host Rock Therrnal Transport Properties 
5.3.1.3 Treatment of Waste Package Internals 
The waste form, basket, and basket support structure within the waste package are represented in 
repository-scale calculations as a homogeneous, smeared-property, heat-generating cylinder. 
The length of the cylinder corresponds to the inside length of the inner vessel, and the diameter 
of the cylinder corresponds to the inner diameter of the inner vessel. The rationale for this 
assumption is that the internal temperatures are not of immediate interest in repository-scale 
calculations, provided that the thermal transport properties for the internals are correct in an 
average sense. This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2..4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.1.4 Fixed Temperature at the Surface of the Mountain 
The boundary condition at the top of the two- and three-dimensional repository representations is 
a fixed temperature, the value of which will be taken from the Technical Data Management 
System. The rationale for this assumption is that while climatic changes affect the temperature 
distribution a few meters into the mountain, the rock acts as a thermal capacitor, and the annual 
averaged surface temperature is adequate for determining temperatures at the repository horizon. 
This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.1.5 Initial Temperature Gradient in the Mountain 
The initial thermal gradient in the host rock is assumed to be that listed in Table 4. The last row 
of the table is modified to reflect the assumption that the last gradient reported in the reference 
extends to the lower bound of the ANSYS representation (a depth of 1300 m, corresponding to 
the water table depth). The rationale for this assumption is that this gradient is based on a 
representation gradient profile obtained from the USW G-4 borehole and is typical for Yucca 
Mountain (Sass et. al. 1988 [DIRS 1006441; DTN: GS950308319213.002 [DIRS 1629901). 
Also, the temperature gradient below 541 m depth is not known, and is therefore conservatively 
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assumed as stated above. Choosing the lower boundary with a depth of 1300 m, which is far 
enough from the heat source and the areas of concern, will not significantly affect the repository 
temperature calculation. This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
Table 4. Initial Temperature Gradient in Host Rock 
Depth Range (m) Gradient ("Clm) 
NOTES: "value obtained from interpretation of' Sass et al. (1 988 [DIRS 1006441, Figure 1-12; DTN: 
GS950308319213.002 [DIRS 1629901). 
bvalue obtained from DTN: M0000~7RIB00077.000 ([DIRS 1540871, Table 6), which is' 
based on interpretation of Sass et al. (1988 [DIRS 1006441, Figure 1-12; DTN: 
GS950308319213.002 [DIRS 1629901). 
5.3.1.6 Modes of Heat Transfer within the Drift 
All three modes of heat transfer (conduction, convection imd radiation) occur in the drift. During 
the preclosure period, most of the heat is removed by mixed (forced and natural) convection. 
This heat is removed by the ventilation system and the heat transfer to the rock is reduced. The 
method of calculating convection effects during preclosure is described in Section 5.3.1.7. 
During postclosure, convective heat transfer is neglected, and heat transfer is represented by 
radiation and conduction only. The rationale for this assumption is that neglecting convective 
heat transfer will result in a conservative calcu1atio.n of waste form peak temperatures. 
Calculations in a drift above borehole-emplaced waste packages have shown that radiative heat 
transfer is an order of magnitude greater than the convective heat transfer (Gartling et al. 1981 
[DIRS 1426401, p. 59). The dominance of radiation hea.t transfer can also be shown by simple 
analytic solutions. Neglecting convection gives conservative (high) values for waste package 
and cladding temperatures and only slightly lower rock temperatures. 
The conductive heat transfer between the waste package and the emplacement pallet, and hence 
through the pallet into the invert, is neglected. The rationale for this assumption is that the 
emplacement pallet contacts the waste package in only i i  few places (an indeterminate number 
due to the evolving design), and conduction is necessarily limited. An effective thermal 
conductivity with directional dependence is used to represent the invert. 
The modes of heat transfer in each portion of the repository-scale, two-dimensional 
representation of the drift and near-field rock are presented in Figure 6 for designs that include or 
omit backfill. The extension to the three-dimensional analyses is obvious. 
This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
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Figure 6. Modes of Heat Transfer In and Near Drift 
5.3.1.7 Approximation of Heat-Removal by Ventila~tion 
For repository-scale thermal analysis, convective heat transfer is not explicitly represented in the 
drift. All heat transfer from the waste package to the drift wall is assumed to be by thermal 
radiation. During preclosure, a reduction in heat generation is used as a proxy for forced 
convective heat transfer. The rationale for this assumption is that, while it is slightly 
non-conservative because it reduces the surface temperature of the waste package, it transfers the 
correct amount of thermal energy to the drift wall. During postclosure all heat generated in the 
waste package is transferred by thermal radiation. This <approximation increases waste package 
surface temperature and transfers the correct amount of heat to the drift wall. These assumptions 
are used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.2 Assumptions for Drift-Scale Thermal Analysis 
All of the assumptions for repository-scale analysis are al.so applicable to drift-scale analysis. In 
addition, drift-scale analysis assumes uniform temperature around a circumference 16 ft (5 m) 
into the drift rock surface. Note drift-scale analysis is valid only for the same linear heat load as 
used to determine the 16-ft (5-m) rock temperature in the corresponding pillar analysis. The 
rationale for this assumption is drift internal structures ha.ve little impact on rock temperatures at 
this location (CRWMS M&O 1997 [DIRS 1015381, Appendix A). This assumption is used in 
Section 6.3.2.3. 
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5.3.3 Assumptions for Waste Package-Scale Thermal1 Analysis 
Assumptions used in waste package-scale thermal analysis are discussed as follows. 
5.3.3.1 Two-dimensional Representation of Waste Package Internals 
Two-dimensional representations of the waste form and waste package components are used for 
the purpose of defining the peak-fuel cladding temperatures. Inherent to this assumption is that 
axial heat transfer does not significantly affect the solution. The rationale for this assumption is 
that the metal thermal conductivities and heat generation rate distributions are such that axial 
heat transfer is negligible. This characteristic behavior is shown in The TN-24P PWR Spent-Fuel 
Storage Cask: Testing and Analyses (Creer et al. 1987 [IIIRS 1369371) and Emplacement Scale 
Thermal Evaluations of Large and Small WP Designs (CRWMS M&O 1995 [DIRS 1060581). 
This assumption is used in Section 6.3.2.4. 
5.3.3.2 Omission of Convection Within the Waste Package 
Convective heat transfer through the waste package fill gas (within the basket gaps and all other 
waste package vacancies) is neglected. Considering only conduction and radiation heat transfer 
is assumed to provide conservative results for peak fuel cladding temperature. The rationale for 
this assumption is as follows: some convective heat transfer will occur in the waste package fill 
gas; however, in a horizontal emplacement configuration, convection is minor compared to 
thermal radiation (at the expected temperatures), and stable convection cells either do not 
develop or are difficult to predict. Also, some fill gases, such as helium, have poor buoyancy 
relative to their thermal conductivity (unlike air, for example), and natural convection has a 
negligible contribution to total heat transfer. An extensive discussion of natural convection heat 
transfer is contained in Introduction to Heat Transfer, 3rd Edition (Incropera and DeWitt 1996 
[DIRS 1077841, pp. 448478). This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.4 Assumptions for Fuel Assembly-Scale Thermal Analysis 
Assumptions used in fuel assembly-scale thermal analysis are discussed as follows. 
5.3.4.1 Boundary Conditions for Fuel Assembly Calculations 
Fuel assembly thermal calculations use a quarter-symmetric representation of the assembly. 
Uniform temperatures are applied at the outer boundaries and adiabatic surfaces are used at the 
inner boundaries. The rationale for this assumption is that the hottest commercial SNF 
assemblies are in the center of a waste package where the temperature gradients are lowest. This 
assumption is used in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.4.2 Generation of All Decay Heat in UOz 
Heat generation due to the decay of commercial SNF fission products and actinides is assumed 
to be evenly distributed throughout all of the U02 pellets. Radial power profiles within the 
pellets and within the assembly are neglected, and heat generation in the cladding (and other 
non-fuel hardware) due to activation and radiation energy is ignored. Heat generated by fission 
products in the gas gap is distributed through the pellet. The rationale for this assumption is that 
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it is conservative to assume that all of the heat produced by the commercial SNF assembly is 
produced in the U02 pellet and not the cladding. The temperature distribution within the pellet 
and cladding is discussed in Determination of PWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Assembly EfSective 
Conductivity (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1624161, Attachment V), and it is demonstrated that the highest 
cladding temperatures result when all the heat is generated in the pellet. This assumption is used 
in Sections 6.3.2.4 and 6.3.2.5. 
5.3.4.3 Geometry of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Assembly 
Components of the commercial SNF assembly (cladding, guide tubes, etc.) are assumed not to 
touch the basket wall or each other. Some spent fuel rods may have bowed such that they 
contact each other or the basket (or the channel for BWR fuel). The rationale for this assumption 
is that it is conservative because the only heat transfer is through the fill gas by thermal radiation 
and conduction. This assumption is used in Section 6.3.2.1. 
5.3.4.4 Omission of Fuel Irradiation Effects 
Fuel irradiation effects are neglected for the purpose of determining material properties in the 
commercial SNF assembly representations. The irradiation of U02 pellets induces several 
changes in the porosity, composition, and stoichiometry of the fuel. These changes, however, 
are generally small in light water reactors. Introduction of fission products, burnup, and material 
cracking under thermal cycling lead to a slight decrease in the thermal conductivity of the fuel; 
however, these effects are neglected. Also neglected are the effects of fuel densification, 
swelling, restructuring, and plutonium content; and the oxygen-to-metal ratio of the uranium fuel 
is assumed to be the theoretical value of two. Zircaloy thermal conductivity is primarily a 
function of temperature; however, other characteristics, such as residual stress levels, crystal 
orientation, and minor composition differences (i.e., zircaloy-2 versus zircaloy-4 as cladding 
material) may have secondary influences on conductivity. These effects, as well as cladding 
dimensional changes (e.g., creepdown, thermal expansion, elastic deformation, and stress 
irradiation growth) are neglected. The rationale for these assumptions is that while these 
neglected effects may affect temperatures within the pellet, they have little or no impact on the 
cladding temperature, the parameter for which margin must be demonsirated. This assumption is 
used in Section 6.3.2.1. 
5.3.4.5 Omission of Cladding Crud 
Appropriate emissivity values for light water fuel cladding without layers of crud are assumed. 
The rationale for using these values is that crud generally increases ernissivity values, and 
crud-free oxide thicknesses provide appropriately ~ons~ervative cladding temperatures. This 
assumption is used in Section 6.3.2.1. 
5.3.4.6 Oxide Thicknesses 
The nominal zirconium-oxide thickness for PWR fuel is 50.8 pm (2 mils) and that for BWR fuel 
is 101.6 pm (4 mils). These values are typical of fuel that has been exposed in commercial light 
water reactors. From Waste Form Characteristics Report, Revision 1 (Stout and Leider 1997 
[DIRS 1004191, p. 2.1.3.1-3), 50 pm (-2 mils) is a conservative maximum for PWR commercial 
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SNF with a discharge exposure of about 40 GWd/MTHM (gigawatt-daystmetric tons heavy 
metal). BWR environments induce a significantly thicker cladding oxide layer in the 40 to 50 
GWd/MtHM exposure range. The 101.6 pm thickness represents an upper bound based on 
BWR design experience as described in Determination of 7x7 Rod Array BWR SNF Assembly 
Effective Thermal Conductivity (CRWMS M&O 1996 [DIRS 144269]), Determination of 8x8 
Rod Array BWR SNF Assembly Effective Thermal Conductivity (CRWMS M&O 1996 [DIRS 
144270]), and Determination of 9x9 Rod Array BWR SNF Assembly Effective Thermal 
Conductivity (CRWMS M&O 1996 [DIRS 1442711). This assumption is used in determining 
decay for Section 6.1.2. 
I 5.3.5 Assumptions for Waste Package Fire Analyses 
Calculations for fire analyses are performed parametrically, assuming the worst fire conditions 
will not exceed those for transportation casks. Fire controls are anticipated to result in far less 
severe fire conditions. An axisymmetric, finite element representation of the waste package is 
used. The waste package inner components are integrally connected and fuel assemblies are 
modeled with an effective thermal conductivity. The integral connection provides minimal 
thermal resistance to the fire and is therefore conservative in estimating peak clad temperatures 
from a fire. More detailed assumptions are given in reports for fire analysis of each type of 
waste package. This assumption is used in Section 6.3.2. 
I 5.3.6 Assumptions for Waste PackageISurface Facility Analyses 
Thermal analyses of the loaded waste packages in the surface facilities are performed. This 
assures cladding temperature limits are not violated and that waste package surface temperatures 
in the weld zone do not exceed temperatures acceptable for welding Alloy 22 N06022. The 
analyses use an axisymrnetric, finite element representation for the waste package and 
transporter. The concrete welding cell is represented in three dimensions with concrete walls at 
ambient temperature. The initial temperature of the spent fuel is taken from representative 
transportation cask reports. Only radiation heat transfer is considered. Convection cooling is 
conservatively neglected. The rationale for this assumption is that it results in conservative 
values for peak cladding temperature. This assumption is used in Section 6.3.2. 
I 5.3.7 Assumptions for DRIFTFLOW Calculations 
DRIFTFLOW is used to determine the effect of ventilation in the repository drifts. All modes of 
heat transfer (conduction, radiation, and convection) are considered. An overall convection heat 
transfer coefficient is used. Conduction is calculated by superimposing temperature responses to 
yearly pulses of heat. The temperature responses are based on ANSYS results for a "pillar" 
analysis. The rationale is that mathematical solutions lcan be superimposed and overall heat 
transfer coefficients are common practice in heat transfer calculations. This assumption is used 
in Section 6.3.2. 
I 5.3.8 Assumptions for FLUENT Calculations 
Convection heat transfer coefficients are calculated by Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis. 
Ventilation flow rates are specified and a uniform rock teimperature 16 ft (5 m) from the surface 
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are taken from ANSYS calculations. The rationale for this is that previous calculations have 
shown that drift internal structures have little impact on rock temperatures at this location 
(CRWMS M&O 1997 [DIRS 1015381, Appendix A).  his assumption is used in Section 6.3.2.3. 
5.4 SHIELDING ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
Assumptions used in performing shielding analysis are discussed in this section. 
5.4.1 Use of an Axial Peaking Factor 
Because the radiation source terms are generated with the assumption that the burnup is 
uniformly distributed within a SNF assembly, an axial power peaking factor is used to develop 
neutron and photon source strengths in the active fuel region. The rationale for this assumption 
is to conservatively account for the maximum values of the actual axial source distributions. The 
axial power peaking factor of a PWR SNF assembly is 1..25 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1695931, Section 
5.2.11. This value is based on the predicted axial decay heat rate profile of a PWR SNF 
assembly provided in Testing and Analyses of the TN-24P PWR Spent-Fuel Dry Storage Cask 
Loaded with Consolidated Fuel (EPRI 1989 [DIRS 1019471, p. 3-26). The axial power peaking 
factor of a BWR SNF assembly is 1.25 (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1665961, Section 3.5, page 9). This 
peaking factor has been determined from the axial burnup profile of a BWR SNF assembly as a 
function of average assembly burnup (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1643641, p. 47). The rationale for using 
this value is that it is conservative for an assembly average burnup of 40 GWDIMTU or higher. 
This assumption is used in the shielding analysis discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.2 Homogenization of the Radiation Source Region for Commercial Spent Nuclear 
Fuel 
In a three-dimensional shielding analysis for the waste palckages containing commercial SNF, the 
contents and radiation sources of each SNF assembly region (i.e., plenum, end fitting, and active 
fuel) are uniformly homogenized. The rationale for this assumption.is based upon a study of the 
effect of source geometry on the waste package surface dose rates described in Calculation of the 
Effect of Source Geometry on the 21-PWR WP Dose Rates (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 
1021341, pp. 22 to 26). The results of the study indicate that identical dose rates on the external 
surfaces of a waste package are obtained for two different source geometry representations: a 
detailed geometric representation, and a representation in which the contents and radiation 
sources are homogenized inside region dimensions. Thds assumption is used in the shielding 
analysis discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.3 Homogenization of the U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister 
The contents and radiation source of the DOE SNF canisters are homogenized inside the cavity 
of the DOE SNF canister. However, if the DOE SNF carlister contains one intact SNF assembly 
(e.g., Shippingport Light Water Breeder Reactor SNF), the assembly contents and radiation 
sources are homogenized inside the assembly dimensions. The rationale for this assumption is 
that the homogenization process decreases the fuel self-shielding and moves the radiation source 
closer to the outer surfaces of the waste package, allowing more particles to reach the outer 
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surface and, hence, increasing the dose rate. This assumption is used in the shielding analysis 
discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.4 Omission of Waste Package Internals 
For the one-dimensional shielding analysis of waste pack;age radial dose rates, the fuel region of 
the waste package, which consists of the waste form, neutron absorber plates, thermal shunts, 
and other structural members, is radially homogenized inside the waste package cavity with 
some internal components omitted. The rationale for this assumption is that it is conservative for 
calculating dose rates on the surfaces of the waste package because the structure components that 
would otherwise attenuate neutrons and photons are not represented. This assumption is used in 
the shielding analysis discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.5 Use of a Watt Fission Spectrum 
A Watt fission spectrum (Briesmeister 1997 [DIRS 1038971, Appendix H, pp. H-2 and H-3) is 
used for the neutron source energy distribution of DOE SNF because the actual neutron spectra 
are not available for most of the DOE fuels. The rationale for this assumption is that the dose 
rate evaluation is not sensitive to the neutron spectrum because the neutron dose rate contribution 
to the total dose rate outside of the waste package is negligible for the repository preclosure 
period. This assumption is used in the shielding calculations discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.6 Fresh Fuel Assumption 
The composition of fresh fuel is used to represent the att.enuation properties of spent fuel in the 
shielding calculations. The rationale for this assumption is that, while photon attenuation 
properties of spent fuel and fresh fuel are similar, fresh fuel has a conservatively higher neutron 
dose rate, due to greater production of fission neutrons. This is not due to the fission yield for 
neutrons, but rather to the greater abundance of fissile constituents. The neutron and gamma ray 
sources in the actinides and fission products are derived from the spent fuel composition and are 
represented as fixed sources in the shielding calculations. Therefore, the radiation sources are 
not affected by this assumption. This assumption is usecl in the shielding calculations discussed 
in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.7 Treatment of Trace Elements 
For material compositions having elements with specified ranges (i.e., weight percentages of 
each constituent), the midpoint value is used and the abundance of the most abundant element is 
adjusted upward to maintain the material density. The rationale for this assumption is that small 
weight percentage variations of each element constituent do not affect the accuracy of dose 
results, as long as the density is maintained. This assumption is used in the shielding 
calculations discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
5.4.8 High-Level Radioactive Waste Glass Source Terms 
The source terms for the design basis glass developed at the Savannah River Site Defense Waste 
Processing Facility are assumed for all other HLW glass forms. The rationale for this assumption 
is that these source terms provide conservative (higher) dose rates for the codisposal waste 
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packages because the source terms for the rest of the H L V V  glass forms are less intense (CRWMS 
M&O 2000 [DIRS 1519471, Attachments V and VI). This assumption is used in the shielding 
calculations discussed in Sections 6.1.2.3 and 6.4.2.2. 
5.4.9 Infinite Cylinder Representation of a Waste Package in SASl Analyses 
For waste package shielding analysis, SASl is an effective tool for evaluating the radiation 
levels on and beyond the radial outer surface of a waste package. SASl assumes a waste 
package to be an infinite cylinder with a homogenized fuel region in the center, enclosed by the 
inner vessel and corrosion barrier. The rationale for this assumption is that, because the length of 
a waste package is approximately three times the diamete:r, the infinite cylinder representation of 
the waste package should yield accurate dose results for the radial direction. This assumption is 
used in Section 6.4.1.4. 
5.5 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
Specific assumptions used in criticality analysis are documented in loading curve evaluations. 
General assumptions used in performing criticality analyses are given in the following model 
reports: Errata for Isotopic Model Report for Commercial SNF Bumup Credit (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
168037]), Configuration Generator Model for In-Package Criticality (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
165629]), Geochemistry Model Validation Report: Extemal Accumulation Model (BSC 2001 
[DIRS 156324]), Geochemistry Model Validation Report: Material Degradation and Release 
Model (BSC 2001 [DIRS 156790]), and Criticality Model Report (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1657331). 
6. WASTE PACKAGE COMPONENT ANALYSIS METHODS AND 
COMPUTATIONAL TOOLS 
This section describes the analytical methodology and computational tools used in each of the 
design disciplines. For each discipline, reference is ma.de to specific computational tools and 
their current qualified versions, to demonstrate that qualified computer codes embodying these 
methodologies exist. However, this should not be construed to limit subsequent analyses and 
calculations to only these versions. New versions of these computer codes can and will be 
qualified for future analyses and calculations. 
Although this section does not discuss them, there are standard engineering approaches 
applicable to various problems. This report does not provide estimates of any of the factors for 
the Postclosure Safety Case or Potentially Disruptive Events. 
6.1 SOURCE TERM DETERMINATION 
The following describes the generation of source terms for the commercial SNF, DOE SNF, and 
HLW. The method for calculating DOE SNF and HLW source terms differs from that for the 
commercial SNF, as the information available for these waste streams is considerably different 
from that for commercial SNF. For a commercial SNF; assembly with any given enrichment, 
burnup, and cooling time, a burnup calculation can be performed that reasonably simulates the 
irradiation history of the assembly in the reactor core and the subsequent decay after it is 
removed from the reactor. For DOE SNF, the source term methodology is described in Source 
Term Estimates for DOE Spent Nuclear Fuels (DOE 2003 [DIRS 1633771). For the HLW, the 
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. chemical composition (in the case of the HLW) and the estimated radionuclide inventory at a 
certain year are provided. The source terms for these waste forms can be computed by simply 
decaying the radionuclides to the desired times. The met,hodology and computational tools used 
to generate the source terms are presented in more detail in the following sections. 
I 6.1.1 Computational Tools 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory developed the SCALE code system for the NRC to satisfy the 
need for standardized analysis methods for licensing evaluations of nuclear fuel facilities and 
package designs. The SCALE system is a collection of well-established functional modules 
(computer codes) that can be used individually or in combination to perform criticality, 
shielding, and heat transfer analyses. The system has many control modules, each of which 
combines several functional modules into analysis sequences to perform a specific analysis. The 
SAS2H control module and the ORIGEN-S functional module in the SCALE system are the 
primary computational tools for source term generation. 
6.1.1.1 Description of SAS2H for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Source Term 
Generation 
In depletion analyses, the fuel isotopics change with time. and are significantly different between 
fuel cycles. Hence, the fuel isotopics and their macroscopic cross sections must be updated to 
reflect these changes. For each time-dependent fuel composition, SAS2H performs one- 
dimensional neutron transport analyses of the fuel assembly using a two-part procedure with two 
separate lattice-cell representations. The first representation (Path A) is a unit fuel-pin cell from 
which cell-weighted cross sections are obtained. The cell-weighted cross sections from this 
calculation are used in a second representation of a larger unit-cell (Path B) that represents the 
entire assembly within an infinite lattice. The zones in Path B can be structured for different 
types of BWR or PWR assemblies containing water rods, burnable poison rods, gadolinium fuel 
rods, etc. The fuel neutron flux spectrum obtained from Path B is used to update the nuclide 
cross sections for the specified burnup-dependent fuel cclmposition. The updated cross sections 
are then used in a point-depletion computation to produce the burnup-dependent fuel 
composition to be used in the next spectrum calculation. This sequence is repeated over the 
entire irradiated history of the assembly. An example of these representations for a BWR 
assembly is presented in Figure 7. 
The functional modules executed by SAS2H to carry out the depletion analysis are BONAMI-S, 
NITAWL-11, XSDRNPM-S, COUPLE, and ORIGEN-S. BONAMI-S and NITAWL-I1 perform 
resonance self-shielding analyses of the cross sections in each irradiation cycle. XSDRNPM-S 
performs the one-dimensional neutron transport analyses in Path A and Path B. COUPLE 
updates the cross-section constants of all nuclides in the ORIGEN-S nuclear information library 
with the cell-weighted information and the weighting spectrum from XSDRNPM-S. ORIGEN-S 
calculates the fuel depletion in all cycles and the decay of nuclides at the completion of fuel 
irradiation. A more detailed description of ORIGEN-S is provided in the next section. The 
computational flow diagram in SAS2H for commercial SNF source term generation is presented 
in Figure 8. 
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The source terms for DOE SNF and HLW are not calculated with the SAS2H control module 
because the radionuclide inventories are given for these fuels. Source terms for DOE SNF and 
HLW come from Source Term Estimates for DOE Spent Nuclear Fuels (DOE 2003 [163377]), 
TRZGA (UZrH) Fuel Characteristics for Disposal Criticality Analysis (DOE 1999 [DIRS 
1038911 and Source Terms for HLW Glass Canisters (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1519471). 
The inventories are entered directly into ORIGEN-S to be decayed to the desired times. This is 
similar to the final ORIGEN-S case for the commercial SNF. In the case of HLW, the 
radionuclide inventory is mixed with the glass chemical composition and then decayed. 
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6.1.1.2 Description of ORIGEN-S 
ORIGEN-S is the main functional module of SAS2H (the control module of the SCALE code 
system) that carries out the depletion and decay calculations. It can also be used as a stand-alone 
program. ORIGEN-S computes time-dependent concentrations and source terms of a large 
number of isotopes, which are simultaneously generated or depleted through neutronic 
transmutation, fission, radioactive decay, input feed rates, and physical or chemical removal 
rates. 
ORIGEN-S can use three lunds of cross-section libraries: card image libraries with nuclear and 
photon yield information, binary libraries with nuclear transition and photon yield information, 
and the Master Photon Data Base containing detailed photon energy and intensity data. The 
second of these, the binary library, contains the same type of information that the card-image 
libraries do, but for only one kind of problem. This represents a major advantage over the card 
image libraries in that these cross sections can be replaced with those determined from the 
detailed neutronics calculations performed by the functional modules that precede ORIGEN-S in 
the SAS2H module. This means that rather than using a previously defined cross-section set, the 
code can be used in conjunction with the cross-section processing codes of SCALE that create 
problem-specific libraries. This capability has led to the NRC preference for ORIGEN-S. The 
following is an excerpt from NUREG-1536 (NRC 1997 [DIRS 1019031, p.5-3): 
"Generally, the applicant will determine the source terms using ORIGEN-S (e.g., 
as a SAS2 sequence of SCALE), ORIGEN2, or* the DOE Characteristics Data 
Base. Although the latter two are easy to use, bothhave energy group structure 
limitations.. .. If the applicant has used ORIGENZ, verify that the chosen cross- 
section library is appropriate for the fuel being considered. Many libraries are not 
appropriate for a burnup that exceeds 33,000 MWdMtU." 
This statement derives from the fact that previous cornpilations of source term values used 
ORIGEN2 and relied on previously calculated cross-section libraries of limited information, 
which can easily be used outside the applicable range. These libraries are only appropriate for 
fuels that have undergone certain irradiation histories and are not as accurate as the problem- 
specific libraries generated for ORIGEN-S. 
6.1.2 Description of Pertinent Analyses 
6.1.2.1 Commercial Waste Forms 
The thermal output, radionuclide inventories, and radiation spectra for commercial SNF are 
developed according to the source term methodology described in this document. Radiation 
source terms for commercial SNF have been created for PWR and BWR fuels. These are 
documented in: 
PWR Source Term Generation and Evaluation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1690611) 
BWR Source Term Generation and Evaluation (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1643641). 
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The commercial SNF source terms calculated with the representative PWR and BWR assemblies 
can be interpolated to provide reasonably close approximations for all assemblies in the waste 
stream. It is assumed that these interpolated source terms are comparable to those that would 
have been obtained from a detailed calculation for each assembly. The waste stream source 
terms are developed by convoluting source terms for PWR and BWR assemblies with detailed 
assembly information for a specified waste stream. They are documented in Waste Packages 
and Source Terms for the Commercial 1999 Design Basis Waste Streams (CRWMS M&O 2000 
[DIRS 1382391). 
6.1.2.2 U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel 
The total initial radionuclide inventory provided by Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (DOE 2003 [163377]) for the year 2010 can be used to calculate the 
total radionuclide inventory and the source terms for the average DOE SNF canisters for the time 
period out to one million years. The ORIGEN-S program is used to perform the decay 
calculations. The following two documents provide the results of calculations based on earlier 
data (DTN: M00001SPADBE00.001 [DIRS 1463621): 
Radionuclide Inventories for DOE SNF Waste Stream and Uranium/Thorium Carbide 
Fuels (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1532471) 
Source Terms for Average DOE SNF Canisters (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1533451) 
Inventory and Characteristics of Potential Repository Waste (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1674411) 
6.1.2.3 Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste 
According to Waste Acceptance System Requirements Llocument (DOE 2002 [DIRS 1588731, 
Section 5.4.1.B(2)), the producers of HLW are required to report the estimated total and 
individual canister inventory, and the associated uncertainties, of radionuclides (in curies) that 
have half-lives longer than 10 years and that are, or will be, present in concentrations greater that 
0.05 percent of the total radioactive inventory indexed to the years 2010 and 3110. This may 
become an operational requirkment not connected to the initial inventories supplied by the 
various sites. The time-dependent photon and neutron sources, decay heat sources, and 
radionuclide contents and activities of the HLW forms are generated in ORIGEN-S decay 
calculations using the initial radionuclide inventories and chemical compositions of the HLW 
forms provided by the producers. These calculations are documented in Source Terms for HLW 
Glass Canisters (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151947]), which provides time-dependent source 
terms for HLW. 
6.2 STRUCTURAL DESIGN 
Structural design uses the computational tools discussed in Section 6.2.1 to perform various 
analysis discussed in Section 6.2.2. A discussion of the mesh used for structural calculations is 
given in Section 6.2.3. Design stress and ductility limits are presented in Sections 6.2.4 and 
6.2.5. 
000-30R-WISO-00100-000-002 77 of 123 July 2004 
6.2.1 Computational Tools 
Structural calculations are performed using ANSYS, LS-IIYNA, and MATHCAD. 
6.2.1.1 ANSYS 
ANSYS is a finite-element software package that can ble used to solve a variety of problems. 
Waste packages, drip shields, and pallets can be represented as two-dimensional or three- 
dimensional finite-element geometries, depending on the symmetry of the design or the loading. 
ANSYS is widely used for structural evaluations of static: and dynamic problems. Materials can 
be represented with elastic or elastic-plastic temperature-dependent properties. Dynamic 
evaluations can be performed, such as real-time events with gravitational acceleration acting on 
component masses. Interfaces between components are represented with contact elements that 
incorporate interface stiffness and friction. Seismic evaluations can be performed as frequency 
domain analyses using a response spectrum or can be solved as time-domain analyses using time 
histories (acceleration, velocity, or displacement). Thermal expansion and stress can be 
calculated by combining thermal and structural representations into a single analysis. 
6.2.1.2 LS-DYNA 
LS-DYNA is a finite element program for nonlinear dynamic analysis of structures in three 
dimensions. Livermore Software Technology Corporation is the development source for the 
LS-DYNA finite element analysis software program. LS-DYNA is capable of simulating 
complex real world problems and is widely accepted as the premier analysis software package 
for a vast number of engineering applications. LS-DYNA analysis capabilities include, but are 
not limited to, nonlinear dynamics, rigid multi-body dynamics, quasi-static simulations, thermal 
analysis, fluid analysis, fluid-structure interactions, and finite element method-rigid multi-body 
dynamics coupling. LS-DYNA is well suited for performing dynamic impact analyses of the 
waste packages, drip shields, and emplacement pallets. 
6.2.1.3 MATHCAD 
MATHCAD can solve systems of equations, allowing the user to evaluate the impact of 
parameter variance quickly. 
6.2.2 Description of Pertinent Analyses 
Structural calculations demonstrate that the waste package, drip shield, and emplacement pallet 
meet the requirements for normal operations and event sequences. These fall into the following 
broad groups: 
Geometric Design 
Normal Operations 
Internal Pressurization 
Impacts on Waste Package or Drip Shield 
Dynamic Impacts on the Waste Package 
Seismic Evaluations 
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Residual Stress Reduction. 
1 6.2.2.1 Geometric Design Calculations 
Geometric design calculations are primarily sizing calculations to verify that each component is 
designed to accept the waste form with the dimensions given in the system description 
documents. Additionally, external features and features that interface with the Facilities Design 
Project are discussed and demonstrated to show compliance with the proper criteria. These 
calculations are written as sections of the analysis of the appropriate component design, rather 
than as stand-alone calculations. 
I 6.2.2.2 Normal Operations Calculations 
Normal operating loads are those associated with expected normal operations, such as loading, 
maneuvering, and emplacing the waste packages. 
Vertical and Horizontal Lifting by Trunnion Ring-Lifting calculations will be performed as 
three-dimensional, static finite-element analyses for each design configuration. The geometry of 
the internal structure of the waste packages will be simplified, and symmetries will be taken into 
account within the representation of the waste packages. Nevertheless, the features of the 
problem relevant to the structural calculations (overall dimensions, masses, and mechanical 
properties of the materials) will be preserved. 
In the horizontal lifting calculations, the trunnion ring will be taken into account by applying 
appropriate boundary conditions to the waste package. As for the vertical lifting calculations, a 
potentiallproposed design of the trunnion ring will be included in the finite element 
representation. 
Lifting by Emplacement Pallet-A lifting calculation is performed for the heaviest waste 
package design loaded on an emplacement pallet. This calculation is performed as a quarter- 
symmetric, three-dimensional, static finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. This 
representation includes the waste package as a cylinder of shell elements. A force is applied 
inside of the cylinder to account for the overall mass of the simplified waste package. This 
approach preserves all features of the problem relevant to the structural calculation. 
Static Loading of Waste Package on Emplacement Pallet-The stresses in the emplacement 
pallet, due to the static loading of the waste package on the pallet, are assessed using a quarter- 
symmetric, three-dimensional, static, finite-element analysis in LS-DYNA. The waste package 
is represented as a simple rigid cylindrical shell with an internal force applied to account for the 
weight of the non-represented parts and internals mass. 
The stresses in the waste package, due to static support from the emplacement pallet are also 
assessed using quarter-symmetric shell elements, three-dimensional, static, finite-element 
analysis in LS-DYNA. A simplified inner vessel with lids and a simplified outer corrosion 
barrier with lids are represented on a simplified rigid pallet. An equivalent force applied on the 
inside of the inner vessel represents the mass that was removed from the inner vessel and outer 
corrosion barrier. 
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Static Load of Collapsed Drift on Drip Shield-The stress and buckling within the drip shield, 
due to static load of the rock from the collapsed drift, is evaluated using a quarter-symmetric, 
three-dimensional, static, finite-element LS-DYNA analysis. The drip shield connector plates, 
connector plate guides, and lifting plates are not included in this representation. This slightly 
conservative approach has a negligible effect on calculated results. The overburden pressure, 
which takes into account the masses of the loose rock, is applied statically on appropriate 
structural members. 
Residual and Differential Thermal Expansion Stresses-Residual and differential thermal 
expansion stresses are evaluated in the axial and radial directions for all waste packages. This 
stress is evaluated parametrically using the highest projected surface temperature of the waste 
package near 239°C (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1647261, Section 6). The inner vessel and outer 
corrosion barrier are designed with radial and axial gaps to prevent contact that would result 
from thermal expansion. These gaps are toleranced such that the nominal dimension is the 
minimum gap allowed. 
6.2.2.3 Internal Pressurization Calculations 
The pressurization of the waste package is assumed to occur due to the rupture of all fuel rod 
cladding or other primary barriers contained in the waste package, provided the waste form 
retains an intact pressure boundary before being loaded into the waste package. The calculation 
uses a closed-form solution to the problem of a cylindrical shell subject to internal pressure load 
to determine the maximum stresses in the waste package. In this evaluation, the inner vessel lid 
is assumed to fail before the outer lid; however, no structural credit is assumed for the outer lid. 
Evaluations are performed over uniform waste package temperatures ranging from 20°C to 
600°C. The peak stresses (membrane and bending) at the junction of the cylinder and lid from 
these evaluations are obtained and shown to be less than the ultimate tensile stress. 
6.2.2.4 Impacts on Waste Package or  Drip Shield 
Rockfall on Waste Package-The waste package rockfall is evaluated as a three-dimensional, 
transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. The interaction of the 
waste package internals, inner vessel, and outer corrosion barrier is conservatively assumed to 
maximize the stress on the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. A realistic rock geometry is 
assumed for this evaluation. The rock shape and dimensions are based on rock fracture 
characteristics, and static material properties are conservatively used due to the unavailability of 
dynamic material properties. Further conservatism is included by use of material properties at 
maximum repository temperatures. 
The rock may have an initial velocity due to a seismic event and then be accelerated due to 
gravitational forces until it strikes the waste package surface. The simulation is continued 
throughout the impact until the rock begins to rebound al: which time the induced stresses reach 
peak values. This approach also provides the results of the rock impact in terms of the residual 
stresses because the finite element simulation is continued. until the steady state values of stresses 
are obtained. The resulting residual stresses are subsequently used to assess the susceptibility of 
the drip shield design to stress corrosion cracking. 
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Rockfall on Drip Shield-The fall of rocks onto a drip shield is evaluated as a 
three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. A 
realistic rock geometry was assumed. The shape and dimensions of the rocks are obtained from 
appropriate sources, and static material properties are conservatively used due to the 
unavailability of dynamic material properties (DTN: M00301MWD3DE27.003 [DIRS 
1615361). Further conservatism is included by use of material properties at maximum repository 
temperatures. 
The relative velocity between the rock and the drip shield includes three different phases prior to 
impact: initial velocity of the rock toward the drip shield in accordance with the seismic ground 
motion, the velocity gained by the rock due to gravitatioilal acceleration, and the velocity of the 
drip shield toward the rock just prior to impact in accordance with the seismic ground motion. 
The finite element simulation is continued throughout the impact until the rock begins to 
rebound, at which time the stresses reach peak values and the maximum displacements are 
obtained. This approach also provides the results of the rock impact in terms of the residual 
stresses because the finite element simulation is continued until the steady state values of stresses 
are obtained. The resulting residual stresses are subsequently used to assess the susceptibility of 
the drip shield design to stress corrosion cracking. 
Equipment Impact on End of Waste PackageThe  fall of handling equipment onto the end of 
a waste package will be evaluated as a three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic 
finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. 
Missile Impact on Waste Package-The calculation for missile impact on a waste package is 
performed as a dynamic, low-velocity impact analysis using basic strength-of-materials 
relationships and empirical relationships obtained for the impact of projectiles onto plates. The 
region of missile impact is represented as a flat plate supported at each end. The analysis is for 
missiles resulting from accident conditions and not for missiles due to terrorism. 
6.2.2.5 Dynamic Waste Package Impacts 
Vertical Drop-The vertical drop evaluation is performed for a waste package as a 
three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. 
This representation of the waste package is positioned just above an unyielding surface. The 
interaction of the waste package internals is conservativ~ely assumed to maximize the stress on 
the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. While static and kinetic friction both have negligible 
effects, approximate friction coefficients are used. Static material properties are conservatively 
used, due to the unavailability of dynamic material properties. 
Swing Down-The swing down evaluation is performed for a waste package as a 
three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. 
The waste package is being lifted in a horizontal orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting 
device inadvertently releases one end. One end of the waste package remains held by the lifting 
device while the other end swings down and impacts the ground. 
10-Degree Oblique Drop with Slap Down-The 10 degree oblique drop with slap down 
evaluation is performed for a waste package as a three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic- 
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plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. The waste package is being lifted in a 
horizontal orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting device inadvertently releases both 
ends. The waste package impacts the ground with a 10 degree angle between the ground and the 
centerline of the waste package then slaps onto the unyielding surface. 
Tipover-The tipover evaluation is performed for a waste package as a three-dimensional, 
transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite element analysis using LS-DYNA. A representation of 
the waste package is oriented with an angle from vertical such that the center of mass is rotated 
past the pivot point, inducing an overturning moment. The waste package representation is then 
allowed to rotate and impact an unyielding surface. 
Tipover from Elevated Surface-This evaluation is performed as a three-dimensional, 
transient, dynamic, elastic-plastic finite element analysis using LS-DYNA. A representation of 
the waste package is oriented with an angle from the vertical such that the center of mass is 
rotated past the pivot point. The pivot point is a surfact: that is a specified distance above the 
impact surface. The finite element representation is initiated just before the waste package 
makes impact, with the appropriate initial conditions. The impact surface is unyielding to ensure 
conservative results. The problem is solved iteratively until the reported stresses have climaxed. 
Horizontal Drop on Flat Surface-The horizontal drop evaluation is performed for a waste 
package as a three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite element analysis using 
LS-DYNA. A representation of the waste package is positioned just above an unyielding 
surface. The interaction of the waste package internals and waste package is conservatively 
assumed to maximize the stress on the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. Static and kinetic 
friction both have negligible effects. 
Horizontal Drop with Emplacement Pallet-The horizontal drop with emplacement pallet 
evaluation is performed as a three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite element 
analysis using LS-DYNA. A quarter-symmetric representation of the waste package and pallet is 
positioned above an unyielding surface. 
Corner Drop-The comer drop evaluation is performed for a waste package as a three- 
dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic-plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA. A full 
representation of the waste package is oriented with an angle from vertical such that the center of 
mass is located directly above the corner of impact. In addition, this representation of the waste 
package is positioned just above an unyielding surface. The interaction of the waste package 
internals and waste package is conservatively assumed to maximize the stress on the inner vessel 
and outer corrosion barrier. Static and kinetic friction both have a negligible effect. The strilung 
of the upper end of the waste package after the corner impact is not assessed because that 
damage is bounded by the tipover analysis from an elevated surface. 
Transporter Runaway-Events resulting in a transporter runaway are not credible (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 1641281, Section 5.6.4), but transporter accidents may occur. For these events, if 
identified, evaluations will be performed as a three-dimensional, transient dynamic, elastic- 
plastic finite-element analysis using LS-DYNA, in a manner similar to the vertical and horizontal 
drops. Impact limiters (represented as yielding surfaces)~ may be required to show compliance 
with the criteria. 
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Sliding and Inertial Effects of Waste Package Contents-Inertial effects of waste package 
contents are an intrinsic part of dynamic structural calculations performed explicitly by finite 
element codes. Sliding effects of waste package contents during impacts are evaluated in 
calculations where specific answers about stresses in the waste package contents are to be 
determined. Coefficients of friction are used based on the materials and situation. When 
coefficient of friction has no effect on the answer, it may not be used. When the waste package 
contents are not specifically under evaluation, those contents are often simplified so that the 
mass and inertial effects are accounted for but geornetry is simplified. A rationale for 
simplifying waste package contents is to decrease computer execution time and size of the finite 
element representation. Another rationale is that for evaluation of the outer corrosion barrier, 
waste package contents need not be modeled in detail to get an accurate answer. 
6.2.2.6 Seismic Evaluations 
Evaluation of Waste Package Component Exposed to Vibratory Ground Motion-The 
motion of repository components (namely waste package, pallet, and drip shield) due to a 
seismic event is evaluated using a three-dimensional finite element representation with an 
acceleration time history as an externally applied load. Because these repository components are 
not anchored to the drift invert or to each other, in case of an extremely intense seismic event 
they are free to move and impact each other, generating considerable contact forces as well as 
material and structural (geometrical) nonlinearities. The; nonlinearity of the problem is further 
exacerbated by an essential role played by friction. The primary objective of these simulations is 
to evaluate structural response of the waste package outer corrosion barrier in the course of 
seismic events of various intensities and frequencies of occurrence. The maximum stress 
intensity and the residual (1'' principal) stress field are, therefore, determined in order to evaluate 
likelihood of immediate breach of the outer corrosion barrier and to estimate the area of the 
containment barrier in which the residual stress exceeds a certain stress threshold. This analysis 
is intended for use in support of the total system performance assessment (TSPA)-License 
Application. The simulations are performed by using the double-precision version of the explicit 
LS-DYNA finite element code. Multiple simulations are performed at each annual frequency of 
occurrence. The stochastic input p&ameters in these structural response calculations are the 
ground motion time history, metal-to-metal friction c:oefficient, and metal-to-rock friction 
coefficient. Structural response is evaluated at two different environment temperatures, and the 
effect of the drip shield constraint is studied to a certain extent. 
Evaluation of Drip Shield Exposed to Vibratory Ground Motion-The motion of the three 
interlocking drip shields due to a seismic event are evaluated using a three-dimensional finite 
element representation with an acceleration time history as an externally applied load. The 
primary objective of these simulations is to evaluate structural response of the drip shield in the 
course of seismic events of various intensities and frequencies of occurrence. The maximum 
stress intensity and residual (lSt principal) stress field are, therefore, determined in order to 
evaluate likelihood of immediate breach of the drip shield plates and to estimate the drip shield 
area in which the residual stress exceeds a certain stress threshold. Another important goal is to 
examine the likelihood of drip shield separation during the seismic event. This analysis is 
intended for use in support of the TSPA-License Application. The simulations are performed by 
using the double-precision version of the explicit LS-I>YNA finite element code. Multiple 
simulations are performed at each annual frequency of occurrence. The stochastic input 
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parameters in these structural response calculations are the ground motion time history, metal-to- 
metal friction coefficient, and metal-to-rock friction coefficient. Structural response is evaluated 
at two different environment temperatures. 
6.2.2.7 Residual Stress Reduction 
The waste package is designed to retain hermeticity for very long periods of time. The chief 
challenge to maintaining this objective is stress corrosion cracking. Three conditions are 
simultaneously required to induce stress corrosion cracking: a corrosive environment, a material 
susceptible to corrosion, and tensile stresses. Removing or reducing the effect of any one of 
these conditions could eliminate or lessen the potential for stress corrosion cracking. While a 
non-corrosive environment cannot be assured, Alloy 22 NO6022 has been chosen as the waste 
package outer corrosion barrier material by virtue of its low susceptibility to corrosion, 
addressing the material requirement. However, residual tensile stresses in the final closure weld 
of the waste package may make Alloy 22 NO6022 susceptible to stress corrosion cracking at 
these weld locations. 
Two countermeasures are currently being evaluated to remove residual tensile stresses in the 
waste package final closure weld by inducing compressive stresses in the weld. One is 
controlled plasticity burnishing; the other is laser peening. A third counter measure (Induction 
Heating) provides an additional backup method to remove residual tensile stresses. The details 
of these methodologies have not been established at the time of this writing, but a brief 
description of each is given below. The method of choice will be determined at a future date. 
Localized Compressive Stress Creation by Laser Peening-In the laser peening operation, 
high-energy density laser pulses with selected intensities and duration are directed at the surface 
of the final closure weld. A,method is currently being developed to confine the release of laser 
pulse energy at the material surface. The resulting pressure or shock wave is propagated into the 
material, thus imparting a compressive surface residual stress layer in the affected material. 
Localized Compressive Stress Creation by Controlled Plasticity Burnishing-Controlled 
plasticity burnishing is a method to apply deep compressive residual stresses to the final closure 
weld. Controlled plasticity burnishing produces a layer of compressive stress of high magnitude 
and depth, with minimal plastic deformation. In the controlled plasticity burnishing process, a 
smooth, free-rolling spherical ball is pressed against and rolled along the surface of the material. 
To ensure free rolling, the ball is supported in a fluid bearing spherical-socket with sufficient 
fluid pressure and flow to maintain the ball out of contact with the socket. The normal force 
with which the ball is pressed against the surface is made large enough to deform the surface 
layer of material into a state of compression, taking account of any tensile stress that exists in the 
material prior to burnishing. 
Weld Annealing by Induction Heating-Induction heating may provide an alternative 
technology to induce compressive stresses. This technique involves localized treatment of the 
material using induction heating. The material is then quickly cooled to room temperature by 
quenching. At present there are no plans to use this technique. 
July 2004 
6.2.3 Mesh Discretization 
The purpose of mesh refinement is to ensure the mesh objectivity of the finite element analyses, 
i-e., that the results obtained are not mesh-sensitive. The mesh-refinement study consists of the 
development of an optimum (cost-effective) mesh that is believed to give mesh-objective 
(mesh-insensitive) results. That mesh is then refined again and computational results for the two 
mesh sizes are compared. The finite-element representation is considered mesh-objective if the 
relative difference in results between the two meshes is approximately an order of magnitude 
smaller than the relative difference in mesh size in the region of interest; otherwise further mesh 
refinement is needed. The mesh size, as used throughout this section, refers to the volume or the 
area of the representative (3-dimension or 2-dimension, respectively) element in the region of 
interest (for example, the element characterized by the highest stresses or strains). 
The optimum mesh is created by the following sequence of steps: 
The initial mesh is created by pursuing the customary engineering practices: the element 
type is appropriately chosen; the mesh is refined in the regions of interest (the highest 
stresslstrain regions, initial impact regions, stress concentration regions, etc.); the mesh is 
mapped whenever possible; and the aspect ratio of elements is kept reasonable. 
In the region of interest, the initial mesh is refined in one direction while the element size 
in the other two directions is kept unchanged (for example, the mesh is refined across the 
thickness while kept unchanged in the hoop and axial directions). The mesh-refinement 
procedure is repeated in this manner until the relative difference in results between the two 
successive meshes is acceptable (i.e., approximately an order of magnitude smaller than the 
relative difference in the mesh size). The mesh dimension in this direction is then fixed at 
the largest value that satisfied the previously mentioned criterion. 
The same procedure is consecutively repeated in the remaining two directions. 
The intention of this one-direction-at-a-time mesh refinement is to create, in a consistent 
and systematic manner, a mesh that is cost-effective and objective. 
Whether the created mesh meets the latter requirement is verified by the final step: the 
simultaneous mesh refinement in all three directions. The level of this mesh refinement 
should be similar in all three directions. In this final step, the same mesh-acceptance 
criterion is evoked: the mesh is considered objective if the relative difference in results 
between the two meshes is approximately an order of magnitude smaller than the relative 
difference in mesh size in the region of interest. 
It should be emphasized that the mesh objectivity is verified by the final step regardless of 
whether the final mesh is arrived at by the described one-.direction-at-a-time mesh refinement or 
not. The one-direction-at-a-time mesh refinement is optional because its only purpose is to 
develop a cost-effective mesh (that satisfies the objectivity requirement). 
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6.2.4 Waste Package Component Design Stress Limits and Failure Criteria 
For structural analyses of preliminary designs that consider material nonlinear behavior, the 
maximum-shear-stress or Tresca (strength of materials) criterion is used in determining stress 
limits. In general terms, this criterion assumes that the design is safe as long as stress intensity 
(the difference between maximum and minimum principal stress) remains below a certain limit. 
In particular, the failure criterion chosen was the acceptance criteria for plastic analysis (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581 151 Section 111, Division 1, Appendix F, F-1341.2). This is an acceptable 
vessel designer choice of ASME Code acceptance criteria for service loadings with Level D 
service limits for vessel designs in accordance with NC-3200 (Safety Class 2 vessels) when a 
complete stress analysis is performed (ASME 2001 [DILRS 158 1151, NC-3211.l(c), Appendix 
XI11 and Note (4) to Table NC-3217-1). 
The ASME Code suggests the following primary stress intensity limits for plastic analyses 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix F, F-1341.2): 
The general primary membrane stress intensity shall not exceed 0.7 S, for ferritic steel 
materials included in Section 11, Part D, Subpart 1, Table 2A and the greater of 0.7 S, and 
Sy + ' b  (S, - Sy) for austenitic steel, high-nickel ;illoy, and copper-nickel alloy materials 
included in Section 11, Part D, Subpart 1, Table 2A, where S, and Sy are tensile strength 
and yield strength, respectively. 
The maximum primary stress intensity at any location shall not exceed 0.9 S,. 
The average primary shear across a section loaded in pure shear shall not exceed 0.42 S,. 
The Pressure Vessel Research Council of the Welding Research Council provides guidelines 
(Hechmer and Hollinger 1998 [DIRS 1661471) to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
Rule Committees for assessing stress results from three-dimensional finite element analysis in 
terms of stress limits in the design-by-analysis rules (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111 
[Class 1, NB] and Section VIII, Division 2). These guidelines were developed for linear 
analyses and Pressure Vessel Research Council recommends that future research work should be 
conducted to generate state-of-the-art guidelines for applying inelastic, large-deformation 
analyses. Therefore, a cautious use of the Pressure Vessel Research Council recommendations 
was made in developing methodologies for post-processing LS-DYNA nonlinear plastic 
simulations to assure conservative representations of the general primary membrane stress 
intensity and maximum primary stress intensity. 
The Pressure Vessel Research Council recommendations also refer to an earlier Pressure Vessel 
Research Council (Phase 1) report (Hechmer and Holllinger 1998 [DIRS 166147]), which 
recommended that the ASME Code (ASME 2001 [DIIRS 158 1 151, Appendix F) "should be 
revised to provide a limit on effective plastic strain which is more appropriate for events that are 
energy controlled, rather than load controlled, which is all that was considered when ASME 
B&PV [Boiler and Pressure Vessel] Code Appendix F was written." The YMP recognizes that 
strain-based or deformation-based criterion may be more appropriate than stress-based limits for 
evaluation of the credible preclosure sequence events (Section 4.1.4.1). However, the project is 
also committed to applying the ASME Code for structural analyses, and until the ASME Boiler 
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and Pressure Vessel Code Rule Committees prepare rules in the ASME Code, Appendix F 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Appendix F) for using strain limits, primary stress intensity limits 
will be used. 
The ASME Code design-by-analysis guidance recognizes the differences in importance of 
different types of stresses and provides guidance on their correct assignment to the different 
categories of stress intensity used to evaluate different types of failure modes (ASME 2001 
[DIRS 1581151). The three types of stresses are membrane, bending and peak stresses. The 
three categories of stress intensity are primary ( P,,, , P, and P, [general primary membrane, local 
primary membrane, and primary bending, respectively]), secondary (Q), and peak (F). 
A primary stress is defined as "a normal stress developed by the imposed loading which is 
necessary to satisfy the laws of equilibrium of external .and internal forces and moments. The 
basic characteristic of a primary stress is that it is not self-limiting. Primary stresses which 
considerably exceed the yield strength will result in failure or, at least, in gross distortion" 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII, XIII-1123(h)). 
A secondary stress is defined as "a normal or a shear stress developed by the constraint of 
adjacent parts or by self-constraint of the structure. The basic characteristic of a secondary stress 
is that it is self-limiting. Local yielding and minor distortions can satisfy the conditions which 
cause the stress to occur and failure from one application of the stress is not expected" (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII, XIII-1123(i)). A cited example of 
a secondary stress is "bending stress at a gross structural discontinuity." A gross structural 
discontinuity is defined as "a source of stress or strain intensification which affects a relatively 
large portion of a structure and has a significant effect on the overall stress or strain pattern or on 
the structure as a whole" (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII, 
XIII-1123(b)). Cited examples of gross structural discontinuities are head-to-shell junctions and 
junctions between shells of different thickness. 
A local primary membrane stress is defined as "a membrane stress produced by pressure or other 
mechanical loading and associated with a discontinuity [that] would, if not limited, produce 
excessive distortion in the transfer of load to other portions of the structure. Conservatism 
requires that such a stress be classified as a local primary-membrane stress even though it has 
some characteristics of a secondary stress" (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, Division 1, 
Appendix XIII, XIII-1123u)). The other differentiating feature of a local primary membrane 
stress is that it is localized, and guidance is provided (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151) for 
evaluating if membrane stress fields are adequately "101:al" to be assigned a PL classification 
rather than a more restrictive P,,, classification. 
The failure mode being addressed by the general primary membrane stress intensity (P,) limit is 
"collapse" in the sense that collapse includes tensile instability and ductile rupture under short 
term loading (Hechmer and Hollinger 1998 [DIRS 1661471, Guideline 1). The principle failure 
mode being addressed by the maximum primary stress intensity (PL + Pb) is excessive plastic 
deformation. However, it also relates to tensile instability due to the nature of Pb . 
The sequence events considered in this report are not repetitive where fatigue cracking or 
incremental collapse might be an issue. It follows that evaluation of secondary stress intensities 
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(Q) or maximum total stress intensities (PL + Pb + Q + I;) are not appropriate. Brittle fracture is 
also precluded by the high ductility of the outer boundary material, Alloy 22 (UNS N06022), at 
the temperatures experienced after waste form loading. Although the high-stress areas are 
comprised of primary, secondary, and peak stresses, only the primary stress intensities (P,, PL 
and Pb) contribute to plastic instability (tensile tearing) or excessive plastic deformation, and 
therefore, only the primary stress intensities are evaluated for the sequence events. 
The ASME Code was used to determine which stress fields should be classified as primary and 
which should be classified as secondary when evaluating the sequence events (ASME 2001 
[DIRS 158 1 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII, Table XIII- 1 130- 1). All membrane 
stress fields were conservatively classified as primary. Classification of the bending stresses was 
more involved. 
Review of representative analyses for the sequence events indicated that the most important 
wall-bending stresses in the outer corrosion barrier occurred near gross structural discontinuities. 
Some of these gross structural discontinuities were integral to the outer boundary and some were 
introduced by the constraint of adjacent parts or impact surfaces. 
The integral gross discontinuities in the outer corrosion barrier are similar to ASME Code vessel 
details such as shell-to-lid junctures and step-changes in wall thickness. The bending stresses are 
being created by self-constraint, and the ASME Code classifies these bending stresses as 
secondary (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII, Table XIII- 
1130-1). The only exception is at the shell-lid junction, where concern about the predictability 
of the central stresses of the lid leads the ASME Code to caution the designer to consider 
classifying the bending stresses as Pb (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, Division 1, 
Appendix XIII, Table XIII-1130-1, Note (4)). However, this is not appropriate guidance for 
inelastic analyses because the increased flexibility of the juncture caused by inelastic behavior is 
correctly captured and the central stresses of the lid are accurately predicted. 
The bending stresses created by the constraint of adjacent parts or impact surfaces (which can be 
considered [temporary] "adjacent parts") were reviewed on individual cases with attention to the 
amount and type of constraint introduced. In the design analyses to date, the constraint of the 
adjacent part (e.g., trunnion sleeve) or impact surface (e.g., emplacement pallet, crane hook, or 
rock) created local yielding and minor distortions in the outer barrier. The outer corrosion 
barrier distorted shape reduced the outer corrosion barrier bending stresses while increasing the 
outer corrosion barrier membrane stresses. The bending stresses in these locally yielded regions 
are therefore self-limiting and satisfy the basic characteristic of a secondary stress. 
The structural criterion developed for the outer boundary for the sequence events was to directly 
address the dominant failure mode, tensile instability: and limit the membrane stresses to 
acceptable limits. The use of inelastic analyses ensures that local thinning or shape changes that 
could increase membrane stresses are properly accounted for. 
Inelastic analyses were conducted using true stress and true strain based constitutive 
relationships, therefore for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022), the limit on P,, is 0.70u, the limit on PL is 
0.90, (where Pb = 0), where o, is the true tensile strength at temperature (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
1581 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix F, F-1322.3(b) and F-1341.2). 
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As stated earlier, PL must be "local" to not be classified as a more restrictive general primary 
membrane stress intensity, P, (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix 
1 1 1  1 1 - 1 1 2 3 ) )  Interpretation of this guidance with respect to the ASME B&PV Code 
Appendix F (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151) limits results in requiring PL values exceeding 0.770, 
to not extend for greater than f i  in any direction, where R is the midsurface radius and t is 
the thickness of the outer barrier. 
Rigorously performed, calculation of the primary membrane stress intensities involves: 
Identifying the governing wall location, which may not necessarily contain the maximum 
stressed point (Hechmer and Hollinger 1998 [DIRS 1661471, Guidelines 3 and 4) 
Identifying the orientation of the stress classification line, typically normal to the mid- 
plane of the shell or lid thickness (Hechmer and Hollinger 1998 [DIRS 1661471, 
Guideline 4d). 
Identifying the stress component ( a ,  , a y  ,a,, z,, zy,  z,) fields across the wall of the 
outer corrosion barrier 
Averaging the stress component fields to create wall-averaged stress components 
Translating the wall-averaged stresses to principle stress directions by solving a cubic 
equation 
Calculating the difference between the maximum ( a , )  and minimum (a,) principle 
stress direction values. 
To simplify the calculation, the wall-average of the element total stress intensity (twice the 
maximum shear stress) values through the outer corrosion barrier is used to define the primary 
membrane stress intensities. This is a conservative representation because it ignores possibly 
changing principle stress planes through the wall, and it includes the secondary and peak stress 
contributions. 
The failure criterion used is broken into tiered screening criteria shown below. The easiest to 
apply and most conservative criteria are applied initially. If these can not be met, less 
conservative screening criteria are imposed that require more calculations. These screening 
criteria in decreasing order of conservatism are listed below. An element's total stress intensity, 
CFint, is equal to twice the element's maximum shear stress (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581151, Section 
111, Division 1, NB-3000). 
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Criteria 
Maximum Bint < 0.70,? 
No. 
Maximum (Tint c 0.770,? 
No. 
Condition of Acceptance 
Yes: Meets P, and PL limits without the need for 
wall averaging. 
Yes: Meets PL limit without the need for wall 
averaging, but the stress field must not be uniform 
Note: P, is the general primary membrane stress intensity 
PL is the local primary membrane stress intensity 
Pb is the primary bending stress intensity 
R is the median wall radius 
t is the wall thickness. 
Maximum wall-averaged oint < 0.7 o, ? 
No. 
Maximum wall-averaged oint c 0.770, ? 
No. 
Maximum wall-averaged oint < 0.84 ou 
&wall-averaged oint <0.77 0, at & 
surrounding maximum location? 
No. 
Maximum wall-averaged oint c 0.9 0, 
and wall-averaged oint ~ 0 . 7 7  o, at 
f i  surrounding maximum location 
&wall-average of each shear stress on 
the stress classification line (z,,, z,, and 
z,,) <0.42~, ? (x,y,z are element (not 
global) directions) 
No: Fails simplified screening criterion. 
If the wall-averaged oint limits can not be met, perform a more rigorous evaluation using all six 
stress components (and solve a cubic equation for principle stress direction values) or use 
multiple stress classification lines to extrapolate to governing wall locations when they have 
significant non-membrane stress contributions. 
around the entire circumference (only a concern 
for vertical drop events). 
Yes: Meets P, and PL limits. 
Yes: Meets PL limit if the stress fields are not 
uniform around the entire circumference (only a 
concern for vertical drop events). 
Yes: Meets PL and average primary shear limit. 
Yes: Meets PL and average primary shear limit 
orthogonal to the Stress Classification Line) 
If the average primary shear limit can not be met, then review appropriateness of using a stress 
classification plane rather than a stress classification line. 
If the screening criteria can not be met, perform a rigorous Code evaluation using quantitative 
instead of bounding stress classifications. This will require additional elastic finite element 
analysis with variable Modulus of Elasticity and time-slicing. 
For lifting analyses, the acceptance criteria are outlined in American National Standard for 
Radioactive Materials-Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 
Pounds (4500 kg) or More (ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161, Section 4.2.1.1). The load- 
bearing members of the lifting device shall be capable of lifting three times the combined weight 
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of the shipping container, plus the weight of the intervening components of the lifting device, 
without generating a combined shear stress or maximum principal stress at any point in the 
device in excess of S,. The lifting device shall also be capable of lifting five times the weight 
without exceeding S,. 
Finally, for structural analyses of the seismic events, the acceptance criterion is based, on stress- 
corrosion-cracking considerations. It is generally assumed that crack initiation will not occur if 
the residual stress is below a certain threshold value. Thus, the first residual principal stress at 
any location exposed to an aggressive environment shall not exceed the lower bound of 0.8 S, as 
suggested by Errata for Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1677801, Section 
6.3.1, p. 32). 
6.2.5 Calculations for True Measures of Ductility 
The material properties in the engineering handbooks and vendor catalogs refer to engineering 
stress and strain definitions: s = P/A, and e = L/L, - 1 (Dieter 1976 [DIRS 1186471, 
Chapter 9), where P is the force applied during a static tensile test, L is the length of the 
deformed specimen, and L,, and A, are the original length and cross-sectional area of the 
specimen, respectively. The engineering stress-strain curve does not give a true indication of the 
deformation characteristics of a material during plastic deformation because it is based entirely 
on the original dimensions of the specimen. In addition, ductile metal that is pulled in tension 
becomes unstable and necks down in the course of the test. Hence, LS-DYNA finite element 
code requires input in terms of true stress and strain definitions: a = P/A and E-= I ~ ( L / L ~ ) .  
The true stresses and strains ( a ,  E )  are calculated by using their engineering counterparts ( s, e ) 
based on the following relations: 
Equations 1 and 2 can be readily derived based on constancy of volume (A, - L,, = A.  L) and 
strain homogeneity during plastic deformation (Dieter 1976 [DIRS 1186471, Chapter 9). These 
expressions are applicable only in the hardening region of the stress-strain curve that is limited 
by the onset of necking. 
Equations 1 and 2 are used to calculate true tensile strength and true uniform strain (the strain 
corresponding to tensile strength). These material properties are then used to calculate the 
hardening (tangent) modulus (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Key Attributes of Bilinear Stress-Strain Curves 
6.2.6 Fracture Mechanics Analyses 
The structural analysis methods discussed so far predict margin to failure by ductile collapse. 
Fracture Mechanics may be used to analyze the potential for brittle fracture. Depending on the 
material properties, a combination of ductile and brittle failure may need to be considered. The 
waste package and the drip shield materials, in general, possess ductile behavior. Specific 
material properties for specific structural calculations may show that only ductile collapse must 
be considered. For such cases, no further investigation of brittle fracture is required. However, 
any potential brittle behavior due to environmental conditions in the repository, such as the 
hydrogen embrittlement of titanium or fabrication effectsfdefects on titanium and Alloy 22 
NO6022 may require further investigation of these materials. For these cases, fracture mechanics 
calculations can be performed using either the stress intensity factor or the J-integral at the crack 
tip, depending on the extent of plasticity that results from the impact. If these fracture 
parameters exceed the material limits, the crack propagation will be evaluated. Otherwise, the 
crack growth is arrested and there is no failure. Hence, a rigorous analysis of the crack 
propagation scheme may determine the consequence of such an event. 
The specific problem of crack propagation in the waste package and drip shield materials 
involves low-velocity impact of two structural components. Existing cracks (manufacturing 
flaws) on metallic plates may be analyzed. The crack propagation or arrest under dynamic loads 
due to rock impacts or handling accidents may be investigated using the commercially available 
software. This problem may require elastic-plastic material properties and large deformation 
simulations in addition to the contact between the impacting object and the metal plate. 
6.3 THERMAL DESIGN 
The purpose of the waste package thermal analyses is to ensure that the waste form temperatures 
do not exceed levels that are important to maintaining their long-term i n t e ~ t y .  For commercial 
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SNF, this involves ensuring that the cladding temperature does not induce rupture, compromising 
the cladding as a barrier to radionuclide release. For DOE SNF, thermal limits will be defined. 
For defense HLW glass, this involves ensuring that the glass does not reach a transition 
temperature that would result in an alteration of the glass microstructure, increasing the solubility 
of the glass and reducing the time required for mobilization of the radionuclides embedded in the 
glass matrix. 
Various thermal calculations require different computational tools and may be performed for 
different levels of detail and accuracy. The suite of computational tools used is discussed in 
Section 6.3.1, and the types of calculations performed for thermal analysis are discussed in 
Section 6.3.2. 
6.3.1 Computational Tools 
Thermal analyses are performed to assure that fuel cladding, waste package, and rock 
temperatures do not exceed maximum limits. Benchmarking calculations are performed to 
demonstrate. that the thermal analysis methods produce valid results. The benchmark 
calculations will include comparisons with data from large experiments at Yucca Mountain, 
including the Large Block Test, the Single Heater Test, and the Drift Scale Test. Benchmark 
calculations of forced and natural convection are compared to data from quarter scale testing. 
6.3.1.1 ANSYS 
The primary computational tool used for heat transfer calculations is ANSYS. ANSYS solves all 
three modes of heat transfer: conduction, convection, and radiation. Typically, convection is not 
specifically calculated in ANSYS. Instead, heat removed by ventilation is subtracted from the 
total heat source and only the net heat transferred to the drift walls is included in the calculations. 
For conduction, the thermal conductivity and specific heats may be spatially varying and 
temperature-dependent. For radiation, ANSYS determines an effective thermal conductivity and 
applies it to Fourier's Law of heat conduction. This effective thermal conductivity is computed 
from the thermal communication between each element of the surfaces, using gray body diffuse 
radiation theory. For an enclosed system of finite radiating surfaces, the theory of gray body 
diffuse radiation heat transfer is appropriate (Siege1 and Howell 1992 [DIRS 1006871, 
Equation 7-31, p. 271). 
ANSYS allows three types of thermal boundary conditions: temperature, heat flux, and a 
convection condition. The boundary condition of convection does not imply a detailed 
convection calculation but rather a heat flux proportional to the difference between the 
instantaneous surface temperature and the free-stream temperature ( i . . ,  Newton's Law of 
Cooling). These boundary conditions are applied at the surfaces of the problem domain. 
Consistent with finite element analysis, the problem dornain is divided into polygons. Within 
these solids, the thermal transport properties and volumetric heat generation magnitudes (as 
appropriate) are spatially constant. However, the variation in temperature within and among the 
polygons is approximated by one of a number of shape functions. This technique permits larger 
polygons to be used than would be possible with uniform temperatures within the polygons and a 
simplistic relationship among the polygons. 
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6.3.1.2 FLUENT 
The FLUENT computational fluid dynamics code is used to calculate heat transfer coefficients, 
air temperature, air velocity, heat flux, and pressure distribution in the h f t .  
6.3.1.3 DRIFTFLOW 
DRIFTFLOW is a Microsoft Visual Basic macro that operates in Microsoft Excel 97. 
DRIFTFLOW is intended to represent the entire repository and give a quick best-estimate of 
thermal conditions therein, during preclosure (forced ventilation as well as natural ventilation) 
and postclosure periods. Conduction is calculated by superimposing thermal responses to a 
series of heat pulses calculated in ANSYS. Convection and radiation heat transfkr are calculated 
using empirical correlations derived for a concentric tube annulus. Ventilation flow rate is 
specified during the forced ventilation period and calculated from pneumatic pressure differences 
during the natural ventilation period. 
6.3.1.4 MATHCAD 
MATHCAD can solve systems of equations, allowing the user to evaluate the impact of 
parameter variance quickly. 
6.3.2 Description of Pertinent Analyses 
Table 5 gives an outline of the various types, of thermal design calculations performed. 
6.3.2.1 Fuel Assembly-Scale Calculations 
Fuel assembly-scale calculations are used to develop effective thermal conductivity correlations. 
These calculations impose a uniform surface temperature on the four sides of a fuel assembly 
and calculate the steady state temperature distribution. The results are used to determine 
effective thermal conductivity for the fuel assembly. 
Effective thermal conductivity is used to predict peak cladding temperatures for SNF assemblies. 
Rather than representing the waste package and every fuel rod in every assembly, this method 
represents the fuel assemblies as a smeared (distributed) solid volume with uniform volumetric 
heat generation. The smeared properties represent the combined thermal radiation and 
conduction heat transfer from the fuel rods to the inner-basket structure. This method, developed 
in Spent Nuclear Fuel EfSective Thermal Conductivity Report (CRWMS M&O 1996 [DIRS 
100215]), provides a best estimate of peak cladding temperatures compared to correlations such 
as "Wooton-Epstein" (Wooton and Epstein 1963 [DIRS 144379]), which produces an 
undetermined degree of conservatism. Such conservatism often leads to over-design. 
To determine the appropriate effective thermal conductivities for PWR and BWR commercial 
SNF assemblies, detailed thermal representations of typical fuel assemblies are developed using 
a finite-element computer code (Figure 10). Vacuum conditions and fill gases of helium, 
nitrogen, and argon are evaluated with various rod array. For BWR fuel, the evaluation 
considers the effects of channels between fuel assemblies, cladding oxidation, locations of guide 
tubes and water rods, emissivity variation, and inner-basket temperature gradients. Calculated 
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effective thermal conductivities are found to be highly temperature-dependent due to the 
contribution of thermal radiation with little dependence on assembly heat output. 
Results from this method are compared to those from previous applications using alternate 
methods and to actual test results from spent-fuel storage casks (CRWMS M&O 1996 [DIRS 
1002151, Sections 7.2 and 7.3). The comparisons to experimental data and test calculations 
indicate that the effective thermal conductivities provide a best estimate of cladding temperatures 
within a spent-fuel waste package. Further, the effective thermal conductivities are consistent 
with single-point values previously published by storage cask vendors (CRWMS M&O 1996 
[DIRS 1002151, Section 8.0). 
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Table 5. Summary of Thermal Calculations for Waste Package Component Design 
Type of Calculation Phenomena Calculated Boundary conditions Calculation Results 
Initial conditions 
Assumptions 
2-D ANSYS calculation at Steady State Uniform assembly outer Results used to determine an effective 
Fuel Assembly-Scale Conduction heat transfer temperature thermal conductivity for fuel assembly 
Radiative heat transfer Matrix of calculations (power, as a function of temperature. Variation 
temp) with power is small, but averaged in 
Ignores convection heat transfer result. 
2-D ANSYS calculation at Pseudo-Transient Waste package temperatures Kefi for entire waste package contents 
Waste Package-Scale Conduction heat transfer specified at top, side and bottom, Waste package interior temperature 
Radiation heat transfer and interpolated between these distribution (most importantly the peak 
Ken for each assembly cladding temperature) vs. time. 
lgnores convection heat transfer 
2-D or 3-D ANSYS calculation at Pseudo-Transient Uniform temp 5 m into rock wall Evaluate impact of drip shield and invert 
Drift-Scale Conduction and radiation heat obtained from "pillar" calculation at on waste package surface and peak 
transfer same linear heat rate cladding temperatures vs. time. 
Kefi for waste package contents 
2-D ANSYS calculation at Transient Lower and upper sink temps. Response surface for peak drift wall 
Repository Scale Conduction and radiation heat Line heat source temperatures vs. repository parameters ("pillar" calculation) transfer K,tl for waste package contents such as ventilation duration and linear 
Arbitrary deletion of heat removed heat loading. Each peak drift wall (or 
by ventilation 5m-into-rock) temperature on the 
response surface can then be used as a 
boundary condition for a drift-scale 
calculation, to also generate such a 
response surface for peak waste 
package surface temperature. 
Axisymmetric ANSYS calculation Transient Waste package surface, peak shell, and 
for Fire Analysis Radiation and convection from Stainless steel initial temp peak cladding temperatures 
fire, only radiation cooling after Detailed waste package contents 
fire 
Axisymmetric ANSYS calculation in Transient Stainless steel initial temp Waste package surface, peak shell, and 
Surface Facility Conduction heat transfer Ambient concrete wall temp peak cladding temperatures 
Radiation heat transfer &n for waste package contents Temperature in weld zone 
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Table 5. Summary of Thermal Calculations for Waste Package Component Design (Continued) 
NOTE: Transient effects for fuel assembly-scale, waste package-scale, and drift-scale calculations (out to 5m-into-rock) have small time constants compared to their inputs (decay 
of the fuel heat and mountain heat storage). Therefore, these calculations are performed as a series of steady-state calculations, at "snapshots" in time, using (a) the power 
produced by the fuel assemblies at that point in time, or (b) the 5m-into-rock temperature at that point in time. 
1-D = one-dimensional; 2-D = two-dimensional; 3-D =three-dimensional. 
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Calculation Results 
Results used to determine the 
fraction of heat removed by 
ventilation, or ventilation 
efficiency. 
Waste package and drift wall 
temperatures vs. time. 
Overall convective coefficient (h), 
detailed h, 
Waste package and drift wall 
temperatures 
Iterate with ANSYS to converge 
on temperatures 
Reference point to quantify axial 
drift wall and waste package 
surface temperature variations 
along the drift, relative to the 2-D 
repository-scale caiculation. The 
appropriate "offset" can be 
applied to the entire response 
surface generated from the 2-D 
results. 
Boundary conditions 
Initial conditions 
Assumptions 
Line heat source 
Coupled with 2-D ANSYS Repository 
Scale calculation to account for 
transient effects of heat storage in the 
rock. 
Overall convective coefficient (h) from 
FLUENT 
Static pressure difference for natural 
ventilation -or  - flow rate for forced 
ventilation 
Uniform rock temperature 5 m from 
surface (from ANSYS Repository-Scale 
calculations) 
Waste package surface heat flux 
Ventilation flow rate 
. . 
Lower and upper sink temps. 
&fi for waste package contents 
Typ. Set of waste packages 
Arbitrary deletion of heat removed by 
ventiiation 
Type of Calculation 
1 -D DRIFTFLOW calculation at 
Repository-Scale 
3-D FLUENT calculation at Drift- 
Scale 
3-D ANSYS calculation at 
Repository-Scale 
("pillar" calculation) 
Phenomena Calculated 
Transient conduction, 
convection, and radiation heat 
transfer 
Natural ventilation air flow 
Transient and steady state 
convection, conduction, and 
radiation heat transfer. 
Steady state, laminar and 
turbulent flow 
Transient 
Conduction and radiation heat 
transfer 

"pillar" calculation for consistency. Drift-scale calculations provide a faster method to study 
variations in invert design, drip shield design, and waste package emplacement order. 
6.3.2.4 Repository-Scale Two-Dimensional Calculations 
While detailed repository-scale three-dimensional calculations are necessary to demonstrate 
margin to the waste form thermal requirements, repository-scale two-dimensional calculations 
are appropriate to study the sensitivity of the temperature field to changes in the major thermal 
variables. Such a representation consists of a perpendicular slice through a single waste package, 
extending from the top of the mountain to well into the saturated zone, and accounting for the 
thermal transport properties of each stratigraphic unit (Figure 11). Such a representation 
appropriately calculates the temperature field for a drift located near the center of the repository, 
provided the packages may be approximated as an infinitely long cylinder with an axially 
uniform heat generation rate. 
Two-dimensional representations have low computational requirements, and a large number of 
calculations may be performed quickly. This rapidity of computation enables time-dependent 
temperature field calculations that span the design space (i.e., the range of independent 
variables). Low-order, multi-variant regressions may then be performed and response surfaces 
created. The functional form of the response surface selected is based on insight into the heat- 
transfer physics and the fidelity with which the particular functional form reproduces the 
calculational results. 
This representation is truly applicable only to an infinitely long waste package; however, simple 
adjustments may be made to approximate three-dimensional effects. The effect of increases in 
waste package separation is obtained by adjusting the average waste package heat generation rate 
(and hence the linear power). This functional form is shown in Equation 3. 
Here QWp is the waste package heat generation rate at emplacement, L,, is the average-waste 
package length, and 6 is the skirt-to-skirt gap between waste packages. The appropriateness of 
this adjustment decreases with increasing waste package spacing because the localized relatively 
high heat regions of such an arrangement are not accounted for. For the range of waste package 
spacings currently considered, this adjustment is applicable. 
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Figure 1 1. Illustration of Two-dimensional Repository Representation 
An operating curve is the locus of values for two independent variables-holding other 
independent variables constant-which results in a particular temperature value on the response 
surface. For instance, if the ventilation duration, waste package heat generation rate at 
emplacement, and backfill effective-thermal conductivity (if backfill is present) are fixed, a 
curve may be constructed providing the combinations of skirt-to-skirt separations and heat 
removal fractions necessary to obtain a given peak-drift wall temperature. This process is 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
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While these two-dimensional calculations cannot legitimately be used to quantify the effect of 
non-uniform heat generation rates, the results from previous three-dimensional cases may be 
used in conjunction with these to estimate the magnitudes of three-dimensions and non- 
uniformity. By assuming the nominal heat generation rate for the repository, peaking factors 
may be developed for a range of design basis heat generation rates. For instance, simple linear 
correlations for incremental temperature increases for non-uniformity may be developed. Such a 
functional form is shown in Equation 4. 
Here, a and a1 are fit coefficients and Pli,,,, is that shown in Equation 3. 
Such an expression is used to adjust upward the peak waste package-surface temperature and the 
corresponding peak-cladding temperature for the particular design basis heat generation rate. 
The waste form limit may then be decremented by the difference between the peak-cladding and 
waste package surface from the two-dimensional calculation. The resulting waste package 
surface temperature is now the target peak waste package-surface temperature. This is illustrated 
in Figure 13. 
) Drifl Wall '
Temperature Response Surface 
Cc 
E Operating Curve 6 
00249DC~LA~0111a.ai 
Where: E is the heat removal fraction 
6 is the waste package skirt- 
6 LOCUS of Points Satisfying T, 
Requirement 
to-skirt gap 
Figure 12. Illustration of Response Surface Interrogation 
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T ~ ~ ~ - ~ ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ )  - WP surface temperature from response surface at the emplacement repository thermal load 
~ ~ p 2 - ~  - WP surface temperature modified for three-dimensional effects 
T ~ ~ ( T ~ ~ ~ ' ~ , ~ ~ ~ )  - Peak-cladding temperature given modified WP surface temperature and design-basis thermal load 
NOTE: In this process, the locus of points (&,&.for which ~ p c ( ~ w $ ~ , ~ o e )  = 350 "C (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, 
Section 5.1.3.2), is determined. This creates the operation curve for peak waste package cladding temperature. 
Figure 13. Three-Dimensional Effect Accommodation 
6.3.2.5 Repository-Scale Three-Dimensional Analyses 
While two-dimensional calculations are appropriate for scoping studies, three-dimensional 
calculations are needed for detailed, final design evaluations. The interface flow of 
two-dimensional and three-dimensional calculations is presented in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Thermal Analysis Technique Decision Flowchart 
The thermal three-dimensional representation approximates the repository as an infinitely 
repeating series of "pillars," extending from the top of the mountain to a plane well into the 
saturated zone. Layers corresponding to the stratigraphy of the mountain represent the host rock 
of the repository. For each of these layers, thermal transport properties (viz., temperature- 
dependent thermal conductivity and specific heat) appropriate to the local rock properties are 
used. Laterally, adiabatic surfaces are placed at the cente,r of the rock masses between the drifts. 
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6.3.2.6 Thermal Calculatioins of kire Events 
Parametric calculations are performed using a 2-D ANSYS simulation of a waste package. 
Duration and temperature of the fire conditions are varied. 
6.3.2.7 Thermal Calculations in Surface Facilities 
Calculations are performed using a 2-D ANSYS simulation of a waste package in surface 
facilities. Thermal response is calculated for waste paclsages located on the transporter, in the 
weld cell, and other surface facilities. 
6.4 SHIELDING DESIGN 
The purpose of shielding analyses is to evaluate the effects of ionizing radiation on personnel, 
equipment, and materials. For waste package shielding, gamma rays and neutrons emitting from 
the commercial SNF or defense HLW are the primary radiation sources. During normal 
operations at the repository, loading and handling of the waste packages will be carried out 
remotely to avoid exposure of personnel to harmful radiation levels. Shielding analyses are 
performed primarily to assess radiation effects to materials and equipment. 
Because waste packages are required to contain waste for thousands of years, the waste package 
barriers must reduce radiation levels at the waste package surface such that radiolysis-enhanced 
corrosion under aqueous conditions is negligible. Shielding analyses are hence carried out to 
determine radiation dose on the waste package surface, in order to evaluate the consequence of 
the radiolytically induced corrosion. Shielding evaluations are also performed to determine 
radiation exposure to equipment during welding of the waste package closure lids. Monitoring 
and control equipment, such as the welding heads and cameras, will be relatively close to the 
radiation sources. The results of the shielding evaluation will be used to quantify the shielding 
necessary for equipment to function properly at a given location for a required period of time. 
In the event of emergency situations, personnel access in the proximity of the waste packages. 
may be required. Shielding analyses provide an evaluation of the radiation environment 
surrounding the waste packages, assuring safety of the personnel. 
6.4.1 Computational Methods and Tools 
Shielding analyses concern attenuation of neutrons and gamma rays through materials. The 
radiation dose rates outside a waste package are determined by solving the Boltzmann equation 
for radiation transport, which governs the behavior of the radiation particles in a material. Two 
methods for solving the Boltzmann transport equation for shielding applications have received 
the most development and have been used extensively for radiation shielding problems. They 
are the discrete-ordinates method and the Monte Carlo method. The computational tools used 
for waste package shielding analyses rely on these two methods. 
6.4.1.1 Monte Carlo Method 
The Monte Carlo method obtains radiation doses for shielding problems by employing a 
stochastic process to solve the Boltzmann transport equation. Using random variables, an 
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"analog" Monte Carlo method simulates the histories of individual particles through the 
geometry (the "random-walk" process) and then analyzes these particle histories to derive the 
desired responses, such as flux density and dose rate. One particle history includes the birth of a 
particle at its source, its "random walk" through the transporting medium as it undergoes various 
scattering interactions, and ultimately the death of the paxticle, which terminates the history. A 
death can occur when the particle is absorbed, leaves the system, or loses significance owing to 
other factors. 
For waste package shielding analyses, the analog Monte Carlo method is inadequate and 
inefficient in calculating radiation responses with acceptable accuracy because the events of 
interest are usually very rare. From the shielding point of view, the particles that escape the 
waste package are of primary interest for radiation dose evaluation. However, the probability of 
recording such an event in a Monte Carlo calculation is extremely low (less than 1 x and 
an unacceptably large number of histories is required to obtain acceptable results. For this 
reason, variance-reduction techniques must be employed for Monte Carlo shielding analyses. 
Variance-reduction techniques are procedures for altering the analog Monte Carlo process so as 
to reduce the variance of the calculated results. They are also known as "importance sampling" 
or "biasing techniques." The natural distributions in the "random walk" are modified by some 
importance function, and the particle statistical weights are adjusted from the analog value of 
unity to remove the bias. The purpose of variance-reduction techniques in Monte Carlo 
shielding analyses is to improve the efficiency of a calculation by reducing the variance of the 
results without increasing the computing time. The objective is to maintain a reasonable particle 
population in the primary regions of interest and, at the same time, control the fluctuation of 
statistical weight of the particles. 
6.4.1.2 Discrete-Ordinates Method 
The discrete-ordinates, or S,, method solves the Boltzmann transport equation by using 
deterministic numerical techniques. The S, method is based on expressing the continuous form 
of the Boltzmann transport equation in terms of discrete values of the space, energy, and angle 
variables. Whereas the continuous transport equation represents particle balance over 
differential intervals, the discrete-ordinates formulation represents particle balance over finite 
intervals. The spatial variables are expressed as finite intervals; the angular variables are 
specified in terms of a finite number of discrete directions and corresponding weights, 
representing solid angles, and the energy domain is divided into a finite number of ranges called 
energy groups. 
6.4.1.3 MCNP 
MCNP (Briesmeister 1997 [DIRS 1038971) is a general-purpose Monte Carlo computer code for 
neutron, photon, electron, or coupled neutron/photon/electron transport. It is capable of 
calculating eigenvalues for critical systems and performing fixed-source (shielding) calculations 
to obtain radiation doses. For waste package design, MCNP is used for criticality and shielding 
calculations. The code allows a detailed geometric representation of the system being analyzed. 
MCNP uses continuous-energy nuclear and atomic data libraries. The MCNP package provides 
nuclear data tables derived from the Evaluated Nuclear Data File system, the Evaluated Nuclear 
Data Library and the Activation Library from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and 
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evaluations from the Applied Nuclear Science (T-2) Group at Los Alamos (Briesmeister 1997 
[DIRS 1038971, p. 1-4). MCNP evaluates the secondary gamma radiation in a coupled 
neutrordphoton transport as well as the Bremsstrahlung radiation produced by the electrons 
generated in the photon transport. 
Because of its versatility, MCNP is extensively used in dose rate evaluations for the waste 
packages. MCNP also serves to confirm the validity of the homogenized SNF assemblies used 
in SAS 1 calculations (Section 6.4.1.4) and to determine the effect of source geometry on the 
waste package surface doses. The input specification in the MCNP dose rate calculations 
represents a conservative or equivalent treatment of the system being analyzed. MCNP 
applicability to the dose rate evaluations for the waste packages requires the following code 
features and calculational approaches: 
Separate photon and neutron transport calculations. 
A coupled neutrordphoton transport calculation when capture gamma rays (photons 
created as a result of a neutron being captured by a nucleus) significantly contribute to 
the total dose rate. 
Photon or neutron surface flux tally specification. 
Dose function specification, which consists of flux-to-dose conversion factors provided 
in the MCNP manual (Briesmeister 1997 [DIRS 1038971, pp. H-5 and H-6). These flux- 
to-dose conversion factors are extracted from ANSIJANS-6.1.1-1977 [DIRS 1070161. 
Photon interaction information. 
Available neutron continuous-energy cross-section tables, preferably those for neutron 
interaction cross-sections with elements of the attenuating medium. 
Contents of the source regions homogenized inside region volumes. The commercial 
SNF consists of four source regions: bottom end-fitting, active fuel, plenum, and top end- 
fitting regions. Studies of the effect of source geometry on the waste package surface 
dose rates have shown that the homogenization of the assembly contents and source 
inside the assembly regions gives practically the same waste package surface dose rates 
as does the detailed geometric representation (CRWMS M&O 1998 [DIRS 1021341, pp. 
22 to 26). 
Uniform volume source distribution specifica1:ions in each source region of the 
uncanistered commercial fuel and defense HLW packages. Because the radiation source 
generation method assumes a uniform burnup within the active fuel region, an axial 
pealung factor is used for photon and neutron source intensity in the active fuel region to 
conservatively account for the maximum values of the actual axial source distributions. 
The default implicit neutron and photon capture and cell importance based on the MCNP 
manual recommendations (Briesmeister 1997 [I>IRS 1038971, p. 2-121) as variance 
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reduction techniques. The shielding analysis for the waste packages does not require 
extensive use of variance reduction techniques. 
6.4.1.4 SASl 
SASl is a one-dimensional discrete-ordinates shielding calculation sequence using simplified 
input. SASl is a module of the SCALE computer code system (NRC 1997 [DIRS 1226751) 
consisting of three processes: (1) preparation of the multi-group cross-section information and 
mixing table used for the shielding calculation, (2) execution of a one-dimensional radiation 
transport analysis, and (3) calculation of dose rates outside the waste package. The default 
neutron and photon-to-dose rate conversion factors used in SASl are extracted from 
ANSUANS-6.1.1-1977 [DIRS 1070161. For waste package shielding analyses, SASl provides 
an effective and efficient tool for evaluating the radiation level on and beyond the radial outer 
surface of the waste package. 
SASl represents a waste package as an infinite cylinder with a homogenized fuel region in the 
center, enclosed by the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. The homogenized fuel region 
consists of the waste form, neutron absorber plates, thermal shunts, and other structural 
members. Because the length of a waste package is approximately three times the diameter, the 
infinite cylinder representation of the waste package is assumed (Section 5.4.9) and has been 
shown to yield accurate dose results for the radial direction. SAS 1 can also be used to estimate 
the radiation dose rate in the emplacement drift because the internals of the waste package are 
approximated as an infinite cylinder. 
SASl has been applied in parametric studies to evaluate the effect of shielding materials on the 
waste package and to examine the individual dose rates due to neutrons, gamma rays, and 
capture gamma rays as functions of time for waste forrrls with different initial enrichment and 
burnup characteristics. 
6.4.2 Description of Pertinent Analyses 
Shielding analyses are performed for several waste package designs including: the 21-PWR 
waste package, 44-BWR waste package, and the 5-DHLWIDOE SNF codisposal waste package. 
For all waste package designs, radiation dose rates in the axial and radial directions are 
determined on segments of the waste package surfaces. The results of the shielding calculations 
allow an estimation of the average operation time of welding equipment, radiolysis-induced 
corrosion, and the radiation environment outside the waste packages for personnel access. 
6.4.2.1 21-PWR and 44-BWR Waste Package Analyses 
For the 21-PWR and 44-BWR waste packages, neutrons are present only in the active fuel, but 
photons emit from the active fuel, plenum, top-end-fitting, and bottom-end-fitting regions. 
Shielding calculations for the commercial waste packages must include all sources in order to 
compute the dose rates of the waste packages. Dose rates due to average, design basis, and 
maximum sources are computed. 
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6.4.2.2 5-DHLWLDOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package Analyses 
The 5-DHLWIDOE SNF waste package contains five HLW glass canisters and a central DOE 
SNF canister. The DOE SNF canister holds one of the many DOE-owned waste forms (BSC 
2003 [DIRS 1672731, Table 5). The HLW glass canister from the Savannah River Site is used in 
the shielding analyses because it has the maximum intensity among the HLW glass canisters 
(CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 15 19471, pp. V- 1 to V-7 and pp. VI- 1 to VI-7). 
6.5 CRITICALITY DESIGN 
The purpose of the waste package criticality analyses is to ensure that the waste package designs 
will fulfill their safety and waste isolation functions for nuclear criticality. 
6.5.1 Computational Methods and Tools 
The criticality analysis methodology for the repository is described in two reports. The process 
for analyzing the potential for criticality during preclosure is described in the Preclosure 
Criticality Analysis Process Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1695901). This report describes how 
criticality safety analyses are performed for various configurations of waste in and out of waste 
packages that could occur during preclosure as a result ol' normal operations or event sequences. 
The methodology for analyzing the potential for criticality during postclosure is described in the 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051). This 
report describes how criticality and consequence analyses are performed for various 
configurations of waste in and out of waste packages in the repository during postclosure. The 
preclosure and postclosure methodologies are consistent with the NRC approach of supporting 
risk-informed performance-based regulation as required by 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 1566051. 
Details of the modeling approaches supporting the preclosure and postclosure analyses are 
documented in five model reports: Errata for Isotopic Model Report for Commercial SNF 
Bumup Credit (BSC 2003 [DIRS 168037]), Criticality Model Report (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 165733]), Configuration Generator Model for In-Package Criticality (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 165629]), Geochemistry Model Validation Report: Extemal Accumulation Model 
(BSC 2001 [DIRS 156324]), and Geochemistry Model Vulidation Report: Material Degradation 
and Release Model (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1567901). The first two model reports support preclosure 
and postclosure analyses, whereas the last three reports support only postclosure analyses. 
6.5.2 Description of Pertinent Analyses 
Preclosure criticality analyses were performed for each waste package design configuration (e.g., 
21-PWR Absorber Plate, 44-BWR Absorber Plate, 5-DHLW Codisposal short) during normal 
operations and for event sequences that could lead to a criticality event. Out-of-package 
evaluations for all waste forms and in-package evaluations for DOE SNF and HLW use the most 
reactive fuel state (i.e., fresh fuel assumption with no burnup credit for nonbreeder reactor fuel or 
calculated most reactive state for breeder reactor fuel). In-package evaluations for commercial 
SNF include credit for burnup similar to the postclosure methodology (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 1655051). The design configuration analyses for commercial SNF packages produce 
loading curves (i.e., the minimum burnup) as a function of initial 2 3 5 ~  enrichment, at which 
assemblies may be loaded in a given waste package design configuration, and still keep the 
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effective neutron,multiplication factor (hff) below the administrative safety limit. These analyses 
incorporate the methodology of Errata for Isotopic Model Report for Commercial SNF Bumup 
Credit (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1680371) and Criticality Model Report (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1657331). 
The design configuration analyses for DOE SNF and HLW waste packages verify that the waste 
package hff remains below the administrative safety limit during normal operations. The event 
sequences analyses verify that the waste package hff remains below the administrative safety 
limit during credible event sequences. 
Postclosure criticality analyses are also performed for each waste package design configuration. 
These analyses evaluate the combined system of waste form, waste package, engineered barrier, 
and repository for effectiveness in limiting the potential for criticality, the consequences of 
criticality, and the affect of any consequences on the regulatory performance objectives of the 
repository (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051, Abstract). Analyses are performed for waste packages in 
a variety of hypothetical conditions ranging from geometrically intact through various stages of 
degradation of the package and contents (e.g., basket intact but fuel degraded or basket and fuel 
degraded). The analyses of degraded conditions rely on information from all the model reports 
described in Section 6.5.1. In addition to various stages of degradation, conditions such as 
partial or full flooding and partial or full reflection by tuff and water are considered. 
Furthermore, the effects of seismic rockfall and volcanic disruptive events are considered. 
Because the events and conditions that may occur cannot be predicted, the determination of 
possible criticality scenarios, analyses of those scenarios, and the resulting consequences are 
evaluated using a risk-infomed, performance-based methodology (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051). 
The references listed in Section 6.5.1 provide technical details of the criticality analyses. 
7. SUMMARY 
No developed data were created in this report. This report describes the methodology used to 
design waste packages, emplacement pallets, and drip shields; however, it does not make 
recommendations regarding the final design of waste packages or the repository. The accounting 
of uncertainties in the methodology falls into one of two categories. For most, parameters are 
selected that produce net conservative results. These require no additional treatment. For a few, 
comparison against benchmarks, either experimental or high-order computational methods, must 
be performed. Comparisons against benchmarks are to'be addressed in later revisions of this 
document. Because this is a design methodology, subsequent use is restricted only to the extent 
that such use would invalidate the theory underlying the particular application. 
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